Metaontology by Tarver, Mark
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications   
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/133950 
 
 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
M E T A O N T O L O G Y
Mark Tarver, B.A., B.Phil.
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Submitted to the University of Warwick
Research conducted in the Department of Philosophy
Month of Submission: August 1985
INDEX
Title Page 
Index
Acknowledgements
Declaration
Glossary of Symbols used
Introduction
Summary
Chapter 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Chapter 2
Ontological Commitment.
The Logic of Ontological Commitment.
1.11 A Conventional Definition of 'theory'.
1.12 Referentiality, Extensionality and Ontological 
Commitment.
1.13 The Conditions of Ontological Commitment. 
Calculi of Ontological Commitment.
1.21 Calculi which lack the Paradoxes of 
Ontological Commitment.
1.22 Other Solutions.
Criteria of Ontological Commitment.
1.31 Quine's Criteria.
1.32 Some other suggestions.
Formalisation: an initial survey.
Ontology in the Formal Tradition.
2 .1 The Tradition Itself.
2.2 Russell and the Logical Atomists. 
Carnap.
Goodman.
2.3
2.4
2.5 Quine.
2.6 Davidson
2.7 Summary.
Chapter 3 Model Worlds and Formal Frameworks.
3.1 On Justification in General.
3.2 The Elements of a New Metaontology.
3.21 A Fragment of a Formal Framework.
3.3 Problems and Tentative Theories.
Chapter 4 Making Sense: how to construct a formal language.
What this is about.
E - variables.
First Epistemological Interlude: the Doctrine of the 
Mind's Eye.
Individuating Relations: the refutation of Idealism. 
The Introduction of non - P variables.
The Second Epistemological Interlude: the Problem 
of Epistemic Access.
The Introduction of non - E variables.
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Appendix I No Entity without Identity.
Appendix II Substitutional Quantification and Ontology.
Chapter 5 Ontological Elasticity.
5-1 The Analysis of Ontological Elasticity.
.5.2 Ontological Elasticity and Philosophical Taxonomy.
5.3 Ontological Elasticity and Existence.
5.4 Ontological Elasticity and Truth.
Chapter 6 Ontological Reductions.
6.1 Recursive Reduction.
6.2 Reduction by Logic Shift.
6.3 Reduction by Limitation of the Target Language.
6.4 Identity Reduction.
6.5 Quine on Ontological Reduction.
Appendix III Russell's Recursive Reduction of Instants of Time.
Chapter 7 Logics and Ontology.
7.1 Preliminary Remarks.
7.2 What a Logic is.
7.3 Applications of Logics: Readings.
7.4 Applications of Logics: Depraved Semantics.
7.5 Monism, Pluralism, Instrumentalism.
7.6 The Case for Monism.
Bibliography
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is difficult to gauge how one's work or life would have transpired but for the 
existence of those one knows. But of the following, I am conscious that their 
presence in my life has created the conditions under which this work has been 
made possible.
My acknowledgements go to Professor Susan Haack, whose clarity of thought 
and criticism were a constant spur to improve the quality of this work. 
Students of Philosophy of Logics will recognise some of the themes repeated in 
this thesis. David Holdcroft, who supervised me for much of the first year of 
my doctorate, deserves recognition for his understanding and encouragement 
when little progress was being made.
A source of valuable information, freely given, was Dr. J.E. Tiles and his wife 
Mary, upon whom I relied heavily in my final year whilst working at home 
without a grant or direct access to research facilities. Without their cheerful 
readiness to answer arcane questions on mathematical logic and philosophy 
over long distance calls, the difficulty of completing this work would have 
been greatly increased. Similar help as provided by members of Hautlieu 
Science Department who funded material on the history of science.
Also to be included is Dr. Jennifer Hornsby of Corpus Christi, Oxford, who 
first taught me philosophical logic, and who defended me when my cause 
seemed lost. Mrs. Fleming-Boyd, the only non-philosopher so far mentioned, 
was my light in the dark night of the soul from which many never return.
I record the financial support of Warwick University, my parents, and the 
people of Jersey. They have been willing to put up money for something they 
did not understand or had yet to see.
Great credit should be extended to Rowan Heaney who produced an 
immaculate typescript through many hours of painstaking work. It is a
v
measure of the magnitude of the task of typing that the work was refused by a 
professional agency.
Lastly, I have a debt shared by every member of the living philosophical 
tradition: to the great figures of philosophy on whose shoulders I stood to see 
a little further.
Mark Tarver 
Christmas Eve 
1984
vi
DECLARATION
No part of this thesis has been submitted for official examination. I declare 
that to the best of my knowledge all uncited material in this thesis is original.
M. Tarver
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED
The following symbols and abbreviations appear within the text; their order of 
presentation approximates to their order of appearance. In those cases where 
one symbol has been given more than one meaning, I have noted the 
homography.
EX
3
&
v
(3x)
(x)
ffx)
Olx)
O
❖
oc
oc
B
function taking a sign to its extension
if....then....; (or more properly, materially implies)
not
and
and/or (non exclusive disjunction)
if and only if; (or more properly, the sign for material
equivalence)
is identical to
existential quantifier; meaning 'For some ...' 
universal quantifier; meaning *For all ...' 
substitutional existential quantifier; meaning 'For at 
least one substitution for V  in the following..., the 
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tautological inference; rule invoked when any piece of 
reasoning proceeds by the propositional calculus 
hypothesis; the premiss of a formal argument 
conditional proof: a rule of inference that enables the 
conclusion Ah BO C to be drawn from A,B h C 
O introduction: a rule of inference that derives OA from 
h A
= introduction: a rule of inference that allows the 
introduction of a = a at any stage in a formal argument 
substitution rule: a rule of inference that allows the 
replacement of a by b throughout any formula as long as 
a = b and a is not in the scope of a modal operator 
O substitution rule: a rule of inference that allows the 
replacement of a by b throughout any formula as long as 
O a = b
universal elimination; a rule of inference that allows 
any closed term to replace a universally quantified 
variable
universal introduction: a rule of inference that allows 
for the inference |-Fa therefore (x)Fx 
existential generalisation: a rule of inference that 
allows for the inference Fa therefore (3x) Fx
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braces for a set abstract: £x:fox J is the set of all foxes,
2,4,6^ is the set containing just the elements 2,4,6
the Greek letter epsilon; meaning 'is a member of'
is a subset of
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the union of
braces indicating an ordered n-tuple
has exactly as many members as
the empty set, or £x: -x = xj
is a proper subset of
function taking a set to its powerset
function taking a set to its cardinal number
the set of natural numbers
aleph zero: the cardinal number of the set of natural 
numbers or^N 
cardinal addition
(i) function taking a set to the set of its factors
(ii) sign for a formal framework
function for taking a set to the set of its ultimate 
factors
/
quasi-quotes
concatenation
(i) is a mereological proper part of
(ii) is before
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in AP'i_ A meaning 'the formula A is deducible from the 
set A of wffs, according to the logic/theory L'. In fF’i_ A' 
meaning 'A is a theorem of L'
in 'J }= A' meaning \] is a model of A'. In ' f=A' meaning 
'A is logically valid'
in 'Afc— S' meaning 'S is depravedly deducible from the setA.
In r£— S', meaning 'S is a depraved theorem'
in 'i|£= S' meaning '(Jr is a depraved model of S'. In '£=S'
meaning 'S is depravedly valid'
the inverse of the (1 - 1 ) function t
is wholly before
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INTRODUCTION
The Ontological Question 'What exists?' dates back over two thousand five 
hundred years to the dawn of Western philosophy, and attempts to answer it 
define the province of ontology. The history of the Western philosophical 
tradition itself has been one of the differentiation and separation of the 
various sciences from the primordial stuff of ancient philosophy. Physics was 
first to break away from the tutelage of philosophy and established its 
independence in the seventeenth century. The other sciences followed suit 
fairly rapidly, with perhaps psychology being the last to separate.
The results for modern philosophy - of this breakup of what was once a great 
empire over human reason - have been mixed. An inevitable result has been 
that questions considered in ancient times to belong to philosophy have fallen 
within the ambit of other disciplines. So speculations about the material 
composition and genesis of the universe that interested Thales, Heraclitus and 
Leucippus, are continued by contemporary cosmologists in well equipped 
research laboratories, and not by philosophers. However ontology, unlike 
cosmology, has not broken away from its parent discipline and the Ontological 
Question as to what exists is still argued by philosophers today.
That ontology has failed to make the separation that cosmology has, is a 
reflection on the weakness of the methodology for settling ontological 
arguments. Unlike their great Rationalist predecessors, most modern 
philosophers do not believe that logic alone is sufficient to provide an answer 
as to what is. But neither do observation or experiment, in any direct way, 
seem to help us in deciding, for example, whether sets or intentions should be 
admitted to exist or not. In consequence, the status of ontology as an area of 
serious study has to depend on the devising of a methodology within which the 
Ontological Question can be tackled. The pursuit of such a methodology is the 
concern of metaontology and is also the concern of this thesis.
The determination of good answers to fundamental questions in ontology 
depends in part on the state of art in the empirical sciences. Ontology is 
therefore an empirical discipline itself, albeit a high-level one. Metaontology, 
though open to and influenced by ideas developed in science, becomes heavily 
involved in areas central to the interests of modern philosophers. What gives a 
sign meaning? What is existence? What is truth or logic? These are all 
questions relevant to metaontology. One advantage of pursuing these 
questions within metaontology is that the change in context can lead to 
insights that were denied in pursuing the same questions along conventional 
lines. Consequently much of what follows will hopefully be of interest even to 
philosophers whose main interests are not in ontology.
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: deals with the logical properties of ontological commitment. 
The conditions of ontological commitment and the relations between the 
ontological commitments of a person and the theories he believes are 
examined within a series of formal logics, (sections 1.1 - 1.2). Second part 
deals with the criteria of ontological commitment (section 1.3). Chapter ends 
with a brief look at formalisation (section 1.4).
Chapter 2: is an historical examination of the formal tradition in ontology 
through the work of Russell, Carnap, Goodman, Quine and Davidson.
Chapter 3: is a six-point exegesis of an original methodology for tackling 
ontological questions. The central idea is that formalisation is a means of 
testing ontological hypotheses rather than developing them. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of problems arising from this methodology and 
some reflections on falsificationism as a scientific methodology.
Chapter 4; is concerned with the conditions under which a sign acquires 
sense. The focus is on the problem of constructing feasible first-order 
languages and the discussion ranges over certain epistemological problems 
relevant to ontology.
Appendix I; examines the role and proper form of a criterion of identity.
Appendix II: examines the ontological consequences and limitations of 
accepting substitutional quantification.
Chapter 5; examines the repercussions of accepting that many theories do 
not define their domain of discourse (ontological elasticity). Ontological 
elasticity is shown to be definable neither proof-theoretically nor model- 
theoretically. The chapter argues that accepting ontological elasticity 
requires a radical evaluation of traditional accounts of logic, existence, truth 
and categories of being.
Chapter 6: reviews certain species of ontological reduction. The chapter 
ends with a critical review of Quine's throughts on ontological reduction.
Appendix III: an illustrative example of reduction through Russell's attempt to 
eliminate unreduced instants of time.
Chapter 7: examines the nature of logics and their relations to ontology and 
natural languages. Three different views on logic are distinguished as to 
whether there is a 'correct' logic; and the chapter concludes with a discussion 
on the tenability of these positions.
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CHAPTER ONE
Ontological Commitment
1.1 The Logical Properties of Ontological Commitment
Ontological commitment is a feature of both theories and people who hold 
theories. The ontological commitments of a theory are completely 
independent of whoever happens to believe (or disbelieve) that theory. The 
ontological commitments of a person are completely determined by the 
theories he happens to believe.
Most philosophers would accept the foregoing statements as true: but they do 
invite a number of questions. To be specific:-
(1) What is meant by the use of 'theory'?
(2) Is ontological commitment a relation between a theory/person and 
something else, or not? If it is, what are the relata?
(3) What is it for a theory to be ontologically committed to the existence of 
an entity or sort of entity?
(4) What is it for a person to be ontologically committed to the existence of 
an entity or kind of entity?
Before proceeding to examine these questions, a word of caution. Like many 
terms of art in philosophy, the phrase 'ontological commitment' is bounded by 
uncertainty in meaning. It is therefore unwise to assume that each of the 
above questions must have one determinately correct answer waiting to be 
paired off with it. Answers are sometimes recommended by pragmatic 
considerations such as clarity or simplicity of usage and amount almost to 
prescriptions or conventions for sharpening up our analytical tools. In other 
areas, intuition and common usage have more to say. Effective analysis often 
requires a judicious balance of prescription and description - so it is here.
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1.11 A Conventional Definition of 'Theory'
In ordinary speech a theory is held to be a collection of generalisations,
deductively linked, concerned with explaining some pattern of phenomona.
This is an undeniably vague definition; but then 'theory' is a vague word.
Nothing is lost, and much is gained in the way of clarity, if the convention is
adopted that 'theory' is to be taken to apply to any non-empty set of
declarative sentences, or to a declarative sentence itself? I should say that
'theory' as used in this stipulative sense, differs in use from the mathematical
logicians' use of 'theory' to mean merely a set of wffs. Such sets of
«
uninterpreted wffs I call uninterpreted theories, or following Quine [113], 
theory forms. Theory forms, like fake diamonds, are not to be confused with 
the real article.
1,12 Referentiality, Extensionality and Ontological Commitment
Conventional wisdom holds that the correct answer to the second question of 
the preceding page (Is ontological commitment a relation between a 
theory/person and something else, or not?') is 'not'. The consensus is that 
ontological commitment is both an intentional and intensional concept; a view 
which is really a comment on the logical grammar of 'ontological 
commitment'. A few preliminary definitions are in order.
Let EX be 1 - place function which takes as arguments either (a) denoting 
terms, (b) function expressions, (c) predicates, (d) declarative sentences. Let<t> 
be any argument to EX, then EX(O) is defined as followss-
EX (0 ) = the denotation of 0, if 0 is a term.
EX(<t>) = the function 0  denotes, if <t> is a function expression.
EX(<t>) = the set of all those things of which 0  is true, if 0  is a predicate.
2
EX(<t>) = 1 if <t> is a true declarative sentence.
EX(<t>) = 0 if <t> is a false declarative sentence.
A segment of a declarative sentence S is any sequence of signs that obtain
concurrently in 5, (thus any declarative sentence is a segment of itself). S is
extensional iff for every segment 6 of S which is an argument to EX, given
EX(5) = EX(?) and S’ is the result of replacing one or more occurrences of 6 in
S by C, then S =  S'. S is intensional iff S is not extensional.
'Intentional' (apart from confusing with 'intensional') is so battered a coin of
2
philosophical currency that I shall not use it. Here in its place, is a newly 
minted word, 'referential'. I say that a declarative sentence S is referential 
just when:-
(1) S contains a denoting term.
(2) S contains no non-denoting term.
S is antireferential when (2) is not satisfied; and non-referentiaf when (1) 
and/or (2) is not satisfied.
The claim that ontological commitment is intensional is conveniently equated 
with the claim that for the following sentence - frame:- >
x is ontologically committed to y;
there are substitutions of definite singular terms for 'x' and 'y' which create 
intensional substitution instances. The claim that ontological commitment is 
intentional and is therefore not a relation is here treated as the claim that 
'ontological commitment' is antireferential; that is, there is at least one 
substitution instance of the above sentence - frame which is (a) true (b) 
antireferential (c) substitutes a denoting term for 'x'.
3
Illustrative instances are not hard to find. Thus, the following sentence is 
true.
'Centaurs exist' is ontologically committed to centaurs.
But although EX 'centaurs' = EX 'unicorns', the following is not true.
'Centaurs exist' is ontologically committed to unicorns.
Again although 'Pegasus' is a non-denoting term, but "Pegasus exists" is not,
%
the following is true.
'Pegasus exists' is ontologically committed to Pegasus.
These two examples prove that 'ontological commitment' is definitely both 
intensional and antireferential. However the force of these conclusions can be 
blunted by what I call Frege's option.
Frege's option was used by Frege [47] to explain the failure of salva veritate in 
intensional sentences. His explanation of this failure was that expressions 
placed in intensional contexts did not refer to their usual extension, but 
instead referred to their sense. It is possible to insist that this is what happens 
to substituends for 'x' and 'y' in the sentence - frame above. The argument 
then develops that ontological commitment is really a relation after alls a 
relation between the entity referred to by the substitution for 'x' and the 
indirect referent of the substitution for 'y'.
Any philosopher who opts for Frege's option acquires an obligation to explain 
what he takes to be the indirect reference of substitutions for 'y'. There are 
various ways of discharging this obligation. Here I will consider four. Each of 
them is unsuccessful for one or more of the following reasons.
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(a) The entities appealed to as direct referents are ontologically dubious in 
that they have neither adequate identity conditions, nor is their 
existence certain.
(b) Absurdities ensue.
(c) The suggestion is contrived, or raises anomalies that abandoning Frege's 
option would avoid.
By far the easiest course is to accept that the intensionality and anti- 
referentiality of 'ontological commitment' shows that ontological commitment 
is not a relation.
«
The First Suggestion; construe the indirect referent as a possible entity 
This is what Jubien [71] [72] does. Thus 'Pegasus' in "Pegasus exists' is 
ontologically committed to Pegasus' would denote a possible winged horse. 
Criticism (a) applies here.
The Second Suggestion: construe the indirect referent as a universal 
The idea is to see "Centaurs exist.' is ontologically committed to centaurs' and 
"Pegasus exists' is ontologically committed to Pegasus' as announcing a 
relation between "Centaurs exist.' and xCcentaur x) and 'Pegasus exists' and
k (x = Pegasus) respectively. Again criticism (a) applies. (Necessary
\
coinstantiation is not a good basis for the identity of universals. The 
universals ¿(greatest prime x) and x(3-sided quadrilateral x) are assumed 
distinct even though they are necessarily coinstantiated.)
The Third Suggestion: construe the indirect referent as a set.
This will not do because of (b). According to this suggestion; the following 
sentence:-
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'Centaurs exist.' is ontologically committed to centaurs
announces a relation R between 'Centaurs exist.' and£x: centaur xj. However 
if R ('Centaurs exist.', [x: centaur x|); then given £x: centaur x|=|x: unicorn x j  
it follows that R ('centaurs exist; £x: unicorn x } ). According to the third 
suggestion this is what is stated by:-
'Centaurs exist.' is ontologically committed to unicorns
which is false: therefore so is this suggestion.4
«
The Fourth Suggestion: construe the indirect referent as an open sentence.
A sentence like "Centaurs exist.' is ontologically committed to centaurs' is 
thought of as announcing a relation of R between 'Centaurs exist.' and 'centaur 
x'. Here, R ('Centaurs exist.' 'centaur x') iff it follows from 'Centaurs exist.' 
being true that there is at least one thing that satisfies the open sentence. 
This suggestion fits in with the intensional properties of ontological 
commitment since if it follows from the truth of S that 'centaur x' is satisfied, 
it need not follow from S that 'unicorn x' is satisfied. The suggestion is weak 
principally because it appears contrived and has anomalies of its own. For 
instance, there are an infinity of appropriate open sentences to choose as 
denotata ('centaur 'centaur X2'...) and to argue for one as the denotata 
above the rest seems impossible. Perhaps the suggestion is really a convention 
for eliminating the embarrassingly antireferential nature of ontological 
commitment: in which case the appropriate open sentence can be arbitrarily 
selected from the appropriate range. But anomalies still arise which 
undermine the value of this convention. If claims about ontological 
commitment are really encapsulations about relations between sentences and 
open sentences of the home language, then translation in the ordinary sense
6
becomes impossible. Thus "Chairs exist.' is ontologically committed to chairs' 
announces a relation between 'Chairs exist.' and (say) 'chair x'. Translated into 
French "Chairs exist.' is ontologically committed to chairs' becomes "Chairs 
exist.' est compromettre la existence des chaises' which (according to theory) 
announces a relation between a French open sentence and an English sentence; 
a claim that is not equivalent to the English version?
1.1.3 The conditions of ontological commitment
When is a theory t ontologically committed to an entity a/sort K? One answer 
is: t is so committed iff it is impossible that t is true but a/Ks does/do not 
exist. Using the accepted equivalence 0 (p  & -q )=  O (pO q) 
this answer is equivalent to:-
A theory t is ontologically committed to an entity a/sort K iff it is necessary 
that if t is true then a/ks exist.
Formalising this answer is not easy. Writing 'oc' as short for 'is ontologically 
committed to', first-order modal logic suggests 
(xXt) (t oc x s  O (true t3 (3 y )  x = y)
(k)(t) (t oc k =  O (true t o (3 x )  kx)
But this will not do.
If ontological commitment is genuinely antireferential, then it is illegitimate 
to employ cbjectual quantifiers binding variables where nondenoting terms 
may stand. For instance *it is legitimate to argue:-
'Pegasus exists' is ontologically committed to Pegasus 
(3 x) x is ontologically committed to Pegasus;
but not to argue
7
’Pegasus exists' is ontologically committed to Pegasus
(3x) 'Pegasus exists' is ontologically committed to x.
In the latter case, there is no value for 'x' for which the conclusion is true. 
Substitutional quantification is one way of escaping this difficulty. Following 
Kripke [74] I write the universal substitutional quantifier as 'IT and the 
existential substitutional quantifier as '£ '. With substitutional quantification, 
as with objectual quantification, a quantified sentence has a truth-value only 
when the bound variables are allocated a range. In the case of the objectual 
quantifier, the range is some non-empty set. For a substitutional quantifier 
the range is some non-empty substitution set of meaningful signs. Let this 
substitution set be S: then the truth-conditions for substitutional quantifiers 
are given as follows:-
'(3x)Fx' is true iff there is some s e S and 'Fs' is true 
'(Vx)Fx' is true iff for any s c S, 'Fs' is true.
In order to formalise the previous definition of ontological commitment, 
many-sorted substitutional quantification is required. Let S j = the set of 
terms denoting theories; let = the set of general nouns and Sx = the set of 
definite singular terms. S j is the substitution set for variables 'T, Ti, T2» 
T3,...'; Sk  is the substitution set for variables 'K, Ki, K2, K3... /  and Sx is the 
substitution set for variables 'X, X i, X2, X3, ....’ Formalised substitutionally 
the definition of ontological commitment becomes:-
(HTXIIK) T o c K H O  (true T =5 (3 x) Kx)
(IITXITX) T o c X f O  (true T => (3x) X  = x)
Read quasi-informally, these formulae amount to the following.
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'For any substitution of a theory-denoting term for the letter 'T', and for any 
substitution of a general noun for the letter 'K' in the formula 'T oc K = O 
(true Td (3 x) Kx)', the resulting substitution instance is true'
'For any substitution of a theory-denoting term for the letter 'T', and for any 
substitution of a definite singular term for the letter 'X' in the formula 'T oc X 
S O (True T o  (3x)x =X)', the resulting substitution instance is true.'
The revised formalisation does deal neatly with the problem of anti- 
referentiality: but it runs into two problems of its own.
First, the formalisation mixes substitutional and objectual quantifiers. This is 
a course frought with peril for the unwary. For example, the formula 
'(IIF)((3x) Fx)' is a significant one: it reads 'Any substitution instance of 
•Gx) Fx' is true'. Reverse the order of the quantifiers and we get '( 3 x)((IIF) 
Fx)'; and this is nonsense. Read directly, it reads 'For some x, any substitution 
of Vx' is true. The first occurrence of 'x' fails to bind the second because the 
second occurrence is part of the quotational name of a formula. (On a similar 
topic see Quine [117]). Consequently it is always wrong to interpose a 
substitutional quantifier between an objectual quantifier and the variables that 
the objectual quantifier is intended to bind.
This restriction raises a lot of difficulties concerning the inference patterns of
k
logics which employ mixed quantification. For instance in second-order logic 
'(3 x)((3F) Fx)' ('There is something which has some property') is equivalent to 
'£3F)((3x) Fx)' ('There is some property which something has'). But in a mixed 
quantificational logic '(3x)((lF ) Fx)' and '(ZFX(3x) Fx)' cannot be treated as 
equivalent since one formula breaks the rule of interposition and the other 
does not. Since there is no current research, to my knowledge, into the 
limitations of mixed quantification, the practice of mixing quantifiers is best 
left alone.
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In deporting existential objectual quantification from our formalisation, the 
need is created for a replacement. Let 'E' be a sentence-forming operator on 
names of predicates or names of definite singular terms. Where K is any 
predicate, 'EK' is to be read 'there is one thing that satisfies K'. Where X is 
any definite singular term, 'EX' is to be read 'there is something X denotes'. 
The quantifier '3  ' can then be conveniently dispensed with, and the new 
formalisation of ontological commitment reads as follows.
(nT)(TIK) T ocK h O (true T 15 EK)
(irr)CHX) T oc X = 0  (true T D EX)
%
This device does not, however, serve to avoid the next problem which is rather 
better known than the problem of mixed quantification: this is the problem of 
quantifying into modal contexts (see Quine [117] again for the classic 
statement of this problem).
Let two pieces of paper be dropped in an urn. One is inscribed 'Unicorns exist', 
the other 'Unicorns do not exist'. One piece is drawn at random from the urn; 
it is inscribed 'Unicorns exist'. Thus we have the identity "Unicorns exist' = 
the theory drawn from the urn'. From the formula, '(IITXIIK) T oc K 2 .0  (true 
T Z> EK)', it can be inferred that:
the theory drawn from the urn oc unicorns
S O  (true (the theory drawn from the urn) 3  E unicorns)
Plainly 'Unicorns exist' oc unicorns and since 'Unicorns exist' = the theory 
drawn from the urn, then the theory drawn from the urn oc unicorns. It then 
follows that:-
O (true (the theory drawn from the urn)3E unicorns)
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But is this final sentence true? Some philosophers (qv. Smullyan [134], Hughes 
and Cresswell [69]) would say it was). The theory selected from the urn is 
'Unicorns exist' and it is necessary that if that theory is true then unicorns 
exist. But some philosophers, like Quine, who have more conventionalistic 
tendencies, might disagree. It is a matter of contingent fact, some might 
argue, that the theory drawn from the urn is 'Unicorns exist'. It does not 
follow merely from the truth of the theory drawn from the urn that unicorns 
exist, unless one adds the contingent identity claim that 'Unicorns exist' = the 
theory drawn from the urn.
One way of cutting through this wrangle is to reformulate, once again, the 
definitions of ontological commitment, as follows:-
(IITXIIK) T o c K  = ((XTi) Ti = T & O (true Ti D EK));
(IITXnX) T oc X = ((XTi) Ti = T & O (true T i D EX));
The topmost formula, roughly translated, reads:-
'For any substitution of a theory-denoting term for 'T' and for any substitution
!/
of a general noun for 'K' in the following formula:- 'T oc K = for some 
substitution of 'T i' in 'Ti = T & O (true T^O EK)', the result is true' 
the result is true.' ,
Applied to the urn case, what is finally derived is not 'O (true (the theory 
drawn from the urn) 3  E^nicorns1)'but:-
fieri) Ti = the theory drawn from the urn &. O (true T iO  E’unicorns).
This formula reads as:-
11
'For some substitution of 'Tj/ in:- 'T]_ = the theory drawn from the urn & O 
(true T iO  E unicorns)', the resulting substitution-instance is true.'
This is in fact the case, since "Unicorns exist" is such a substitution.
1.2 Calculi of Ontological Commitment
The analysis of the concept of ontological commitment proceeds one stage
further with the construction of calculi whose sole purpose is to exhibit the
«
logic of ontological commitment. The calculi that will be examined are all 
extentions of a single calculus Q shortly presented. Q is a substitutional modal 
calculus with many-sorted variables with an enriched vocabulary including 
'true' 'false' and 'E'. The exotic nature of Q is simply a reflection of the 
minimum apparatus needed to deal with the intensional and antireferential 'oc' 
and the intensional 'O'.
The Calculus Q
The Alphabet of Q: consists of (i) four kinds of individual constant; t j, t2, t j ,
t 4 , ....... . ki, k2, k3, k4, ....; ai, a2, a3, .......... p i, p2, P3, P4, ....... ; (ii) four
kinds of variable; T i, T2, T3, T4, ...... ; K i, K2, K3, K4, ........; X j, X2, X3,
X4, .......... ; P i, P2f P jf P4>.......... . (iii) the substitutional quantifiers 'IT and ' ! '
(iv) the logical constants; -, v, =, O, O, B, oc, oc, true, false, (,), =, E.
Rules of Formation for Q
An atomic formula of Q is any of the following (nothing else is an. atomic 
formula of Q). For any i, j > 1 where i and j are whole numbers (i) Bpjtj (ii) 
tjoc kj (iii) tjoe kj (iv) pjoc kj (v) pjoc kj (vi) t\ = tj (vii) p\ = pj (viii) true tj (ix)
false tj (x) Elq (xi) Eaj (xii) kiaj.
Any atomic formula is a wff of Q. Let w  ^ and W2 be wffs of Q: -w^ is a wff 
of Q, (w]_ v W2) is a wff of Q, (w  ^ & W2) is a wff of Q, (wi W2) is a wff of Q, 
(wi W2) is a wff of Q, wi is a wff of Q, O wj is a wff of Q.
Let c be any individual constant and let v be any variable of Q: v and c are of 
the same type iff (0 if c = tj then v = Tj (ii) if c = kj then v = Kj (iii) if c = 
ajthen v = Xj (iv) if c = p\ then v = Pj.
If Fc is any wff of Q containing n (n > 1) occurrences of c, then (ITv) Fv
and (Iv) Fv are wffs of Q where Fv results from Fc by the replacement of m (1
< m < n) occurrences of c in Fc by v and v is not bound in Fc and v and c are of
*
the same sort.
Nothing else is a wff of Q.
Informal Reading of Q
Although Q can be studied as a formal system, its point and philosophical 
interest derive from the way its symbols are read. The informal readings of 
the symbols of Q are as follows.
Alphabet Reading
t j, t2> t3, t4, .....  theory-denoting terms
ki, k2, k3, k4, .....  general nouns
aj_, a2> a3» a4>.....  definite singular terms
Pi» P2> P3> P4>.....  person-denoting terms
Z. ’There is some true substitution for'
TT 'Any substitution for ... is a true
substitution for'
T i, T2, T3, T4, .....  substitutionally bound variables whose
substitution set is t i, t2, t3, t4, ...
K l, K2» K3, K4, .....  substitutionally bound variables whose
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Pi» P2» P3> p4>
A i, A2, A3, A4,
v
&
D
O
B
oc
oc
E
true
false
substitution set is k]_, k2, k3, k4, ... 
substitutionally bound variables whose 
substitution set is pi, P2, P3, P4» ••• 
substitutionally bound variables whose 
substitution set is aj, a2, 83, 84, . . .  
not
and/or
and
If then 
if and only if
«
It is necessary that 
It is possible that
.....believes .... to be true
..... is ontologically committed to ...
......  is committed to the non-existence
of ...
operator on mentioned predicates and
singular terms showing they are
satisfied or denote
true
false
Axioms of Q: any substitution instance of the following axiom schemata is an 
axiom of Q.
A l. OwJ=-^- wi 
A2. Ow^Dwi
A3. 0(w i0 w2 )3 (0  wiDO W2)
A4. true tj v false tj 
A5. - (true tj & false tj)
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Rules of Derivation in Q: X— *Y is to be read as 'From X derive Y'
OI (O Introduction): 
Taut (Tautology):
CP (Conditional Proof):
=1 (= Introduction): 
Sub (Substitution):
O Sub (O Substitution):
Where v and c is a variable and 
UE (Universal Elimination):
EG (Existential Generalisation) 
UI (Universal Introduction):
EE (Existential Elimination):
I- v/\—
Where A is any set of wf f s of Q;
A.A tautologically implies w i—>wi«
In particular where A = A ,
------>wj directly.
A , w j h w j— »A h w j3 w2- 
In particular where A =A ,
— >w ^3 W2 directly.
Where c is any individual constant,
%
— ► c = c directly.
Where Cj and cj are individual constants 
and Fc ., is any wff containing Cj; Fc .,
Cj= Cj—-^*FCj, where *FCj is the result 
of replacing cj in Fc . by cj whenever cj 
is not in the scope of a modal operator. 
FCj, O (cj = cj)—>FC., where Fc . is the 
result of replacing one or more 
occurences of cj in Fc . by Cj. 
a constant of the same sort:- 
(IIv) Fv —*FC 
Fc —*C£v) Fv 
h Fc —* (ITv) Fv
Where c does not occur in any element 
of A or in w j:-
A, Fc F w j- ^A F CLv) Fv D w^
The calculi examined are tagged with decimal numbers according to their 
deductive strengths: higher numbers indicate stronger systems.
The Calculus of Ql: results from adding to Q, two axiom schemata, A6 and
A7.
A6 (nTiXnKjXTjOc Kj = (31Tk)(T|< = Tj & O (true TkO  EKj)
A6 (IITiXlIKjXTi55 Kj = (£TkXT|< = T5 & O (true Tk3  - EKj)
A6 is the definition of ontological commitment offered earlier and the 
rationale of A7 is obvious given the reading of 'oc'. Some important theorems 
of Ql are:-
• ■
Theorem 1 Kq i  (nT]XnK])(Tioc Ki & true T i)3  EKi
1. t jo c  ki & true ti Hyp
2. tioc 1, Taut
3. t^oc kx3  (ZT2XT2 = t i  & 0  (true T2 3  EKi) A6, Taut, UE
4. (IT 2)T2 = t i & 0  (true T2 3  Eki) 2,3 Taut
5. t2 = t i & O (true t2^  Eki) Hyp
6. O (true t2 D Eki) 5 Taut
7. true t2 D Eki 6, A2 Taut
8. true t i 1 Taut
9. t2 = t i 5 Taut
10. true t2 8,9 Sub
11. Eki 7,10 Taut
12. ((I T2)T2 = t i  & O (true T2 D  EkX)) Eki 4,5,11 EE
13. Eki 4,12 Taut
14. (tioc ki & true ti )D  Eki 1,13 CP
15. (IITiXnKiXTloc Ki & true T i)D  EKi 14 UI
Theorem 2 Fq i  (IITiXlIKiXT]oc Ki & true T i)3  - EKi
As theorem 1 using A7 instead of A6.
Theorem 3 Hq i  (nTi)(lIK]XTioc Kl & T joc Ki)D false Ti
1. tjoc  l<i S c tide ki Hyp
2. (t]oc ki & true t i )D  Eki Theorem 1, UE
3. (tioc ki S c true t i )D - Eki Theorem 2, UE
4. - ((t]oc kj & true t i ) & (tioc 'k i & true t j  )) 2,3 Taut
5. - true ti 1,4 Taut
6. true t i v false ti A4
7. false ti 5,6 Taut
8. (tioc ki S c ti5c k\ )D  false ti 1,7 CP
9. (nTiXnKiXTioc Ki & Tioc K i)D  false Ti 8 UI
Theorems 4 to 7 each depend on the Paradoxes of Strict Implication:
1. w i3  (w2 D w i) Taut
2. 0 ( w iD (w2 D w i)) 1, 01
3. O w p O  (w2 D w i) 2, A3
1. - w iD  (wi D w2) Taut
2. 0(-w i O  (wi D W2)) 1, OI
3. 0 - w iD 0 ( w jD w2) 2, A3
We admit the Paradoxes as Derived Rules.
DR1 O wi D  O (w2 O  wi)
DR2 O - W]_ O  O (wi D W2)
Theorem 4 F-'q i  (IITiXnKi)O (E K i)3 T joc Ki
Hyp 
= I
1. O Eki
2. t i = t i
3. O (true t j p  Ekj.) 1, DR 1
4. t i  = t i  & O (true txO  Eki) 2,3 Taut
5. (XTx) Ti = t i  & 0  (true TxO Ekx) 4 EG
6. ((ZTx) Tx = t & O (true T x^  Ekx))3 txoc kx A6, UE, Taut
7. txoc kx 5,6 Taut
8. O EkxO txoc kx 1,8 CP
9. (IITxXlIKxXO (EKx) OTxoc Kx 8 UI
Theorem 5 F q i  (IITiXnKiXO - EKi)l> Tioc Ki
As theorem 4 using A7 instead of A6.
Theorem 6 f- q i  (ÌtTxXlIKxXO false T i)D T ioc  Ki
1. 0  false tx Hyp
2. false txO - true tx A5, Taut
3. Oifalse tx3 - true tx ) 2, 01
4. O false tx D 0  - true tx 3, A2
5. 0  - true tx 1,4 Taut
6. 0  (true tx O Ekx) 5 DR2
7. ti = tx = I
8. ti = tx & 0  (true txD  Ekx) 6,7 Taut
9. (XTx) Tx = tx & O (true TxO Ekx) 8 EG
10. ((XTx) Tx = tx & O (true T x^E kx))3  txoc kx A6, UE, Taut
11. txoc kx 9,10 Taut
12. 0  false tx^  txoc kx 1,11 CP
13. (IITxXlIKxXO false Tx)DTxoc Kx 12 UI
Theorem 7 1-qx (nTxXlTKxXO false Tx )D  Txoc K i 
As theorem 6 using A7 instead of A6.
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Theorems 4 to 7 embody what I call 'the Paradoxes of Ontological 
Commitment'. Theorem 4 claims, approximately, that every theory is 
committed to the existence of every necessary entity. Theorem 5 claims that 
every theory is committed to the non-existence of every impossible entity. 
Theorem 6 claims that every impossible theory is committed to the existence 
of anything and theorem 7 says that every impossible theory is committed to 
the non-existence of anything.
Some of the bizarre consequences of these theorems are best brought out by 
example. By theorem 4, if (say) numbers exist necessarily then 'Numbers do 
not exist' is ontologically committed to numbers. By theorem 5 'Square 
triangles exist' is ontologically committed to the non-existence of square 
triangles. By theorem 6 '0 = 1' is ontologically committed to unicorns, but, by 
theorem 7, at the same time denies their existence.
The Calculus Q2: arises from Q1 by the addition of A8 and A9.
A8 CnTjXnTjXnKkXO (true T* D true Tp) 3  (Tjoc Kk D Tjoc K|<)
A9 OlTiXnTjXlIKkXO (true T* O true Tj)) O (Tjoc Kk D  Tjoc Kk )
A8 claims that if T j necessarily implies T j then all ontological commitments 
incurred by Tj_ are incurred by Tj. A9 claims the same for oc.
4
Theorem 8 I-Q2 (HTi)(nT2)(IIK]XO true T]_ & O true T2)D (Tjoc K jS  T]OC
K l)
1. 0  true t j & O true t2 Hyp
2. 0  true ti 1 Taut
3. O true t2 1 T aut
4. O (true t^D true t2 ) 2 DR1
5. 0  (true t2 D true t i ) 3 DR1
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6. O  (tru e  t £ D  tru e  t i  ) p  ( t i o c  k ] .D  t 20c  k i ) A 8 , UE
7 . O  (tru e  t i  ^  tru e  t2  ) O ( t 2o c  k j O  t i o c  k i  ) A 8 , UE
8 . t i o c  k i O  t20C k i 5 ,6  T au t
9 . t20C k i 3  t i o c  k i 4 ,7  T au t
1 0 . t i o c  k i s  t20C k i 8 ,9  T au t
1 1 . ( 0  tru e  t i  &  0  tru e  t2  ) D  ( t i o c  k i =  t 20c  k i ) 1 ,1 0  C P
1 2 . (n T iX lT T iX lIK iX O  tru e  T i  & O  tru e  T 2)
D  ( T i o c  K i  S  T 2 oc K i  ) 11 UI
Theorem 9 Hq 2 (IITiXlITiXlIKiXO true T]_ & O true Ti) D  (Tioc Ki 3  Tioc 
Ki )
As theorem 8 using A9 instead of A8.
Theorems 8 and 9 might be classed as amongst the Paradoxes of Ontological 
Commitment since both rely essentially on one of the Paradoxes of Strict 
Implication. Collectively, theorems 8 and 9 claim that any two necessary 
theories are ontologically committed to the existence of exactly the same 
things and deny the existence of exactly the same things.
Whether theorems 8 and 9 are judged acceptable is partly determined by the 
justice of certain philosophical views on modality and existence. According to
one view of modality that did, (and still does), enjoy much influence, a%
sentence or theory is only necessarily true because of human conventions that 
determine the meaning of that sentence. This position is commonly called 
conventionalism ( a good exposition being Ayer [10] chapter four). 'All 
triangles have three sides' is necessary, according to the conventionalist, 
because human beings have determined that 'triangle' shall mean three sided 
figure. It is impossible however, that the contents of the universe should be 
determined by the way that people use words. Consequently, it is not possible 
to deduce anything from a necessary truth about what exists: a position
2 o
Wittgenstein expressed in the Tractatus.
•Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality'
Wittgenstein [150] (4.462)
Conventionalism fits in well with theorems 8 and 9; all necessary truths have 
the same commitments, i.e. none at all.
A rather older view of modality, endorsed by figures such as Leibnitz [80] and 
St. Anselm [3] does not see all existence claims as contingent. The older 
school prefers to see some of the properties that attach themselves to objects 
as attaching themselves necessarily to that object. This view is commonly 
termed essentialism. Those sentences which report on the existence of objects 
which necessarily exist are themselves necessarily true. An essentialist who, 
for example, took both numbers and universals as necessary would not wish to 
equate the ontological commitments of 'Numbers exist' with that of 
'Universals exist'.
The Calculus Q3; results from adding A10 and A ll  to Q2
A10 (nPjXnKj) Pjoc Kj = (XTi) BPjTfc & Tkoc Kj 
A l l  (IIPjXnKj) PiOC Kj =(XTi)BPiTk & Tk5?K j
i
A10 is an answer to a question in the opening page of this chapter: 'What is it 
for a person to be ontologically committed to a sort of entity?'. The answer 
A10 provides is that a person is so committed just when he believes a theory 
which is so committed.
Theorem 10 I- Q3 (IIPi )(HT]XHT2)(IIK]X(0 (true T ]^  true T2))
& (T2oc Ki  & BP]T 1 ) ) 0  P ioc K 1
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1. (O (true t^ 3  true t2)) & (t20c kx & Bpxtx)
2. O (true tjD  true t2 ) D (t20C kxO tioc  kx )
3. txoc kj
4. Bpxti & t^oc kx
5. (ZTx) BpxTx & Tx oc kx
6. ((ZTx) BpxTx & Tx oc kx) pxoc kx
7. px°c kx
8. ((O (true txD true t2)) & (t2oc kx & Bpxtx))
Hyp
A8, UE
4 EG
1,2 Taut
1,3 Taut
A10, UE, Taut
5,6 Taut
O  PX°ckx
9. (nPxXnTxXnT2XlIKxX(0 (true T x3  true T2))
1,7 CP
&(T2ocKx <?cBPxTx))OPlocKx 8 UI
Theorem 11 Kq 3 (nPxXnTxXnTxXnKxX(0 (true Tx^ true TX))
& (Txoc Kx & BPxTx ))O Px°c Kx 
As theorem 10 using A9 and A ll instead of A8 and A10.
Theorem 10 makes it possible for a person to have ontological commitments he 
does not recognise himself. A person can assent to a theory which strictly 
implies the existence of a kind K, and nevertheless fail to acknowledge his 
ontological commitment because he fails to see the implication.
The Calculus Q4: results from Q3 by the addition of A12.
A12 (nPjXnKj) Pioc Kj D - Pioc Kj
A12 claims that if a person is committed to the existence of a kind K, he is 
not committed to the non-existence of Ks. A12 is a contentious.axiom. 
Immediate is theorem 12.
Theorem 12 h Q4 (IIPjXIIKi ) - (Pioc Ki & Pioc K j )
1. Pioc - pioc k^ A12, UE
2. - (pjoc kx & pioc ki ) 1 Taut
3. (ÜPiXlIKi) - (Pioc Ki & Piöc Ki ) 2 UI
But within Q4 there are theorems which definitely merit rejection; for
example theorem 13.
Theorem 13 Fq4 (IIPiXlITi) - (O (false Tj) & BP^T  ^ )
1. 0(false ti) & Bpiti
2. 0(false ti) O tioc  ki
3. 0(false t i ) 3  tioc ki
4. tioc ki
5. tiöc ki
6. Bpiti & tioc ki
7. Bpiti & tioc  ki
8. (iT i)B piTi & Ti oc ki
9. (XTi)BpiTi & Ti oc ki
10. ((ZTi)BpiTi & Ti oc k i)D p ioc  ki
11. ((ZTi)BpiTi & Ti oc k i )3 p io c  ki
12. Pioc ki
13. Pioc ki
14. Pioc kiD - pioc ki
15. -Pioc ki
16. Pioc ki & - pioc ki
17. (O false ti & B piti)D  (pioc ki & - pioc ki)
18 -(O false t i & Bpiti)
19. (nPiXnTi) - (0  (false Ti) & BPiTi)
Hyp
Theorem 6, UE
Theorem 7, UE
1,2 Taut
1.3 Taut
1,4 Taut
1,5 Taut
6 EG
7 EG
A10, UE, Taut
A ll, UE, Taut
8,10 Taut
9,11 Taut
A12, UE
12,14 Taut
13,15 Taut
1,16 CP
17 Taut
18 UI
Theorem 13 claims nobody believes a theory which is necessarily false! The 
immediate thought is that unpleasant consequences can be avoided by 
banishing A12 and staying within Q3. This immediate thought is squashed by 
theorems 14 and 15, which are theorems of Q3.
Theorem 14 h Q3 (ITPiXlITiXnKiXBPiTi & O (false T i))3  Pioc
1. Bpiti & O (false ti) Hyp
2. CXfalse ti)D  tjoc  ki Theorem 6, UE
3. t]oc  ki 1,2 Taut
4. Bpiti & t]OC ki 1,3 Taut
5. (lT]X3p]Ti & Ti oc ki 4 EG
6. .^(ZTi)BpjTi & Ti oc k^)D pioc ki A10, UE, Taut
7. pioc ki 5,6 Taut
8. (Bpiti & 0  false tj)D  pioc kj 1,7 CP
9. (HPiXnTiXnKxXBPxTi & 0  (false TX))D P10c Kx 8 UI
Theorem 15 t- Q3 (IIPiXnTiXIlKiXBPiTi & O (false Ti))D  P joc Ki
As theorem' 14 using A ll  instead of A10 and theorem 7 instead of theorem 6. 
Theorem 14 declares that anybody who accepts a theory which is necessarily 
false is ontologically committed to everything. Thus the Greek 
mathematicians who believed that an angle could be trisected using only a 
compass and straightedge (which was proved impossible in the 19th century by 
Wantzel) were committed, by theorem 14, to the existence of talking stones, 
cubic pyramids, flying saucers (or teapots for that matter) and any other 
phantasm imagination can suggest.
1.21 Calculi which lack the Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment
For believers in the claim that strict implication is to be distinguished from 
entailment, the Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment are a sure sign that 
something has gone wrong as early as Ql. Since the derivations of the 
implausible theorems 13, 14 and 15 depend on the Paradoxes of Ontological 
Commitment, these later difficulties will then be thought of as advanced 
symptoms of a disease which crept in at Ql. One option is to block off the 
Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment at the start.
The simplest way to do so is to insist on a distinction between strict
*
implication and entailment; then to follow up the distinction by defining the 
conditions of ontological commitment in terms of entailment. Using '=*' for 
'entails', the revised definition of ontological commitment reads:-
A*6 (TITiXlIKj) Tjoc Kj 3 (n T k) Tk = Ti & (true Tk«J  EKi)
A*7 (TUjXlTKj) Tjoc Kj S (IITk) Tk = Tj & (true Tk=* -EKi)
In order to cope with the logic of the new connective Q must be enriched. 
Anderson and Belnap's [12] System E is a likely choice for encapsulating the 
logic of entailment for those who wish to demarcate entailment from strict 
implication. The system Q* is the result of adding to Q:-
(1) the connective «4’ along with the appropriate accommodation in the rules 
of formation; namely, if wi and W2 are wffs, so is wi*sj W2*
(2) The rule of inference: wji=% W2---- > D(wi D  W2) H E : (^Elimination))
(3) Certain axioms dealing with *=^  ie. System E.
El ((wj*^ wi)**w2)=»6 W2
E2 ((w ]^  W2)*3 ((w2«^ W3)e§ (w] ^  W3))
2 5
E3 (wi*^(wi=>^W2))n^ (wi?=9W2)
E4 (wx 2c W2)“ 9 wx
E5 (wx 2c W2)^ W2
E6 ((w i«^ W2) & (w i-^w 3))-^(w ]/^(w 2 & W3))
E7 ( O w j i O  W2)*^0 (wx & W2)
E8 wx*^ (wx v W2)
E9 w i’- i  (w2 v wx)
E10 ((wx ~9 W3) & (w2 w3))-a> ((wx v w2)-& W3)
E ll ((wx 2c (w2 v W3))^ ((wx 2c W2) v W3)
E12 (wx-^  - wx)«eä - wx 
E13 (wx«9 - W2)®> (^w2’=9 - wx)
E14 - - wx—i wx
In system E neither 'O wxO (w2—*wx)' nor 'O - wx^>(wx=iw2), are derivable. 
Thus the Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment are not forthcoming when 
A*6 and A*7 are added to Q* to form Q *l. By replacing '0 ( . . .3  ...)' by 
5=^  throughout A8 to A12, one generates a whole series of calculi parallel 
to Q1 to Q4.
i.e. Q* = Q + O^E) + System E 
Q*X = Q* + A*6 + A*7
A*8 (üTiXlTTjXTIKkXtrue Ti*$true T j)3 (T joc K k oT joc  Kk ))
A*9 (ITT¡XnTjXlIKkXtrue Ti=dtrue T p 3  (Tjoi Kko  Tjoc Kk ))
<3*2 = Q*1 + A*8 + A*9
Q*3 = Q*2 + A10 + A ll  .
0*4 = Q*3 + A12
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Q*1 to Q*3 are free from the Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment and from 
theorems 13, 14 and 15. Q*4 is dubious, however, since in Q*4, it is a theorem 
that nobody believes a theory which entails there are K p  and a theory which 
entails there are not K p.
Theorem 16 b <3*4 (nPi)(nTi)(IIT2Xm<i) - ((B P ^ i & BP]T2 ) «5= (T p c  Ki & 
T20C Ki))
1. (B ppi & Bpp2) & ( t p c  kj & t20 c ki ) Hyp
2. B pp i & t]OC ki ITaut
3. Bpp2 & t20c kj 1 Taut
4. (ZTi) B pp i <5c Tioc ki 2 EG
5. (XTi) BpiT2 & T20C ki 3 EG
6. ((IT j) BP2T1 & T joc k j)D  pjoc kj A10, UE, Taut
7. ((ZTi) BpiTi & Tioc k i )3  pioc ki A ll , UE, Taut
8. p p c  k\ 4,6 Taut
9. P20C ki 5,7 Taut
10. p p c  k jD  - piöc ki A12, UE
11. -  p p c  ki 8,10 Taut
12. Piöc k  ^ & -pioc ki 8,11 Taut
13. ((Bpiti& Bpit2) & ( t p c  ki & t20C kj)) 1,12 CP
14.
Z) (piöc kj & -pioc ki )
- ((Bpiti & Bpit2) & (tioc kx & t20C ki )) 13 Taut
15. (nPi)(nTiXirT2)aiKi) - ((bpxTi  & bpxT2 ) 
& (T 10c Ki & T20c Kij) 14 UI
The weakness of the Q* calculi lies in the theory of entailment on which they 
are all founded; namely System E. In System E, two axioms are inconspicuosly 
absent. These are the axioms of disjunctive syllogism.
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((wj v v/2) & - v/^)=^W2 
C(wi v W2) & - W2)=  ^wi
These axioms cannot be added to system E without engendering 'Paradoxes of 
Entailment' exactly parallel to those of Strict Implication (see Anderson and 
Belnap [12]). Many logicians feel that rejecting the axioms of disjunctive 
syllogism is a step more drastic and questionable than identifying strict 
implication and entailment. The axioms of disjunctive syllogism are ones that 
Stoic logicians said even dogs in the street recognise: when chasing their prey 
to a point where the road forks, they will sniff along one fork, and if they 
catch no scent there, they will chase along the other without sniffing.
1.22 Other Solutions
Other solutions to the absurdities of theorems 13, 14 and 15 retain the 
Paradoxes of Ontological Commitment, but modify the later axioms. The 
modifications center principally on A10 and A ll ; which are those axioms 
which relate the ontological commitments of a person to the ontological 
commitments of the theories he happens to believe. A10, for instance, claims 
that a person is committed to a kind K if, and only if, he believes a theory 
which is ontologically committed to Ks. However, the Paradoxes of 
Ontological Commitment assure us that any necessary falsehood is committed 
to the existence (and the nonexistence) of anything. So we deduce that any 
person unfortunate enough to accept a necessary falsehood is committed for 
and against the existence of anything.
A fairly obvious thought is that if the ontological commitments of a person 
were only extracted from the consistent parts of his belief-set then these 
difficulties would be avoided. This thought can be taken up in various ways. 
For instance, BIO and B ll can replace A10 and A ll .
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BIO (nPj)(m<j) Pjoc K j=  (ZTk) BPjTk & (Tkoc Kj ¿ ❖ tru e  Ti<)
B ll (ITPi)CnKj) P,oc Kj =  (ZTk) BPjTk & (Tkoc Kj & ❖  true Tk)
The extra condition Otrue Tx' prevents the derivation of theorems 13 and 14. 
R1 is the result of adding BIO and B ll to Q2, and R2 is the result of adding 
A12 to R l.
i.e. R l = Q2 + BIO + B ll 
R2 = R l + A12
«
But R2 is not itself free from absurdity for it is a theorem of R2 that nobody 
believes two contingent theories with contrary commitments.
Theorem 17 F-R2 (nPi)(nTi)(IIT2XnKi) - (((Tjoc Ki  & T20C Kj )
& (BPiTj & BP1T2)) & (❖  true T j & ❖ true T2))
1. ((tioc ki & t20C ki) & (Bpitj & Bp]t2))
& (❖  true t i & ❖ true t2)
2. Bpitx & (tioc kx &^true tx )
3. Bpxt2 & (t20C kx ¿«❖ true t2 )
4. (ITx)BpxTx & (Txoc kx & ❖ true Tx)
5. (ZTx)BpxT2 & (T20C kx & ❖ true T2)
6. ((ZTx)BpxTx &(Txoc kx & ❖  true Tx))3px°c kx
7. ((ZTx)BpxT2 & (Txoc kx & ❖  true T2))0 pxoc kx
8. pxoc kx
9. px°c kx
10. pxoc kxD - pxoc kx
11. - pxoc kx
12. pxoc kx & -  pxoc kx
Hyp 
1 Taut
1 Taut
2 EG
3 EG
BIO, UE, Taut 
B ll, UE, Taut
4.6 Taut
5.7 Taut 
A12, UE
8.10 Taut
9.11 Taut
2 ?
13. (((tioc k i  & t20C k \  ) & (B p it i & B p it2))
& (❖  true t i & Otrue t2 ))D  (pjoc ki & - pioc ki ) 1, 12 CP
14. - (((tioc ki & t2oc ki) & (Bpiti & Bpit2))
& (O true t i & ❖ true t2 )) 13 Taut
15. (nP1XnT1XnT2XlIK1) - (((Tioc Ki & T2oc Ki)
& (BPiTi & BP1T2)) & ( ❖  true Ti & ❖ true T2)) 14 UI
An alternative to BIO and B ll is CIO and C ll .
CIO OlPiXlTKj) Pjoc Kj =((ZTkXBPiTk & Tkoc Kj) & - dTiXBPiTi & Tjoc Kj))
_ «
C ll  OlPiXlIKj) PjOC K j* ((Z T kXBPiTk & Tkoc Kj) & - (LT^BPjTi & Tjoc Kj))
SI results from adding CIO and C ll  to Q2. In SI, axiom A12 is not 
independent but may be proved as a theorem.
Theorem 18 F- s i  (IIPlXlIKi)Pioc K iD  - P ioc K i
1. Pioc ki Hyp
2. pioc k iD  ((ZTiXBpiTi & Tioc k )
& - (ZT2)(BpiT2 & T20C ki)) CIO, UE
3. (£Ti)(BpTi & Tioc k ) & -(ET2XBP1T2 & T20C Ki) 1,2 Taut
4. - &T2XBP1T2 & T20C Ki) 3 Taut
5. pioc ki
D (&T2XBpiT2 & T20C k ) & - (UTiXBpiTi & Tioc k i )) C ll , UE
6.  -  pioc ki 4,5 Taut
7. pioc kiD -  pioc ki 1,6 CP
8. (n P iX lIK i)P ocK iD -P  o cK i 7 UI -
However SI, though deductively strong, goes too far. In SI it can be proved 
that anybody who believes a theory which is necessarily false, is ontologically 
committed to nothing!
Theorem 19 I- S1 (nP1)tnT1)(nKi)(BP1Ti & O false T i)3  - Pioc Ki
1. Bp].ti & 0  false t j Hyp
2. O false t j !?  tjoc  kx Theorem 7, UE
3. pioc kx
D  ((£T]XBP1Ti  & T10c ki) & - (ZptepxTi & Ji~c k^) CIO, UE, Taut
4. Bpitx & tioc kx 1,2 Taut
5. (ST)BpxTi & Txòc kx 4 El
6. -  pxoc kx 3,5 Taut
7. (Bpxtx & 0  false tx)D - Pioc kx 1,6 CP
8. (nPxXHTx)CHKxXBPxTx & O false Tx)D - Pxoc Kx 7 UI
The relations between the various calculi are illustrated in diagram I.
Which 'ontic logic' best captures the logical properties of ontological commit­
ment? The issues and problems are surprisingly similar to those surrounding 
modal logics: in modal logic too, we have a plethora of non-equivalent formal 
systems each competing for recognition. In such cases our intuitions seem too 
flimsy to discriminate in favour of one unique system. Perhaps there is no 
'right' modal logic and no right ontic logic either.
The case, cannot, at any rate, be settled for any one system by an 
investigation of 'ordinary use'. The phrase 'ontological commitment' is a term 
of art amongst professional philosophers and a head count of philosophers 
would establish very little. However we can argue for the selection of a 
calculus on pragmatic grounds. These grounds are that a calculus should be as 
deductively strong as is consistent with it being free from absurdity. The
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Diagram 1
—
+ A *6 
+ A*7
Q*1
+ A*8 
+ A*9
yf
Q*2 *
+ A10 
+ A ll
' '
Q*3 
+ A12 
4
+ System E 
+ E 
— Q
+ A 6 
+ A7
V ' r
Q4 R2
calculus selected can then serve to legislate for the logical properties of 
ontological commitment, even where our intuitions leave off. From this 
perspective, R1 looks the likeliest choice for the logic of ontological 
commitment.
1.3 Criteria of Ontological Commitment
A criterion need not be a definition, and conversely, a definition need not be a 
criterion. Before embarking on an examination of criteria of ontological 
commitment, it is useful to have a clear idea of the distinction between the 
two.
A definition of a property P states what it is for an object to have P or to be a 
P. Thus a definition is required to have the form 'For any x, x is P if and only 
if ....’ and not only to be true but also to be necessarily true. A definition is 
also required to be non-circular (a formally difficult condition to define) which 
requires that the definiens and the definiendum contain different expressions. 
In philosophy, the concept of circularity is widened to embrace 'dictionary 
definitions’ 'x knows that p if and only if x is cognisant of p' would be counted 
as circular by most philosophers even though it would be good enough for the 
basis of a dictionary entry.
’Criterion' is a slippery word as those involved in the exegesis of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy know. In ordinary speech a criterion for the prescence of a 
property P is a feature or procedure for basing reasonable judgements on the 
prescence or absence of P. Thus a reading of a temperature above 98.4°F 
(37°C) on a human being would be a criterion that the human being was ill. 
But the criterion of having a high temperature, though normally a sufficient 
condition of being ill, is not a necessary condition of being ill, since there are 
certain diseases (e.g. cancer, multiple sclerosis) which are not associated with 
high body temperature. A. criterion need not be infallible. A yellow sky in the
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evening is a criterion of stormy weather to come and yet it is not an infallible 
criterion.
The most important feature of a criterion is that being a standard by which to 
make judgements it must be epistemically useful. The concept of epistemic
usefulness can be defined as follows. A criterion C for the detection of a
property P is epistemically useful to an agent A if and only if the possession of
C by A improves the capacity of A to recognise the prescence of property P.
Criteria can also be roughly divided (with certain borderline cases) into
procedural criteria and nonprocedural criteria. A procedural criterion is a
criterion which requires knowledge and execution of a procedure in order for
«
that criterion to be applied. For example, the Marsh test for arsenic and the 
electrolysis test for distilled water require knowledge of some of the 
procedures of analytical chemistry to be applied successfully. Other criteria 
do not require to be prefaced by a procedure: e.g. forecasting the weather by 
looking at the clouds.
Definitions in contrast, though they may be procedural, need not be 
epistemically useful. An example of an epistemically useless definition is 
Tarski's Semantic definition of truth as satisfaction by all sequences. This 
definition of truth is not circular in any formal sense, but it does not improve 
our ability to distinguish the true from the false; to settle for instance, the 
Bacon/Shakespeare controversy or any unsolved problem in science or 
mathematics. Nor is there any reason why a definition of truth should 
improve our capabilities of distinguishing the true from the false. In summary, 
then, the leading features distinguishing criteria and definitions are these.
Criteria Definitions
Gives often sufficient conditions, 
but may not be necessary.
Gives necessary and sufficient 
conditions.
Possibly fallible; more desirable 
the less fallible it is.
Infallible; necessarily true 
in all cases.
Epistemically useful: improves 
our capacity to detect the 
requisite properties.
Non-circular; but may not be 
epistemically useful.
Procedural in many cases.
Moving from reflection on criteria in general to criteria for ontological 
commitment in particular, most current studies on criteria of ontological 
commitment are either written or inspired by the work of Quine. Quine's 
statements of his criterion are not always equivalent to each other or 
satisfactory in themselves. To gain a foretaste and a general impression of 
Quine's work in this area, here is one criterion of ontological commitment that 
Quine offers.
'In general, entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some 
of them must be counted among the values of the variables in order that the 
statements affirmed in the theory be true.'
Quine [108] (103)
The technical phrase 'values of the variables' shows that Quine's criterion is 
one that requires a certain technical knowledge to appreciate. In fact, Quine's 
criterion is a procedural one, at least in part, and the useful application of
Quine's criterion presupposes an ability to institute a procedure Quine calls 
paraphrase or regimentation, but which most philosophers call formalisation. 
The exact nature of this procedure and the constraints under which it should 
be carried out is an arguing point for many philosophers. What is said here is 
only in the way of preparation for a more detailed discussion in chapters 2 and 
3, and as an opportunity for signposting the reader to some relevant but 
scattered material throughout this text.
The consensus opinion amongst those analytical philosophers who favour 
formalisation as a philosophical tool is as follows. The best means of 
determining an answer to the ontological question as to what exists is to select 
those theories that expert opinion judges to be true, and determine to what 
those theories are ontologically committed. If those theories are expressed in 
a natural language however, frequently their ontological commitments are not 
immediately apparent. Most formally inclined philosophers blame this on the 
fact that natural languages do not provide an adequate syntactical mark of 
ontological commitment (see 2.2 on the distinction between grammatical and 
logical form). Their solution is to rephrase or formalise the theories in 
question into a formal language; (generally a first-order language based on the 
predicate calculus, but see 6.2 and chapter 7 for the consequences and 
principles involved in the choice of an appropriate notation). What is the 
relation between the original natural language theories and the formal theories 
which are the product of formalisation? Here formal philosophers divide. 
Some insist that formalisation is a meaning-preserving procedure and hence 
that formalisation is like translation (see 2.2, 2.6). Some formalists believe a 
theory has one and only one proper formalisation and this is the logical form of 
the theory in question (see 2.2 and 2.6 again); but other philosophers insist that 
there are a number of competing but equally viable formalisations of certain 
natural language theories (see chapter 5). Having completed the process of
formalisation, one looks for theorems of the form (3x)(_____ ) to determine
what the ontological commitments are.
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1.3.1 Quine’s Criteria
Statements of a criterion of ontological commitment are scattered throughout 
much of Quine's work and the best way of coming to grips with them is to 
examine them one by one on their own terms. This is how, in fact, we shall 
proceed.
Formulation 1
'We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the 
alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our 
variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true.'
Quine [116] (13)
'To show some given object is required in a theory what we have to show is no 
more or less than that object is required for the truth of the theory to be 
among the values over which the variables range'
Quine [109] (93)
These two versions of Quine's criterion are similar enough to deserve grouping 
together under one formulation. Nevertheless there is one subtle difference 
worth noticing. The first quoted version presents a criterion of ontological 
commitment for persons and the second, for theories. Since Quine does not 
devote any space to examining the relations between the ontological commit­
ments of persons and of theories, it is likely this sort of difference would not 
engage his attention. Actually, of course, there is a substantive philosophical 
issue at stake here, as we saw in 1.2., about the exact nature of the relations 
between the ontological commitments of theories and the people who believe 
them.
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Formulation 1 fails principally because it treats ontological commitment as 
referential; which it is not. 'Dracula exists' is ontologically committed to 
Dracula, but Dracula is not an object to be counted amongst the values of the 
domain of the theory, since Dracula does not exist as an object at all.
These versions also fail to apply to cases of ontological commitments to sorts 
of things. The theory '@x) table x' is ontologically committed to tables. But it 
is false to say that, of any particular object, that that object is required to be 
counted within the range of the variable 'x' in order for the theory to be true. 
(See Chihara [26]).
Formulation 1 fails of ontological commitments to individual items which do 
not exist and also of commitments to sorts of item which do exist. 
Formulation 1 also fails of ontological commitments to individual items which 
do exist. Thus '(3x)x = Richard Nixon' is obviously ontologically committed to 
the existence of Richard Nixon. Formulation 1 captures this much, since 
Richard Nixon has to be counted within the range of the variable 'x' in order 
for the theory to be true; on this score formulation 1 is successful. However, 
Richard Nixon = 37th President of the United States, and if Richard Nixon has 
to be included amongst the values of 'x' for '(3x)x = Richard Nixon' to be true, 
so has the 37th President of the United States. But '(3x)x = Richard Nixon' is 
not ontologically committed to the existence of the 37th President of the 
United States. (See Gottlieb [54]). Formulation 1 fails to acknowledge the 
antireferential and intensional nature of ontological commitment.
Formulation 2
'In general, entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some 
of them must be counted amongst the values of the variables in order that the 
statements affirmed in the theory be true'.
Quine [108] (103)
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This criterion represents something of an improvement over the previous 
characterisation. It handles 'C3x)table x' rather better; for although it is true 
that no particular table has to be counted amongst the values of 'x' in order for 
the theory to be true nevertheless some table must be counted in for '(3x)table
x' to be true. However Cartwright [25] has isolated some mistakes in this 
formulation too.
If formulation 2 is formalised in first-order notation then the result is 
something as follows; where 'T' and 'D' range over theories and domains 
respectively and 'x' over the universe set.
(T) T is ontologically =  (D) (D satisfies T CD(3x)Kx & x c D 
committed to Ks
Cartwright points out that if no D satisfies T (as in 'Unicorns exist'), then T 
will be committed to any sort K. The right-hand side of the above equivalence 
can be altered to avoid this difficulty, thus:-
(T) T is ontologically— (3D) D satisfies T & (D')(D' satisfies T 
committed to Ks CD (3x) Kx & x £ D*
But problems still arise. In the above case, since -C3D)D satisfies 'Unicorns 
exist', 'Unicorns exist' will have no ontological commitments at all.
The only course would seem to be to abandon first order notation and interpret 
Quine's 'must be' in formulation 2 as requiring the prescence of the modal 
operator 'O' or something like it. Such an interpretation would be contrary to 
Quine's avowed preference for first-order notation and his abhorrence for 
modal logic. Cartwright reaches similar conclusions, and his version of a 
criterion of ontological commitment will be examined in the next section.
Formulation 3
'To show that a given theory assumes a given object or objects of a given class, 
we have to show that the theory would be false if that object did not exist, or 
if that class were empty; hence that the theory requires that object, or 
members of that class, in order for it to be true.'
Quine [109] (93)
This formulation makes essential use of the counterfactual conditional, an 
idiom which remains stubbornly beyond the scope of first-order notation and 
which has resisted philosophical analysis (see Campbell [17], Goodman [52]). 
The material conditional is obviously too weak to do the job here, since:-
(T) T is ontologically= (T is true O (3x) Kx) 
committed to Ks
entails every false theory is committed to everything and any theory is 
committed to anything that exists.
But even accepting Quine's use of the counterfactual conditional, the 
'criterion' stated above is at best a necessary rather than a sufficient condition 
of ontological commitment. For example, it is reasonable to believe that the 
following sentence is true.
Had Leonardo da Vinci never existed then it would have been the case that the 
painting of the Mona Lisa does not exist.
This sentence is equivalent to:-
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Had Leonardo da Vinci never existed then it would have been that 'the painting 
of the Mona Lisa exists' is false.
By formulation 3 it follows that 'The painting of the Mona Lisa exists' is 
ontologically committed to Leonardo da Vinci. But this is false. We have to 
distinguish between a theory requiring the existence of an entity because, as a 
matter of contingent fact, had that entity not existed the theory would not 
have been true; and the truth of that theory necessitating the existence of an 
entity. It is this latter concept that formulation 4 fails to capture.
Formulation 3
'We commit ourselves to an ontology containing numbers when we say that 
there are prime numbers larger than a million; we commit ourselves to an 
ontology containing centaurs when we say that there are centaurs; and we 
commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus when we say Pegasus is.'
Quine [116] (8)
'We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, 
for example, that there is something (bound variable) which red houses and 
sunsets have in common; or that there is something which is a prime number 
larger than a million. But this is, essentially, the only way we can involve 
ourselves in ontological commitments.'
Quine [116] (12)
Chihara [27] accurately remarks that explicitly stating that a sort K exists is a 
sufficient condition of ontological commitment but not a necessary one. To 
state 'numbers exist' is, amongst other things, to commit oneself to abstract 
objects even if one has not explicitly stated there are such objects.
Recognition of this point seems to demand some recognition of the role of 
analytic truths and analytic implication: concepts Quine [108] would choose 
not to employ, (but possibly not Quine [120]).
Apart from this point, it is doubtful if formulation 5 is a criterion of 
ontological commitment. It is surely evident that we commit ourselves to 
centaurs if we say there are such: so evident, in fact, that it is hard to see 
how a statement of this fact could improve our abilities to uncover ontological 
commitments.
Formulation 6
'If a theory implies '(3x)(x is a dog)' it will not tolerate an empty universe; still 
the theory might be fulfilled by a universe that contained collies to the 
exclusion of spaniels and also vice-versa. So there is more to be said of a 
theory, ontologically, than just saying what objects, if any, the theory 
requires; we can also ask what various universes would be severally sufficient. 
The specific objects required; if any, are the objects common to all those 
universes.'
Quine [112] (96)
The significance of this passage turns upon the interpretation given to 
'universe'.
Under one interpretation, 'universe' means set, domain or universe of 
discourse. Formalised, the criterion is:-
(T)(T is ontologicallyS £x:Kx } c n [D : D satisfies T  ^
committed to Ks
41
But consider '(3x) dog x'jthis theory is satisfied by D when D = £x: collie dog x 
and when D =£x: spaniel x^ . But since £x: collie dog x^ fl £x: spaniel x^ = A , 
then on this interpretation, '(3x) dog x' has no ontological commitments.
Under the other interpretation, 'universe' means possible world. But Quine has 
explicitly rejected the use of possible worlds and possible entities (I think 
rightly) for the reasons that their identity criteria are in doubt, and they are 
even more obscure than the modal idioms they are supposed to elucidate; (see 
Quine [116] and Quine [119] (245)).
1.32 Some Other Suggestions
Some of the philosophers who have noted the formal deficiencies of Quine's 
criteria have suggested their own rerradies. Alonzo Church [29] offers the 
formulation:-
the assertion of (3 x)MX- carries ontological commitment to entities x such that 
M; ■*
where the letter 'x' may be replaced by any variable, 'M' by any open sentence 
containing only that variable, be.' by the name of the variable replacing 'x' and 
'M! by the name of the variable replacing 'M'. Chihara [27] remarks that this is 
only a sufficient condition of ontological commitment, since the theory '(3 x) 
number x' is committed to entities such that number x all right, but it is also 
committed to abstract objects too. In general, we have to look beyond the 
overtly existential pronouncements of a theory to see all of its commitments. 
Gottlieb's [57] criterion suffers from some of the same problems. Gottlieb's
criterion is:-
'T is ontologically committed to a/Fs iff T logically implies '(3x)(x = a)'/'(3 
x)Fx' and '(3x)' is understood objectually.'
But logical implication, as it is generally understood, does not hold betwen '&<) 
number x' and '(3 x) abstract object x'. So again Gottlieb's criterion is only 
sufficient. Scheffler and Chomsky [130] suggest:
assumption if and only if it yields a
i.
—  9
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where ____________ ' can be filled by any general expression. This criterion is
unsatisfactory mainly because of the vagueness of 'yields' (strictly implies, 
logically implies, entails?).
Cartwright is most successful; he offers:-
'An elementary theory, T, presupposes objects of a kind K if and only if there 
is in T an open sentence having o^as its sole free variable such that (i) 
is a theorem of T; (ii) it follows from the semantical rules of T that for every 
x, jZ( is true of x only if x is a member of K.
Cartwright [24]
i
Quine would baulk at the concept of 'semantic rules' (see Quine [105] for his 
criticisms of Carnap's use of the same concept). Aside from this, Cartwright's 
version seems both true and necessary and sufficient. But is it epistemically 
useful enough to be a good criterion of ontological commitment? This is open 
to debate. In a sense all that Cartwright tells us is that a first-order theory is 
ontologically committed to Ks iff (3x)Kx can be deduced from that theory. 
Surely this was clear all along and that all that Cartwright has achieved is a 
measure of detail in respect of "deduce"? There is some justice in this
'A theory T makes a _________
statement of the form '(3x)x is a
objection, but the fact is that any criterion of ontological commitment for 
first-order theories will be truistic. This arises because first-order theories 
are ontologically perspicuous anyway (which is why formalists in ontology have 
advocated formalisation). We should not have to be told that '(3x) dog x' shows 
an ontological commitment to dogs; our knowledge of the symbolism told us 
this much. So it is not clear that Cartwright's criterion will be epistemically 
useful to anybody whose grasp of logic is sufficient to enable him to 
understand it.
Is Cartwright's formulation epistemically useless after all? Where this is so or 
not depends not on the criterion itself, but on the procedure that prefaces its 
application: that is, formalisation. If Cartwright's version is supplemented by 
a good account of how to phrase natural language theories in the formal idiom 
then it will be epistemically useful, otherwise it will not. This means that the 
focus of attention slips away from the nature of ontological commitment, onto 
the nature of formalisation.
1.4 Formalisation; an initial survey
At a very abstract level, formalisation is a procedure which establishes a 
function from some set of natural language theories onto some set of formal 
theories. Obviously not just any function will do, the function must satisfy 
certain constraints. What are those constraints?
In his admirably lucid section on metaontology, Campbell [19] confronts this 
question. Commenting on the relations between a natural language theory and 
a canonical (formal) one, Campbell remarks:-
The two must be reality equivalents.....  That is the very claim about the
world legitimately encapsulated in the natural sentence must be reproduced in 
the canonical one. The notion of reality equivalence is an intuitive one which
resists systematic treatment. Yet so far as I can see, we cannot do without 
it.'
Campbell [19] (160)
What Campbell means by 'reality equivalents' is, as he admits here, obscure.
One natural way of interpreting Campbell's notion of reality equivalence is
that if two theories are reality equivalents then at least they must share the
same ontological commitments. If theory A claims the existence of composite
numbers and theory B does not, then surely A and B cannot be reality
equivalents. So we might require that formalisation preserve ontological
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commitment; and this ushers in a very serious problem: the Paradox of 
Formalisation.
Grant that preservation of ontological commitment is a necessary condition of 
formalisation; then if we formalise a natural language theory A by a formal 
language theory B, we shall only be justified in accepting this formalisation if 
it is authoratatively established that A and B have the same ontological 
commitments. The ontological commitments of B ought to be clear, for it is 
the clarity of formal notation that is the raison d'etre of formalisation. But 
what of A? If the ontological commitments of A are obscure to us, we will not 
know if A has the same ontological commitments as B or not. Ergo, it will not 
be possible to determine if the formalisation is good or not. On the other 
hand, if the ontological commitments of B are clear, why bother formalising B 
anyhow? The Paradox of Formalisation concludes this reasoning by saying that 
formalisation either cannot be successfully practised (where we cannot 
determine the ontological commitments of the natural language theory, how 
can we tell if those commitments have been preserved?) or it is totally 
redundant where it can be practised (for if we already know the ontological 
commitments of the natural language theory, when we already have all that 
formalisation can give us).
The Paradox of Formalisation can either be treated as a knock-down
refutation of the formal tradition in ontology, or as a mistake arising from 
false presuppositions about how formalisation works. Which turns out to be 
the case will only be determined by looking at formalisation in depth. This 
will be the concern of the next two chapters.
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'in adopting this convention I assume that a declarative sentence is, at least in 
some cases, true or false. There is a sizeable and rather unrewarding 
literature on the nature of truth-bearers (see Strawson [139], White [146] and 
Frege [48] for examples). Certain authors prefer not to identify truth-bearers
with declarative sentences, but choose propositions, statements, or thoughts
instead. Much of the resulting argument has been fairly futile, and to my
mind, at least some these supposedly rival identifications could be made to
serve the same useful services. The advantages of choosing declarative
sentences as truth-bearers are those of ontological economy and clarity of
identity conditions. Related material to this convention is scattered
«
throughout the text. See 6.3 for an examination of the concept of a 
declarative sentence and 5.2 for an aside on the truth-bearer argument.
2
For a good history of the use of 'intentional* and the vagueness attached to it, 
see Chisholm [27]. Chisholm's article persuaded me to abandon the word 
altogether.
3See Gottlieb [54] for an exposition and criticism of Jubien. Section 4.4 and 
appendix II of this work contains material on the importance of identity 
criteria in ontology.
4See Scheffler and Chomsky [130], Parsons [95], and Jubien [70] for criticisms 
of similar strategies to this suggestion.
5See Church [29] for a similar criticism of Carnap [21]
ICHAPTER TWO
Ontology in the Formal Tradition
2.1 The tradition itself
The formal tradition in modern philosophy originated from the work of Gottlob 
Frege, and emphasises the importance of the formal logic Frege invented, in 
the investigation of many philosophical problems. Frege’s pioneering research 
into formal logic arose from two goals that dominated his lifetime's work. 
One goal was to devise a notation sufficient to express all mathematical 
reasoning, within which it could be effectively established whether any given 
sequence of formulae constituted a proof. The second was to lay down an 
axiom set from which, using only stipulative definitions and the rules of 
deduction laid down for his notation, all truths of pure mathematics could be 
derived.1 Frege's own attempt to provide such an axiomatisation in 
Grundqesetze der Arithmetik failed at the pres ence of Russell's Paradox (see 
Hatcher [65]). The long term prospects of realising the axiomatisation of 
mathematics were destroyed, six years after Frege died, by Godel's 
Incompleteness theorem of 1931. But the logical system that Frege created 
lived on to exert a very great influence on twentieth century philosophy.
Frege was principally a mathematician who went into philosophy only insofar 
as it helped him to understand mathematics. It was Russell, operating as a 
sort of intellectual Prometheus between mathematics and philosophy, who 
took Frege's new logic, improved its notation and suggested its philosophical 
application. So Russell opened his Lowell Lectures in 1914, on the eve of a 
war that was to give birth to the twentieth century, with the promise of a new 
philosophy that, in scientific rigour and boldness, promised to match that 
century itself.
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'The following lectures are an attempt to show, by means of examples, the 
nature, capacity, and limitations of the logical-analytic method in philosophy. 
This method, of which the first complete example is to be found in the 
writings of Frege, has gradually, in the course of actual research, increasingly 
forced itself upon me as something perfectly definite, capable of embodiment 
in maxims, and adequate, in all branches of philosophy, to yield whatever 
objective scientific knowledge it is possible to attain.'
Russell [123] (7)
Russell was not always as clear about the logical-analytic method in 
philosophy as he implies here. But Russell was the intellectual father of much 
of the formal tradition in philosophy, and particularly in ontology, Russell 
marks the best starting point for research.
In this chapter, five major figures of the formal tradition in philosophy are 
examined: Russell, Carnap, Goodman, Quine and Davidson. There is a common 
conviction to be found in all these philosophers as to the value of 
formalisation. Each of them is convinced of the value of formal logic to 
philosophy, and in particular, of its ability to clarify ontological problems. 
Three questions are, worth bearing in mind during the subsequent examination 
of the thought of these five men; they are as follows
(1) Why formalise?
(2) What makes a good formalisation?
(3) How does formalisation help determine an answer to the Ontological 
Question, 'What exists?'?
Answers to these three questions reveal profound differences between our five 
authorities. We cannot do better than begin with the first of them.
2.2 Russell and Logical Atomism
The philosophy of logical atomism is founded on the representationalist theory 
of meaning. This theory is that the words of a language depend for their 
meaning on things for which they stand. These things are the meanings of the 
words in question. Simple as this theory seems, much of the development of 
logical atomism is a record of an attempt to formulate representationalism in 
a way that would save it from criticism; the Tractatus Loqico - Philosophicus 
being the apogee of sophistication in that development.
In 1902, while writing the Principles of Mathematics, Russell accepted 
representationalism as the archtypal form for any theory of meaning.
’Words all have meaning, in the sense that they are symbols which stand for 
something other than themselves.'
Russell [121] (51)
The entities which words stood for Russell called 'terms'. At the time of 
writing, Russell took a term to be any object of thought, existing or not.
'A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else 
that can be mentioned is sure to be a term: and to deny that such and such a 
thing is a term must always be false.'
Russell [121] (51)
Russell's theory of terms enabled an explanation of how nondenoting 
descriptions, like his later - famous 'the present King of France', could be 
meaningful even when there was no denotatum. The explanation was that the 
meaning of such a description was a subsistent, though nonexistent term, the 
present King of France.
In 1905, Russell abandoned this position with the vigour of a reformed 
alcoholic: there were no such things as nonexistent terms subsisting only for 
the sake of being married off to nondenoting descriptions. In his most 
influential article, 'On Denoting', Russell clarified the change in his views.
'The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem 
unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents 
of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible 
theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This 
theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an 
object. Thus 'the present King of France', 'the round square', etc., are 
supposed to be genuine objects ...... the chief objection is that such objects,
admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for 
example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not 
exist; that the round square is round, and also not round etc. But this is 
intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to 
be preferred.’
Russell [122]
Russell's solution, his Theory of Definite Descriptions, was essentially a 
modification of his earlier representationalism. His position emerges more 
clearly in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism nearly 15 years after 'On 
Denoting’.
Russell had, by 1920, come to hold that for two classes of symbols 
representationalism did not apply, that is, symbols in these classes could have 
meaning and yet stand for nothing. In the first class were the logical 
connectives, 'not', 'or', 'and' and so forth, whose meaning, Russell believed, was 
entirely explained by the contribution they made to the truth-conditions of the 
molecular sentences they helped to form. In the second class were incomplete
51
symbols, of which 'the present King of France' was one. Incomplete symbols, 
Russell believed, were essentially abbreviations or shorthands for collections 
of symbols in which incomplete symbols did not appear. Thus 'The present 
King of France' appears as an incomplete symbol in 'The present King of 
France exists' because there is a procedure for eliminating 'the present King of 
France', in the context of a sentence, in favour of symbols whose meaning was 
what they stood for. When this eliminative procedure is carried out, what 
emerges is this:-
'The propositional function 'x is the present King of France' is (i) true for at 
least one value of V  (ii) true for at most one value of 'x.'
Russell [125]
There is no suggestion in the above quotation that the sentence is crediting to 
a subsistent present King of France, the property of existing. Existence 
claims turn into assertions about the properties of propositional functions. 
Russell drew a number of significant conclusions from his method of dealing 
with definite descriptions. For our purposes, his four most important 
conclusions relate to the distinction between grammatical and logical form, 
the importance of analysis, and the need to recognise logical fictions.
The phrases 'grammatical form' and 'logical form' appear quite seldom in 
Russell's work considering the effect that the distinction has had and the 
current popularity of the latter phrase in Oxonian circles. The distinction 
between grammatical and logical form is really the old philosophical 
distinction between appearance and reality, here transferred onto language. 
The sentences 'I am bald' and 'The present King of France is bald' are 
grammatically very similar, both begin with a definite singular term, continue 
with a copula, and end in the same predicate. Both sentences have a very 
similar grammatical form. But according to Russell's ideas these two
sentences work in very different ways. The personal pronoun in the first 
sentence is a logical name; it serves to pick out a particular, the speaker, and 
that particular is the meaning of the word. By contrast 'the present King of 
France' picks out nothing: it is an incomplete symbol which is a shorthand for 
a string of symbols which are not incomplete. The sentences 'I am bald' and 
The present King of France is bald' have similar grammatical forms but 
different logical forms.
Russell never gave a precise definition of 'grammatical form' and I think one
comes closest to a satisfactory definition through the resources of generative
grammar; a subject that was not developed until nearly 40 years after
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Russell's lectures of 1918. (See Grinder and Elgin [52] or Lyons [86] for an 
introductory exposition of generative grammar). Generative grammar is 
concerned with the determination of the formation rules for the sentences of 
various natural languages. Integral to generative grammar is the concept of 
constituent structure, in which the grammatical structure of a sentence, (in 
terms of its composition into words, phrases and clauses) is represented. 
Constituent structure is often represented by means of a tree -structure or 
phrase - marker like this one:-
s
Represented as a derivation from a phrase structure grammar, the above 
phrase-marker would appear like this:-
1 S
2 NP VP
3 DET N VP
4 DET N V NP
5 DET N V DET N
6 The N V DET N
7 The girl V DET N
8 The girl saw DET N
9 The girl saw the N
10 The girl saw the boy
Call one of the entries 1 to 10, a constituent level of the sentence 'The girl 
saw the boy'; and the number tagging a constituent level a constituent index of 
that level. Two sentences have the same grammatical form to the degree that 
their constituent levels are identical down to a given constituent index i. The 
higher the value of i in relation to the highest (or deepest) constituent level 
attainable, the more similar the grammatical forms of the two sentences. 
This definition of 'grammatical form' makes the phrase scalar in application 
rather than non-quantative, but that, I believe, is how the facts stand anyway. 
Although 'I am bald' and 'The present King of France is bald' have similar 
grammatical forms they have different logical form. (A better example is 
Quine's 'I did it for my wife's brother' and 'I did it for my wife's sake', both 
sentences are very similar in grammatical form, but different in logical form. 
There is not an entity my wife's sake to be ranked along with her brother).
Russell believed that in a perfect language such misleading locutions as 'The 
present King of France' and 'my wife's sake' would not appear. In a perfect
language, logical form and grammatical form would coincide, and the way that 
the sentence appeared on paper would reflect the state of affairs that it was 
about. Russell identified the perfect language as a first-order language.
'In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every
simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a
combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for
the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. A
language of that sort will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the
logical structure of the facts asserted or denied. The language which is set
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forth in Principia Mathematica is intended to be a language of that sort.'
Russell [125]
Many traditional philosophical problems arose, Russell argued, because 
philosophers took the grammatical form of a sentence as a good guide to its 
logical form. So Russell circa 1900 had been misled by grammar into thinking 
that the phrase 'The present King of France' works as a name, picking out an 
object, because, like a logically proper name, it appears in the subject 
position. This misconception had generated a baroque ontology of terms. In a 
logically perfect language, in which every sentence appears in its true colours, 
mistakes like these would not be made.
'I think the importance o f ..............  grammar is very much greater than it is
generally thought to be. I think that practically all traditional metaphysics is 
filled with mistakes due to bad grammar, and that almost all the traditional 
problems of metaphysics and the traditional results - supposed results - of 
metaphysics are due to a failure to make the kind of distinctions in what we 
may call philosophical grammar [logical form] with which we have been 
concerned.' Russell [125] (269)
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Even over 40 years later, in 1959 Russell's opinions on this matter had not 
changed. In reply to Strawson's ordinary-language 'On Referring', Russell 
wrote:-
'I.....  am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy,
and that any attempt to be precise requires modification of common speech as
regards vocabulary and as regards syntax............. In philosophy, it is syntax,
even more than vocabulary, that needs to be corrected.'
Russell [128] (241 - 242)
«
The cure for the traditional mistakes of traditional philosophy lay through 
analysis and the exposure of logical fictions.
The present King of France is a logical fiction. Natural language makes it 
appear that the present King of France js in some fashion; whereas in a 
perfect language the phrase 'the present King of France' would disappear in 
the manner suggested by Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. To say 
that X was a logical fiction meant for Russell that when talk of X was 
analysed into the symbolism of a perfect language, no mention of X would 
appear. As Russell progressed in his philosophical career, he uncovered a 
surprisingly diverse number of logical fictions apart from the present King of 
France; numbers, classes, and even material objects and egos were to become 
logical fictions. Numbers were logical fictions because number-talk could be 
analysed into class-talk, and classes were logical fictions because talk of 
classes could be analysed in terms of propositional functions.
The use of the word 'analysis' in this context raises fairly obvious parallels 
with the physical sciences; particularly chemistry. In chemical analysis, the 
chemist begins with a chemical whose formula and molecular structure are 
unknown and he obtains knowledge of them by analysis: his goal is simply to 
describe accurately what he has got in his sample. The imputation of the
phrase ’logical analysis' is that the philosopher engaged in logical analysis is 
only concerned with making clear what is already contained in an assertion, 
and is not concerned in adding or subtracting from what is there, or judging 
whether that assertion is true. Wittgenstein interpreted analysis in this way 
and summed up the doctrine in the Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus.
'Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the 
clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is 
to make them clear and give them sharp boundaries.'
Wittgenstein [144] (4 - 112)
On this view, analysis was concerned with the explication of the meanings of 
signs. Since this activity required not special knowledge bar the familiarity 
with language that an old fashioned liberal education affords, analysis was 
heartily endorsed by many Oxbridge philosophers. By taking analysis to be the 
concern of philosophy, the philosophical establishment at Oxford were able to 
find refuge for themselves in a century in which, as Russell correctly 
predicted, those innocent of science would be pushed to the wall. In due 
course the activity of analysis was to be watered down even further in the 
shape of ordinary language philosophy.
Gilbert Ryle's 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', written in 1931 is a 
classical statement of analysis viewed through the foggy and grey-tinted 
lenses of the classically grounded philosopher interpreting analysis according 
to his own lights. Ryle's article will be used to illustrate Ryle's approach to 
analysis, what he thought it could achieve for philosophy, and also why it does
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Ryle opens up his article with an observation that Russell made; namely, that 
there are sentences in common use whose grammar is apt to be seriously 
misleading to philosophers. Lewis Carroll provides a delightful example in 
Alice through the Looking-Glass.
'I see nobody on the road' said Alice.
'I only wish J[ had such eyes’ the King remarked in a fretful tone. 'To be able to 
see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I^  can do to see 
real people, by this light!'
Lewis Carroll [23]
Needless to say, the White King misunderstands the use of 'nobody', which 
unlike, say 'Robinson' is not used to designate an entity. We might explain this 
to the King by saying that when Alice said that she saw nobody on the road, 
she meant that it was not the case that there was somebody she saw on the 
road. In Ryle's opinion, as in Russell's, mistakes occur in philosophy because of 
philosophers being confused like the White King about the use of words which 
are philosophically misleading. The cure (and the activity) of philosophy 
consists in replacing sentences which mislead by sentences which do not. So 
'Carniverous cows do not exist' means what is meant by the less misleading 'No 
cows are carniverous' and does not refer to a group of subsistent carniverous 
cows. 'Unpunctuality is reprehensible' is less misleadingly recast as 'Whoever 
is unpunctual merits reproof.'
The preceding two examples are Ryle's. It is when Ryle turns the focus of 
inquiry on more interesting and also more problematic examples that his 
method unravels. For example, Ryle considers the sentence 'The idea of 
taking a holiday has just occured to me' as less misleadingly recast as 'I have 
just been thinking that I might take a holiday'. Since Ryle adopts a 
behaviourist stance and rejects the existence of mental entities, it is easy to
see why Ryle prefers the latter sentence. But it is also true to say that Ryle
is right in saying that the second sentence is less misleading than the first only
if he is right in supposing that there are no mental entities, especially ideas!
This means, in effect, that in the most interesting and strongly contested
ontological questions do not admit of resolution by Ryle's technique. Ryle,
ontologically speaking, stocks the deck from the outset by condemning as
systematically misleading all expressions which impute the existence of
entities outside of his ontology. Methodologically, as far as ontology goes,
2Ryle's version of analysis is circular.
Russell, in contrast to Ryle and his Oxford contemporaries, was more
«
influenced by mathematics and the sciences than by the supposed forms of 
correct speech. Thus Russell's version of analysis is considerably less 
gentlemanly and respectful to ordinary use, than that developed by Ryle and 
others; it is also much more interesting. To distinguish Russell's version of 
analysis from Ryle's, I shall refer to Russell's version as 'revisionary analysis', 
of which these were the main features:-
(1) The purpose of revisionary analysis is to minimise our ontological 
commitments and to substitute logical fictions for assumed entities.
(2) The only entities which should be assumed are those entities which are 
given to us in experience.
(3) Revisionary analysis (unlike descriptive analysis) does not attempt to 
preserve meaning, but only structure.
I shall explain these points in order.
Russell was the end of a line of great philosophers, beginning with Descartes, 
who saw epistemology as the most important area of philosophy. The question 
of the scope of human knowledge occupied Russell throughout his career. Like 
Descartes, Russell believed that both scientists and ordinary people were
prone to accept a great many assertions that could not be defended in 
philosophy. In many cases, what made these assertions philosophically 
doubtful was that they assumed the existence of entities whose existence was 
rationally undemonstrable. These entities Russell called 'metaphysical'. Part 
of the job of the philosopher was to reframe those assertions in such a way as 
to give them the best chance of being true: and this meant getting rid of 
metaphysical entities from the common ontology. The end result of the 
philosophers' labour would be the elimination of a large number of different 
metaphysical entities in favour of a small number of assumed entities: 
entities of what may be called the minimum domain, (the smallest domain of 
entities necessary to support our assertions). This is how Russell interpreted 
Ockham's Razor.
'Suppose, e.g., that you have constructed your physics with a certain number of 
entities and a certain number of premises, suppose you discover that by a little 
ingenuity you can dispense with half of those entities and half of those 
premises, you have clearly diminished the risk of error, because if you had 
before 10 entities and 10 premises, then the 5 you have now would be all right, 
but it is not true conversely that if the 5 you have now are all right, the 10 
must have been. Therefore you diminish the risk of error with every 
diminution of entities and premises.'
Russell [125]
Revisionary analysis was the procedure whereby metaphysical entities were 
eliminated from our ontology. The technique of revisionary analysis was to 
substitute logical fictions for metaphysical entities, or as Russell puts it:-
'Wherever possible, substitute logical constructions for inferred entities ...'
Russell [125] (146 - 147)
What this meant was that assertions that reported on the existence of 
metaphysical entities were reinterpreted so as to refer to logical fictions. As 
you remember, to say X was a logical fiction was to say that in a perfect 
language (like that in PM) all statements about X could be analysed into a 
symbolism in which no mention of X appeared. The entities which were 
mentioned in the perfect language when analysis had reached an end, wold be 
the elements of the minimum domain. So the program of revisionary analysis 
had two parts (i) a substitution of logical fictions for metaphysical entities as 
the objects of reference for ’ordinary language sentences (ii) the elimination 
of logical fictions in favour of entities of the minimum domain.
«
By 1920 Russell believed that the entities of the minimum domain should be 
sense-data. In this respect Russell was very much the British empiricist, for 
he held that the elements of experience were sense-data and experience was 
the only basis for knowledge in respect to what exists. Russell was by no 
means always constant as to what the entities of the minimum domain were. 
For example in The Problems of Philosophy (1914), universals and selves were 
assumed entities. Roughly speaking, as Russell got older, his budget of 
minimum entities became smaller, (see Quine [115] for a statement of 
Russell's ontological development)
Russell believed that revisionary analysis would often carry one away from the 
meaning of the analysandum. A case in point is Whitehead's analysis of 'point' 
and 'straight line' in The Concept of Nature (an analysis Russell admired and 
often referred to). Whitehead analyses talk of points and instants of time in 
terms of abstractive sets of regions of space-time. There is no reason to 
suppose, and it would be implausible to suggest, that Whitehead was engaged in 
an analysis of the meaning or ordinary usage of 'point' or 'straight line'. In 'The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism', Russell confesses that meaning may not be all 
that pertinent to the procedure of revisionary analysis.
'I think that the notion of meaning is always more or less psychological, and 
that it is not possible to get a pure logical theory of meaning, nor therefore of 
symbolism.' Russell [125] (40)
What restrictions do bind revisionary analysis if preservation of meaning is not 
one of them? Russell answers many pages later.
'.........I think that any valid kind of interpretation ought to leave the detail
unchanged, though it may give a new meaning to fundamental ideas. In 
practice, this means that structure must be preserved. And a test of this is 
that all the propositions of science should remain, although new meanings may 
be found for their terms.' Russell [125] (161)
What Russell meant by 'structure' emerges by example from his earlier 
writings. In order to interpret sentences within the process of revisionary 
analysis, but also at the same time, to preserve their structure, one had to find 
some way of assigning extensions to the elements of those sentences which 
would preserve the truth of those deemed true, and the falsehood of those
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deemed false.
A good example is the Frege - Russell definition of cardinal number. In Frege 
and in Russell, a cardinal number is an equivalence class of similar classes. 
The cardinal number series, 0C, l c , 2C, 3C................is defined as follows.
0c ={x:x*rAj 
l c =[x: x « {0 c]$
2C =£x: x « { o c , l cJJ 
3C ={x: x teJoc , l c ,2c |^
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Cardinal addition [+] is defined thus; where m and n are cardinal numbers, 
m [+] n = x: (3y)(3z)(ye m & ze n & yOz =A & x*y U z)
From the definition, together with other definitions and axioms, [+] can be 
proved to be commutative and associative. Indeed if we assign [+] as the
extension of V  and fix EX('O'), .... so that EX('O') = 0C, EX('l') = l c ,.....then we
can recover many of the basic truths of arithmetic, including Peano's axioms. 
The extensions attached to the elements of the language of arithmetic may 
not be familiar. For Russell this did not matter. The important thing was that 
in interpreting arithmetic in this manner it was possible to preserve what was 
valuable in arithmetic (what mathematicians accepted as true) and, at the 
same time, to disperse with an ontology of unreduced natural numbers. It was 
never important to preserve the meanings attendant on arithmetical 
sentences. Whatwas important was that, syntactically, the same sentences 
should be counted in as true, after revisionary analysis, as had been counted in 
before. Any meaning-shift that transpired during this process was irrelevant. 
The philosophical heritage that Russell bequeathed to twentieth century 
philosophy was a rich one. He was, as William James wrote of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, 'a goldmine of ideas for the coming generation'. All of the succeeding 
figures in this chapter owe a lot to Russell; but not all of his ideas were of 
equal value. His belief that every sentence had a unique logical form was a 
weak element. Indeed, Russell in his Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, was already aware of the existence of competing, but equally 
satisfactory, set-theoretical formalisations of arithmetic. His decision to base 
his ontology on sense-data was also mistaken in retrospect (see 4.4). Butfor 
the realisation of the potential of symbolic logic to philosophy, he was ahead 
of the mass of his generation. In seeing that it was structure and not meaning 
that was important in formalisation; he was not only ahead of his own time,
but writing over sixty years ago, still ahead of philosophical logic at Oxford 
today.
2.3 Carnap
An early work in the formal tradition was Carnap's Per Loqische Aufbau der 
Welt, published in 1928, and translated and published in English as The Logical 
Structure of the World in 1967. Carnap's work is philosophically notable 
because it was the first sustained attempt to carry out the Russellian project 
of exhibiting a system by which all statements of fact could be analysed into 
reports about sense-data. That this project is fundamentally misguided does 
not detract from the value of the methodological remarks that Carnap has to 
make in that book. The fact that Carnap conveniently separates out his 
metaontological remarks in the first half of the book (pi - 105), from his 
exposition of his sense-datum ontology in the second, only makes the task of 
assessment much easier. Consequently in what I have to say I will concentrate 
almost entirely on Carnap's metaontology.
Carnap pursued ontology through the creation of a constructional system. In 
order to understand Carnap's metaontology, the elements of a constructional 
system have to be grasped.
One of these elements is that a constructional system contains an array of 
constructional definitions written in a constructional language. It is clear 
from Carnap's remarks that he envisaged the constructional language as 
modelled closely on the sort of language one finds in Principia Mathematica 
i.e. a first-order language. Constructional definitions were essentially rules 
which allowed certain symbols to be defined in terms of others and were 
formulated in a way appropriate to the symbols concerned. Carnap offers as 
an example the constructional definition ''x is a prime number' is coextensive 
with 'x is a natural number whose only divisors are 1 and x itself"
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(alternatively '(x) prime number x = (y )  divisor of (x = y v y = 1))'. The
statement can be thought of as a rule enabling us to eliminate all occurrences 
of the propositional function 'x is a prime number' in favour of 'divisor of', 
'natural number' and '1'.
The purpose of this system of constructional definitions was to exhibit a 
method whereby the elements of the constructional could be reduced to a few 
fundamental expressions which Carnap called basic concepts or undefined 
concepts. Any defined concept could be eliminated in context by recourse to 
the constructional definitions. The purpose of this process was to show that 
the only objects with which the constructional language was concerned were 
the objects which fell under the extension of the basic concepts. Carnap 
called these objects, 'basic objects' (= Russell's simples, the elements of his 
minimum domain). The objects which were the apparent subjects of the 
defined concepts, Carnap called logical complexes (= Russell's logical fictions 
or logical constructions). A constructional system can be thought of as a 
logical machine for demonstating the reducibility of a manifold of apparent 
objects, the logical complexes, to a few, the basic objects.
The second element of a constructional system is that it is also a means for 
achieving a unified science. The idea was that in a constructional system, 
axioms written in the constructional language could be formulated, from which 
the important truths of various branches of the sciences could be deduced. 
Carnap envisaged a constructional system as an axiomatised theory, in the 
manner of Principia Mathematics, from which the laws of science would be 
theorems.
'A theory is axiomatised when all statements of the theory are arranged in the 
form of a deductive system whose basis is formed by the fundamental 
concepts. So far, much more attention has been paid to the first task, namely, 
the deduction of statements from axioms, that to the methodology of the
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systematic construction of concepts. The latter is to be our present concern 
and is to be applied to the conceptual system of unified science. Only if we 
succeed in producing such a unified system of all concepts will it be possible to 
overcome the separation of unified science into unrelated special sciences.'
Carnap [18]
Carnap thought that, in order for a constructional system to be satisfactory, 
the constructional definitions had to satisfy a requirement: this requirement I 
call (since Carnap gives it no name) extensional adequacy. What is extensional 
adequacy?
To this question, Carnap gave two answers which he thought were equivalent, 
but in fact which are not. I shall tag them 'Answer A' and 'Answer B'.
Answer A
Carnap's first answer was that in order for a constructional definition to be 
extensionally adequate it had to relate definiens and definiendum which were 
extensionally coextensive. The point of this requirement was that such a 
definition would, in the context of a first-order language, allow from the 
systematic replacement salva veritate of the definiendum, wherever it 
occurred, by the definiens. In this way constructional definitions would allow 
statements which dealt with logical complexes to be broken down so as to 
preserve truth-value, into basic statements that dealt with basic objects. 
Goodman [53] has offered a number of criticisms of Carnap's answer (A). I 
shall not repeat them here. By far the most telling of all criticisms of 
extensional adequacy, as a criterion of the correctness of any constructional 
definition, comes from the reduction of arithmetic to set theory.
In the section on Russell, we saw one set-theoretical interpretation of natural 
numbers in terms of equivalence sets of similar sets. It is also quite feasible
to use ordinal instead of cardinal numbers to do the same job. Ordinal 
numbers are definable thus4: let ON be the property of being an ordinal 
number; then ON is defined:-
(x) ON x =(CON x & TRANS x).
CON and TRANS are thus defined:-
(x) CON x =  (CyXzXCy t x & z t x & - y  = z ) D ( z t y  v y t z ) )
(x) TRANS xS=(y)(y ex D  y cx )
This definition defines the following series of sets as ordinal numbers, the 
series itself being well-ordered by e. —
a-Ia)-K a}Ma MH*}})'
The numerals 'O', '1', '2', '3'......... can be interpreted so as to denote the
elements of this series. Moreover if the account is supplemented by sufficient 
set-theoretical machinery, then it is possible, by means of the above 
identification, to derive the Peano axioms. One can create a constructional 
system X for arithmetic based on cardinal numbers and one Y based on ordinal 
numbers and either will satisfy arithmetic. But in the context of Carnap's 
answer (A) at least one of X and Y must be wrong. In system X, based on 
cardinal (CARD) numbers, the definition of natural number (NUM) is:-
(x) CARD x =  NUM x.
In system Y, the definition is:
(x) ON x =  NUM X.
If both definitions are true then (x) CARD x =  ON x . But plainly cardinal and 
ordinal numbers are not the same. Therefore, by Carnap's criterion: at least 
one of X or Y is wrong. Since both systems are perfectly adequate to the 
demands of arithmetic, Carnap's answer (A) cannot be right.
Answer B
In his commentary on Carnap in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Norman M. 
Martin gives an interpretation of extensional adequacy somewhat different 
from answer (A).
'A concept x is said to be reducible to a set of concepts Y if every sentence
containing x can be transformed into sentences concerning concepts belonging
to Y (with preservation of truth-value). This transformation is carried out by
means of a rule, or constitutional [= constructional] definition. Although such
a rule is formally a definition, it need not be a definition in the sense of a
purely verbal transformation; that is, it need not be the case that the objects
indicated by the definition [definiens?] are the same objects as those indicated 
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by the definiendum.'
Martin [89] (Vol II. 26)
Martin's interpretation is somewhat more than slightly misleading because 
Carnap did believe that coextensiveness was the principle condition required 
to guarantee the adequacy of constructional definitions. Nevertheless Carnap 
did offer a functional definition of extensional adequacy very similar to, if not 
identical with, Martin's. Unlike Martin, Carnap was unaware that he was 
offering a substantially different account of reducibility and the adequacy of
constructional definitions than in (A). Consequently there is little 
development of answer (B) in the Aufbau. Carnap's comments are limited to a 
short passage.
'The purpose of construction theory is to order the objects of all sciences into
a system according to their reducibility to one another...... In view of this task,
it is advisable to express the criterion [of extensional adequacy] in still 
another form so that we no longer speak of propositional functions and their 
logical relations, but of states of affairs and their factual relations.... We now 
arrive at a factual criterion of reducibility which is wanting in logical 
strictness, but allows easier application to the empirical findings of the 
individual sciences. It is the following: we call an object a ''reducible to the
objects b,c,....... " if, for any state of affairs whatever relative to the objects
a,b,c..., a necessary and sufficient condition can be indicated which depends 
only upon objects b,c...'
Carnap [18] (79 - 80).
Carnap follows this up with an argument to the effect that his 'factual 
criterion' is equivalent to answer (A). In fact it is not. A first-order language 
L can have a number of isomorphic models with distinct domains. If I and J 
are isomorphic models of L and we have a specification of the isomorphism 
between I and J, then we can systematically 'translate' L-sentences about 
objects in the domain of I, under the interpretation I, into sentences about 
objects in the domain of J under interpretation J . Whatever object can be 
described under I , necessary and sufficient conditions for that object being 
involved in a given state of affairs in I, can be stated in terms of J . The 
language of arithmetic £o,',+,x} has a number of isomorphic models and we 
have seen that it can be legitimately interpreted to the domain of cardinal or 
ordinal numbers.
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Had Carnap pursued answer (B) he would have avoided several difficulties and 
reached a number of conclusions about structional systems that would have 
fitted in well with his later thought. First, he would have avoided the most 
telling objection to answer (A): namely that from cardinal and ordinal 
numbers. Secondly, he would have been compelled to recognise that there 
could be rival constructional systems, each adequate at yielding as theorems, 
the fundamental laws of science, but each based on a different set of basic 
objects. This recognition would have fitted in well with many of the things 
that Carnap had to say in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'. To 
understand how Carnap arrived at his position in that article, it is necessary to 
explain something of Carnap's metaphilosophy.
Carnap, like his contemporary logical positivists, drew a distinction between 
genuine statements and pseudo-statements. A genuine sentence could be of 
three kinds: (i) a statement of logic or mathematics, these were deducible 
from stipulative definitions and the rules for manipulating signs; (ii) 
statements of the empirical sciences; these were distinguished by the fact that 
observation sentences could be deduced from them or in conjunction with 
other observation sentences, new observation sentences could be deduced (iii) 
statements of logical syntax, which were essentially statements about 
statements and were the concern of philosophy. Pseudo-statements were 
found in traditional metaphysics and were distinguished by, (a) the fact that, 
like the statements of empirical science, they purported to be statements 
about the nature of the world, but (b), unlike statements of empirical science, 
no observations could be made which would determine their truth or falsity.
A language framework (also a linguistic framework) was similar in many ways 
to Carnap's earlier constructional system. A language-system was essentially 
a formal theory written in a formal language. L - rules (or as we would say 
now, deduction rules) permitted the derivation of one formal sentence from a
set of sentences and mathematical truths were those that could be deduced
from stipulative definitions laid down. L - truths were just those truths which 
were the combined sum of the logical and the mathematical truths. P - rules 
were, like L - rules, rules of transformation for moving from a set of 
sentences to a new sentence. Unlike L - rules, P - rules were not though ot as 
specifically 'logical' in character, but were thought as embodying inferences 
based on physical laws such as Newton's principles of mechanics, Maxwells's 
equations of electromagnetics and the like.
It is fairly obvious that if a language - system could be made to incorporate 
the findings of human beings, that all specifically mathematical or scientific 
questions that could be answered in terms of present-day knowledge, could be 
answered by addressing oneself to the theorems of the system. Where does 
that leave philosophy? Carnap believed that whereas the statements of logic, 
mathematics and the empirical sciences were to be found within the system, 
philosophy was concerned with statements about the system; or as he puts in 
Philosophy and Logical Syntax, philosophy is about logical syntax.
It was Carnap's opinion that in taking philosophy to be concerned with logical 
syntax, philosophers could learn to avoid the sterile debates and pseudo­
statements of traditional metaphysics. Any genuine set of philosophical 
questions and answers could be reformulated in terms of questions and answers 
about the logical syntax of a language-system. So for instance, a question 
about the nature of wisdom, could be reformulated as a syntax question about 
the L - rules and semantic postulates concerning the word 'wise'. This brings 
us to Carnap's distinction between the material and the formal modes of 
speech.
A sentence was in the material mode of speech when, syntactically, it looked 
as if it was a sentence concerned with extra-linguistic reality; but in content 
it was really concerned with language. Carnap [19] gives as an example the 
sentence 'That A is older than B, and B is older than A is an impossible state of 
affairs', which is written in the formal mode as "A is older than B and B is
older than A' Is contradictory*. This latter sentence was in the formal mode 
because syntactically it presented itself as a question about language. Carnap 
believed all philosophical activity should take place in the formal mode.
The consequences of applying Carnap's metaphilosophy to metaontology are 
interesting ones.
Ontological questions like 'Do numbers exist?' and 'What are numbers?' are 
questions addressed in the material mode of speech. Properly reformulated is 
the formal mode of sppech they have to be referred to one or another 
language-system. When this is done pseudo-problems in ontology disappear. 
Carnap illustrates:-
'To take a case in point, in the different systems of modern arithmetic dealt 
with logically, numbers are given different status. For instance in the system 
of Whitehead and Russell numbers are treated as classes of classes, while in 
the systems of Peano and of Hilbert they are taken as primitive objects. 
Suppose that two philosophers get into a dispute, one of them asserting: 
'Numbers are classes of classes', and the other: 'No, numbers are primitive 
objects, independent elements'. They may philosophise without end about the 
question what numbers really are, but in this way they will never come to an 
agreement. Now let them both translate their theses into one formal mode. 
Then the first philosopher makes the assertion: 'Numerical expressions are 
class-expressions of the second-order', and the other says: 'Numerical 
expressions are not class-expressions, but elementary expressions'.
In this form, however, the two sentences are not yet quite complete. They are 
syntactical sentences concerning certain linguistic expressions. But a 
syntactical sentence must refer to one or several specific language-systems; it 
is incomplete unless it contains such a reference. If the language-system of 
Peano is called L_i and that of Russell l_2, the two sentences may be completed
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as follows: 'In l_i numerical expressions are elementary expressions,' and: 'In 
l_2 numerical expressions are class expressions of the second order'. Now 
these assertions are compatible with each other and both are true; the 
controversy has ceased to exist.' Carnap [19]
These conclusions reach their fruition in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' 
where Carnap distinguished between external and internal questions in 
ontology.
External questions are questions like 'Are there numbers', 'Are there minds' 
which unrelativised to any language-framework are pseudo-questions. If these 
questions are relativised to a language-framework then they are sensible. A 
question like 'Are there (really) space-time points' is an external question. A 
question like 'Does this language-framework presuppose space-time points' is 
significant and an internal question. Within a language-framework the distinct 
categories of entity presupposed are marked out by the use of variables which 
range over entities of that type.
(The use of variables to mark out the distinct categories of things presupposed 
in a language-framework created a misunderstanding by Quine [109]. Quine 
wrongly mistook the internal-external distinction to mark out a distinction 
between questions of the form 'Are there Xs?'; where Xs were a proper subset 
of the range of some variables of a language-framework; and questions of the 
form 'Are there Ys?', where Ys were the range of certain variables of that 
language-framework. Quine then goes on to criticise Carnap, arguing that 
merely by adjusting the range of variables, external questions can become 
internal and conversely. It should be clear that Quine has misinterpreted 
Carnap. (See Ayer [11] for an indictment of Quine's misunderstanding)). 
Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions has been rejected 
on the grounds that it depends on the acceptance of something very much like 
the Verification Principle (Cornman [31], Goldstick [51]). Certainly there are 
passages in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' which have a strong 
positivistic flavour, like this one.
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'Suppose that one philosopher says: 'I believe that there are numbers as real 
entities. This gives me the right to use the linguistic forms of the numerical 
frameworks and to make semantical statements about numbers as designata of 
numerals'. His nominalistic opponent replies: 'You are wrong, there are no 
numbers. The numerals may still be used as meaningful expressions.. But they 
are not names, there are no entities designated by them ....' .. I cannot think 
of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by both 
philosophers, and therefore, if actually found, would decide the controversy or 
at least make one thesis more probable than another.... Therefore I feel 
compelled to regard the external question as a pseudo-question, until both 
parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question as a 
cognitive question, this would involve an indication of possible evidence 
regarded as relevant by both sides.'
Carnap [20] (219).
Under one interpretation, a very natural one, the argument is:
All declarative sentences which are neither verifiable or falsifiable are 
meaningless.
All declarative sentences which make ontological commitments to numbers 
etc., are neither verifiable or falsifiable.
All declarative sentences which make ontological commitments to numbers 
etc., are meaningless.
The criticism then is that the major premises of this syllogism is nothing 
better than a version of the discredited Verification Principle. Actually, this 
interpretation does little credit even to the consistency of Carnap's position!
If the conclusion of the syllogism is true then many of the sentences within the 
linguistic framework themselves are meaningless: namely, those that record
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their commitment to numbers, propositions and the like. A much fairer 
interpretation of Carnap runs, oratio dicta, somewhat as follows.
'Traditional ontology has produced a series of controversies about the 
existence of numbers, propositions and the like which have been sterile 
because no methodology has existed for their resolution. It is doubtful 
whether expressions like 'real' and 'exists' have any application to the items of 
the ontologist; for there appear to be no rules to settle their application. 
Whatever good can be found in ontology can only be found by agreeing to adopt 
a common methodology for the practice of ontology. This is to be found in my 
linguistic framework and in the systematic translation to the formal mode 6f 
speech.'
The conclusion of Carnap's thinking that external questions are pseudo­
questions which do not answer to rational discussion, seems contrary to Quine's 
view of ontological questions. Quine views all existence questions as logically, 
on a par, and questions about the existence of numbers or propositions differ 
only in their degree of generality from questions about the existence of King 
Arthur's crown or of subatomic particles like quarks.
'Our theory of nature grades off from the most concrete fact to speculations 
about the curvature of space-time, or the continuous creation of hydrogen 
atoms in an expanding universe; and our evidence grades off correspondingly, 
from specific observation to broadly systematic considerations. Existential 
quantifications of the philosophical sort belong to the same inclusive theory 
and are situated way out at the end, farthest from observable fact.'
Quine [12] (98)
In fact Carnap and Quine are not as divergent in their views as conventional 
wisdom believes, nor, perhaps, as either Carnap or Quine believe. In 
'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' Carnap admits an important fact: that 
certain language-frameworks are better than others and hence we can have 
rational reason to prefer one language-framework to another.
'To accept the thing [= physical object] world means nothing more than to 
accept a certain form of language.... The decision of accepting the thing 
language, although not itself a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be 
influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision 
concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules.... The efficiency, 
fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the 
decisive factors.
Carnap [20] (208)
'A question like 'Are there (really) space-time points' is ambiguos...., it may be 
meant in the following sense: 'Are our experiences such that that the use of 
the linguistic forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?' This is a 
theoretical question of a factual empirical nature.'
Carnap [22] (213)
The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the 
acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of science, 
will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the 
results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required.'
Carnap [22] (221)
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Carnap's pragmatic criteria, efficiency, results, expedience, simplicity, 
fruitfulness which he regards as desiderata in selecting a linguistic framework 
are the same criteria that Quine invokes as desiderata in selecting an 
ontology.
'Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our 
acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least 
insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the 
disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged.'
Quine [116] (16)
If there is some linguistic framework L, and L is distinguished by its 
fruitfulness, economy etc and L presupposes the existence of a kind K, and, 
further, this presupposition is essential to L retaining its pragmatically 
desirable features then surely this is evidence that Ks do in fact exist. If so 
then the statement 'Ks exist' and the question 'Do Ks exist’ is not pseudo­
statement and a pseudo-question respectively. Each is amenable to rational 
discussion in relation to objective features of language-frameworks; and 
Carnap's hard distinction between external and internal questions vanishes.
2 A  Goodman
Nelson Goodman's contributions towards a nominalist ontology in The 
Structure o f Appearance and (with Quine) in 'Steps towards a Constructive 
Nominalism' have been important and original. His important metaontological 
contributions though are more limited, and occur principally in the first 
chapter of The Structure of Appearance. Essentially, Goodman's metaontology 
is much the same as Carnap's in the Aufbau, except that Goodman differs from 
Carnap in arguing that coextension between definiens and definiendum in a 
constructional definition is not a necessary condition of the definition being 
adequate; though it is, according to Goodman, a sufficient one.
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Goodman argues that coextension is not what to look for between definiendum 
and definiens but extensional isomorphism is. What Goodman has to say about 
extensional isomorphism is largely contained in the following long passage.
'If we now look more closely at the very divergent definitions of a given
concept that were equally legitimate, we find that they possess in common one
feature that every illegitimate definition lacks; namely, that in each
legitimate definition, the extension of the definiens is isomorphic to the
extension of the definiendum. The necessary and sufficient condition for the
accuracy of a constructional definition seems to be that the definiens be
*
extensionally isomorphic to the definiendum. More generally, the set of all 
the definientia of a system must be extensionally isomorphic to the set of all 
the definienda. I shall explain first and illustrate the kind of isomorphism I 
mean and then consider whether this criterion is satisfactory.
We may think of the extensions of the definienda and definientia in question as 
relations - that is, classes of couples, classes of triples, and classes of longer 
sequences of any uniform length. While sequences may in turn be construed as 
classes, it is simpler to disregard this for our immediate purposes. A class of 
individuals or other one-place sequences may be considered as a monadic 
relation. By the components of a sequence I shall mean the elements that 
occupy entire places in the sequence. Thus the sequence
«a,b>,c>,<d,e>
is a couple: its components are <<a,b>,c> and <d,e>, not the couple <a,b> or 
any single individuals. On the other hand, if we progressively dissolve each 
component that is a sequence into its components any every component that is 
a class into its members, and continue this until we reach elements that have 
no further members, we have what I call the ultimate factors of the sequence.
Here they are a and b and c and d and e. The ultimate factors of a relation or 
other class are reached in a similar fashion. For our purposes in the present 
chapter, a sequence is not considered to be identified, as by the Wiener- 
Kuratowski definition, with a class. An ultimate factor is always either an 
individual or the null class.
A relation R is isomorphic to a relation S in the sense here intended if and only 
if R can be obtained by consistently replacing the ultimate factors in S. 
Consistent replacement requires only that each not-null ultimate factor be 
replaced by one and only one not-null element; that different not-null 
elements; and that the null class be always replaced by itself. Since the 
replacing elements need not be ultimate factors (eg. h,k might replace t) this 
sort of isomorphism is not symmetric; for if R is isomorphic to S, still there 
may be no way of replacing the ultimate factors in R so as to obtain S. 
Nevertheless, if R can be obtained by consistently replacing the ultimate 
factors in S by certain elements of R, it will also be true that S can be 
obtained by replacing those elements in R by the correlated ultimate factors 
of S. It is often more convenient to work in this direction in establishing that 
R is isomorphic to S, but it should be noted that this does not establish the 
isomorphism of S to R. Every relation is, or course, isomorphic to itself. Also 
any class having the same number of members as a given class of individuals is 
isomorphic to it, but a class is not necessarily isomorphic to every class having 
the same number of members or ultimate factors.'
Goodman [53] (13 - 14)
There are some peculiarities and mistakes in this passage. For example 
Goodman writes of the ordered pair <h,k> as 'h,k' rather than the usual '<h,k>'. 
I shall follow the usual practice. His reference to the Wiener-Kuratowski 
definition of ordered pair is wrong since Wiener and Kuratowski offered 
different definitions of ordered pairs. Kuratowski's definition; viz:-
<a,b> = fa  ,[a,b]j
would serve Goodman's purposes well since the ultimate factors of <a,b> are a
would obviously not suit Goodman's purposes, since the ultimate factors of 
£a are a,b and A. It is useful, in the interests of formal clarity, to do
what Goodman did not: which is to formalise the above account. Unlike 
Goodman I shall identify ordered pairs with sets in the manner of Kuratowski. 
Where A is any set, a factor of A is given by the following equivalence:-
(x) factor (x ,A )=(x c A v (3y) (factor (y,A) & x c y))
This definition is not circular; its content is reproduced by the following 
inductive definition.
For any x, and for any y:-
(1) If x e A, x is a factor of A
(2) If y is a factor of A, and x e y, then x is a factor of A.
(3) If x is not a factor of A by (1) and (2), then x is not a factor of A.
F (A) is the set of factors of A. The set (¿£A) of ultimate factors of A is given 
by the identity:
¿¿(A ) = [x: - set x v x =A}flF(A)
Where A and B are any sets, A is extensionaily isomorphic to B if any only if 
there is an extensional isomorphism e defined from B to A. Where e is a
and b and likewise with (Wiener's definition, <a,b> =
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function which satisfies the following conditions:-
(i) The domain of e is F(B).
(ii) Where x and y are ultimate factors of B:-
x = A=e(x) = A
-(x = y>D -(e(x) = e(y))
(iii) Where z is any non-ultimate factor of B:-
e(z) = [x: (3 y) y e z &. e(y) = x j  
£x: (By) y e B & e(y) = xj = A
In sum Goodman's account of extensional isomorphism is as follows:-
A constructional definition of the form <|>= ¿fiji is O.K. 
if, and only if ^
vji is extensionally isomorphic to <|» 
that is, if and only if
EX(<|>) is extensionally isomorphic to EX(<|>) 
that is, if and only if
there is an extensional isomorphism defined from EX($) to EX(<|>)
Goodman's extensional isomorphism criterion produces some strange results. 
For instance, Goodman states extensional isomorphism is not necessarily 
symmetrical. Consequently it would be possible for a constructional definition 
of the form $ =cjf*!• to be O.K. by Goodman's criterion but not one of the form 
• From a logical point of view, the order of the definia presented in a 
definition should not influence the adequacy of the definition, since, logically, 
. . . . .  both are equivalent.
Another weakness of Goodman's account is that in identifying the adequacy of 
a system in terms of the adequacy of all of its constructional definitions,
insufficient emphasis is placed on the role of the theorems of the system. So, 
let C i be a constructional system which takes as its set of definienda, the 
arithmetical expressions of basic arithmetic. Suppose C j offers constructional 
definitions of those expressions in a way that identifies the natural number 
series with cardinal numbers and the relations and operations over this series 
with relations and operations over the set of cardinal numbers. Each 
definition of C j should be O.K. by Goodman's criterion. Suppose C2 offers an 
alternative constructional system using the same set of definienda but basing 
the reduction of natural numbers on ordinal numbers. C2 might be O.K. too. 
It is obvious that if, (in the Goodmanian sense) C i and C2 are O.K. as 
constructional systems so should any C3 where C3 S C 1 U C2. But plainly a 
constructional system that identified natural numbers with cardinal numbers, 
but used the definitions of arithmetical operations and relations appropriate to 
a system based on ordinal numbers would be totally inadequate. Within such a 
system it would be impossible to recover the basic truths of arithmetic as 
theorems of the system.
A final failing of Goodman's criterion is one that it shares with Quine's 
criterion of ontological reduction (see chapter six). Extensional isomorphism 
demands that we admit the objects of the definiendum into our ontology as 
unreduced objects. Consider an ontologist who defines natural numbers in 
terms of cardinal numbers. He cannot claim to have shown, on this basis, that 
we can dispense with an ontology containing unreduced objects; for to assume 
there are no unreduced natural numbers is to assume £x: natural number 
xj= A and hence that there is not extensional isomorphism from the set of 
natural numbers to the set of cardinal numbers and that his definition is not 
O.K.. His only alternative then is to admit the existence of natural numbers 
as a natural consequence of the adequacy of his definition. But since the point 
of the exercise was to show the redundancy of natural numbers, this seems 
self-defeating. The final course - admitting both natural numbers and cardinal
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numbers but identifying the two - runs into the same essential difficulties that 
Carnap's definition (A) of extensional adequacy did: namely, there are equally 
satisfactory nonequivalent definitions of the same arithmetical concepts.
2.5 Quine
As one of the greatest living formalists, Quine's work in metaontology has 
been as important as Russell's. At the cost of a certain inevitable
artificiality, Quine's contribution to metaontology can be divided into three 
areas.
(1) The statements of his criterion of ontological commitment. These were 
reviewed in chapter one.
(2) Quine's remarks on formalisation and the truth of ontological hypotheses. 
These are the subject of this section.
(3) His views on ontological relativity and ontological reduction. These are
dealt with in 6.5. *
Quine's initial position to ordinary language sentences is precisely the same as 
Russell's: they are grammatically misleading and ontologically unperspicuos.
'The trouble is that there is no simple correlation between the outward forms 
of ordinary affirmations and existences implied. Thus, granted that the 
construction exemplified by 'Agnes has fleas' can often be accorded the
forthrightly...... existential sense intended by '( 3x) Fx & Gx', there remain
abundant cases like 'Tabby eats mice' and 'Ernest hunts lions' that cannot. 
Reflective persons unswayed by wishful thinking now and again have cause to 
wonder what, if anything they are talking about.'
Quine [119] (242)
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Quine's solution is broadly the same as Russell's: the solution to this tangle is 
to rephrase our existing theories into an ontologically more perspicous 
notation. Quine believes this notation will be a first-order language and the 
process of rephrasing which I have called 'formalisation', Quine calls 
'regimentation' or 'paraphrase'.
At the end of the previous chapter, it became clear that the constraints which 
bind the enterprise of formalisation are of crucial importance in 
metaontology. Without any guide as to what constitutes a good formalisation 
there seemed to be no point to any of Quine's criteria of ontological 
commitment, and with the wrong guides, problems like the Paradox of 
Formalisation arose. It would be reasonable to expect that Quine would 
expend much effort on clarifying the nature of formalisation and the relations 
between natural and formal language theories. But although Quine does offer 
some examples of formalisation with respect to belief sentences, his remarks 
on the criteria for good formalisation are brief and not altogether helpful. 
What he does say is limited to the quotation below.
•[Preservation of meaning is not] to be claimed for the paraphrase. Synonymy, 
for sentences generally, is not a notion that we can readily make adequate
sense of....... and even if it were it would be out of place in these cases. If we
paraphrase to resolve ambiguity, what we seek is not a synonymous sentence 
but one that is more informative by dint of resisting some alternative 
interpretations. Typically, indeed, the paraphrasing of a sentence S of 
ordinary language into logical symbols will issue in substantial divergences. 
Often the result S' will be less ambiguos than S, often it will have truth values
under circumstances under which S has none.....and often it will even provide
explicit references where S uses indicator words....[The] relation [of S'] to S is 
just that the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying 
to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough
to suit him by using S' instead of S. We can even let him modify his purposes 
under the shift, if he pleases'. Quine [119] (159 - 160)
Quine's remarks hardly provide a shopping list of positive features any 
formalisation should satisfy: instead we are given a few features that 
formalisation does not have to satisfy and then left to muddle through as best 
as we can.
Quine's cavalier attitude to the problems of formalisation does have a 
justification which is internal to his metaontology. Quine believes not only 
that ordinary language is grammatically confused but that it is so confused as 
to merit its complete rejection in the processes of ontology. Ontology can 
only be seriously practised within first-order notation or something like it. 
From Quine's point of view, the interest in the ontology of a speaker only 
begins when that speaker expreses himself in a formal language; so it really 
does not matter what criteria the speaker uses to formalise his ordinary 
discourse. From this perspective, Quine's sketchy picture of how formalisation 
should proceed is not a symptom of carelessness, but of professional and 
conscious disinterest. This is how Quine puts his case:-
'Futile caviling over ontic implications gives way to an invitation to 
reformulate one's point in the canonical notation. We cannot paraphrase our 
opponent's sentences into canonical sentences for him and convict him of the 
consequences, for there is no synonymy; rather we must ask him what 
canonical sentences he is willing to offer, consonantly with his own 
inadequately expressed purposes. If he declines to play this game, the 
argument terminates. To decline to explain oneself in terms of quantification, 
or in terms of those special idioms of ordinary language by which 
quantification is directly explained, is simply to decline to declare one's 
refential intent'
Quine [119] (242 - 3)
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Quine's deliberate abandonment of a systematic theory of formalisation has 
two immediate dividends and one long term loss. The most immediate 
dividend is a saving of work. The next most immediate dividend is that Quine 
really sidesteps the Paradox of Formalisation. The Paradox of Formalisation 
depends on the assumption that formalisation should preserve ontological 
commitment. Quine makes hardly any assumptions about how formalisation 
should proceed, and certainly does not make that one.
Now for the long-term loss. However interesting the byways of metaontology 
the prime purpose of the subject is to uncover a methodology of ontology 
which is capable of rationally determining our ontological beliefs. This 
requires of a good metaontology that it provide a means for rationally 
distributing truth-values to ontological sentences. Writing one's ontological 
prejudices in canonical notation does not help in itself to determine if these 
prejudices have any foundation or not. What is needed (and from Quine) is a 
method by which we can judge the results of our formalisation to see if the 
ontological commitments there recorded are well-founded or not. This is 
where Quine incurs his long-term loss and this is what Quine has to say.
'Now how are we to adjudicate between rival ontologies? Certainly the answer 
is not provided by the semantical formula 'To be is to be the value of a 
variable'; this formula serves rather, conversely, in testing the conformity of 
a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological standard. We look to bound 
variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in 
order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else's says 
there is ... .
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our 
acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least 
insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the 
disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged. Our
ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the overall conceptual scheme 
which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense; and the 
considerations which determine a reasonable construction of any part of that 
conceptual scheme, for example, the biological or physical part, are not 
different in kind from the considerations which determine a reasonable 
construction of the whole.'
Quine [116] (15-17)
'Existence statements differ in no way, epistemologically, from theoretical 
sentences generally. They are parts of an inclusive theory whose overall claim 
to acceptance resides in the systematic simplicity, or something like that, 
with which the whole theory accommodates our observations. I am sorry that I 
have nothing new to say by way of illuminating this vague matter of the 
acceptability of theories.'
Quine [114] (95)
Quine is right in saying that his criteria of acceptability are vague: but his 
admission leaves him exposed to Carnap's attack on ontology. If the criteria 
are as loose and as vague as even Quine admits they are, is this not good 
evidence to show Carnap is right in saying that traditional ontological 
questions are pseudo-questions without good means of settling them?
These is a core of a Quinean response in both the quoted passages above. It is 
this. The criteria for evaluating the acceptability of scientific theories are no 
less vague than the criteria for assessing ontologies: in fact they are the 
same. So if ontology is to be rejected because those criteria are too vague, so 
should science. The reply is effective because very few philosophers would be 
heroic enough to reject Western science. But is the comparison between 
science and ontology a good one? Principally, are ontological questions on a 
par with scientific ones as Quine says they are?
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In one very important sense, ontological theories (as Quine presents them) and 
scientific theories seem to differ, and Quine's comparison between the two 
suffers from the Fallacy of Division. (The Fallacy of Division holds that what 
is true of the whole must be true of all its parts. Thus the argument 'I am 
made of my molecules; my molecules are not alive, therefore I am not alive' 
commits the Fallacy of Division). Quine is right in thinking that the criteria 
which govern the acceptability of scientific theories in general are vague. But 
when we come down to specific scientific theories the picture is very 
different. Very often it happens that scientists are well aware of the exact 
observations and results that would discredit or confirm a theory and the 
criteria of acceptability are not at all vague. This is true even of the more 
architectonic pieces of science like Relativity Theory which in its generality 
and abstractness should approach ontological theories more closely than most 
portions of science. It is only when we draw together all scientific theories 
and ask what acceptability for all cases amounts to, that the philosophical 
platitudes ('simplicity', 'accommodates our observations') plod in. (Compare 
answers to 'What is the point of brushing your teeth?' and 'What is the point of 
anything?').
But ontology has not been comparable to science in this respect: ontologists 
have not agreed on the sorts of evidence relevant to a given ontological 
hypothesis and the history of ontology is not one of precise hypothesis and 
experiment. This was of course what Carnap's complaint about ontology was 
really about; that ontologists lacked criteria for resolving their own disputes. 
Quine's failure to define clearly what makes an ontological hypothesis 
acceptable, derives in part from his abandonment of any theory of 
formalisation. Had Quine produced such a theory he could have characterised 
a good ontological hypothesis thus:- a good ontological hypothesis is 
committed to a kind K if and only if Ks are quantified over in a theory Tc , 
where Tc is a canonical theory which is the proper formalisation of a true
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theory Tn. As it is, Quine's counsel to show 'tolerance and an experimental 
spirit' to ontologies is rather redundant. In the absence of a clear idea of what 
experiments to perform, tolerance of a flaccid kind seems our only option.
2.6 Davidson
Davidson is unique amongst the five formalists considered in this chapter in 
placing his theory of formalisation squarely in the theory of meaning. (Indeed, 
to a large extent, Davidson's theory of meaning is his theory of formalisation.) 
According to Davidson, an acceptable theory of meaning M for a language L 
provides for each sentence s of L, a true statement as to what s means. Since 
to understand M and to know M is true is to know the meaning of every 
sentence of L; and to know the meaning of every sentence of L is to be a 
master of L; we can also characterise an adequate theory of meaning for a 
language L as something that when understood, and known to be true, will 
make us masters of L. This is how Davidson puts its-
•........someone who knows the theory can interpret the utterances to which the
theory applies' Davidson [37] (315)
A second feature of an adequate theory of meaning M for a language L is 
related to the fact that languages are learnable. If natural languages were 
such that every sentence that had never been heard by a speaker was not 
understandable to him, and had to be learnt as an unfamiliar word is learnt, 
then languages would be humanly unlearnable. This point, Davidson conceeds, 
depends on a number of empirical assumptions:-
'....for example, that we do not at some point suddenly acquire an ability to 
intuit the meanings of sentences on no rule at all; that each new item of
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vocabulary takes some finite time to be learned; that man is mortal.'
Davidson [34] (388)
Nevertheless the point is true.
The question then arises as to how finite intelligences operating in a finite 
lifespan can learn to use natural languages. The answer Davidson gives (and he 
is surely right) is that we learn to understand sentences by understanding the 
words in them and how their mode of combination helps determine the 
meaning of the sentences of which they are a part.
'When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite 
number of features of the sentence, we have an insight not only into what 
there is to be learned; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be 
encompassed by finite accomplishments.'
Davidson [34] (387)
Davidson links this view with an important constraint on a theory of meaning.
'..... a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of how the
meanings of sentences depend the meanings of words. Unless such an account 
can be supplied for a particular language, it is argued, there would be no 
explaining the fact that we can learn the language: no explaining the fact 
that, on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules, we are 
prepared to produce and to understand any of a potential infinity of sentences.'
Davidson [37] (304)
A theory of meaning M for a language L should tell us how the meanings of L 
sentences are a function of the meaning and arrangement of L words. 
Obviously, if M is merely an infinite set of assertions of the form 'S means
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that p', where S is a structural name of an L sentence and p is some sentence, 
then M will not be an adequate theory of meaning for L. M will not explore 
the structure of L sentences nor the meanings of L words. This possibility can 
be avoided if M is required to be finite. In this case, M would consist of a 
finite number of assertions concerning the rules of meaning for L from which 
it would be possible to deduce the meaning of each L sentence. Davidson's 
idea was that any finite theory of meaning would be forced to explore the 
semantic structure of L sentences, to stay finite.
This left Davidson with the problem of the exact form in which a theory of 
meaning is to be couched and how it is to be tested. One way of 'generating' 
an infinite number of assertions from a finite number is by constructing an 
axiomatic system in which there are a finite number of axioms but an infinite 
number of theorems to be deduced. Perhaps what is needed is an axiomatic 
system, containing a finite number of axioms, from which theorems of the 
form 'S means that p' can be deduced.
But the phrase 'means that' is philosophically obscure. So Davidson suggested 
'S means that p' be dispensed with and replaced by 'S is T =  p', where T is some 
as yet unknown predicate. Davidson's idea was that if the right restrictions 
were placed on T and on M itself, that from ["m S is T =  p, we would be able to 
infer that S means that p.
Davidson further suggested that 'true' replace ’T'. Theorems of M thus include 
sentences of the form 'S is true =  p'. An example of such a theory for English 
might be:-
'Snow is white' is true=snow is white.
Students of Tarski's theory of truth will recognise the above sentence as a 
substitution - instance of Tarski's T-schema 'S is tru e= p '. Tarski showed, for 
any first-order language, how to construct an axiomatised theory that would
provide, for each sentence of the first-order (object) language in question, a 
theorem of the form 'S is true^p'. S was the metalanguage name of an object 
language sentence and p was a metalanguage sentence. Tarski allowed the 
derivation of an infinite number of such theorems from a finite number of 
axioms which stated satisfaction conditions of the object language variables. 
Davidson seized on Tarski’s means of generating equivalences of the form 'S is 
tru e= p ' as a way of generating the same equivalences within his theory of 
meaning. Tarski had a way of deducing an infinite number of these 
equivalences from a finite number of axioms which went into the structure of 
the object language sentences. This was the sort of thing that Davidson 
thought a theory of meaning should do. So why not equate a Tarski-style 
theory of truth for a language L with a Davidsonian theory of meaning for 
language L? Davidson did.
'We have such theories, I suggest, in theories of truth of the kind Tarski first 
showed how to give.'
Davidson [37] (318)
A Tarski-style theory of truth for a language L was the proper form for a 
theory of meaning M for L. Suppose that L was English. Davidson envisaged 
that a more-or-less formal portion of English (let us call it Formal English) 
would receive a Tarskian explication of the truth-conditions of its sentences. 
So in such a theory we might have as a theorem:-
'(3x) dog x* is true =  (3x) dog x.
Davidson believed a feature of this Formal English is that, although it would 
not include every English sentence, anything that could be stated in English 
could be stated in Formal English. Since Davidson expresses a clear
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preference for using first-order languages, this amounts to the belief that
what can be stated in any natural language can be reproduced in a first-order
language. Here one must interject an element of doubt about the whole
Davidsonian program. It is by no means evident that any formal language yet
constructed can match the subtleties and expressive capacities of a natural
language as rich in nuances of meaning as English. Strawson for instance, puts
up fairly convincing arguments to show how the meanings of logical constants
differ from the accepted readings given to them. I doubt if '3 ' means what is
meant by 'if...then' and I doubt that 'if...then' has only one meaning in use. (See
Austin [6] for an analysis of the different meanings of 'if'). Such features of
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English as tone seem neglected on Davidson's truth-conditions theory of 
meaning. It is ironic that Tarski, from whom Davidson draws so much 
inspiration, should have precisely these doubts.
'Whoever wishes, in spite of all difficulties, to pursue the semantics of 
colloquial language with the help of exact methods will be driven first to 
undertake the thankless task of a reform of this language... It may however be 
doubted whether the language of everyday life, after having been 'rationalised' 
in this way, would still preserve its naturalness and whether it would not 
rather take on the characteristic features of the formalised languages.'
Tarski [141] (267)
Whatever the hopes for the Davidsonian program in the long term, Davidson 
himself is optimistic. Once a Tarskian truth-theory for Formal English has 
been given we can extend this theory to the whole of English by associating 
the Formal English sentence with all those English sentences which mean the 
same. Davidson believed Chomsky's work in transformational grammar offers 
help in this task: for transformational grammar is largely concerned with 
transforming the output of certain PS-grammars into sentences each of which
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are identical in meaning. This close parallel between this aspect of Davidson's 
work on the theory of meaning and Chomsky's ideas has led Harman [62] [63] to 
identify Chomsky's deep structure with Davidson's logical form7. So, returning 
to our previous T-sentence, '(3x) dog x' is true— (3 x) dog x'; transformational 
rules would associate '(3 x) dog x' with various synonymous sentences in 
Informal English. The structure of a Davidsonian theory of meaning is 
illustrated in diagram 2.1.
When does such a theory of meaning M give a proper representation of the 
meaning of L sentences? Once again Davidson borrowed off Tarski. Tarski 
held any good theory of truth for a language L should have as a consequence 
ail substitution-instances of the schema 'S is tru e~ p ' where s is the structural 
name of p. This was Tarski's material adequacy condition on any theory of 
truth. Following a policy of taking truth for granted and defining for meaning, 
Davidson adapted Tarski's material adequacy condition. Davidson argued that 
M gave a good account of the meanings of L sentences just when all theorems 
of M which were of the form 'S is true= p' were true.
Davidson summed up,
'It is enough to demonstrate that a theory gf truth [= a theory of meaning in 
Davidson's view] is empirically correct, then, to verify that the T-sentences 
are true ....' Davidson [37] (321)
This requirement is Davidson's convention T. (It should be said that Davidson 
undoubtedly envisages that if 'S is true s  p' is a T-sentence of M, and S is 
asociated by transformational rules with S', then 'S' is true= p' is also to be 
counted as a T-sentence of M).
How do Davidson's theories about meaning relate to the metaontological 
questions with which we are concerned? Simply, many philosophers consider 
that Davidson has provided a methodology for correlating each sentence of a
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Diagram 2.1
INFORMAL SENTENCES OF L
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natural language L with the logical form of that sentence. The logical form of 
any L sentence is thought of as a meaning-preserving formal equivalent of that 
sentence. Because any sentence and its Davidsonian logical form are 
ontologically equivalent, the logical form of an L sentence reproduces with 
canonical clarity the ontological commitments of that L sentence. In 
determining the ontological commitments of all true L sentences, by 
examination of their individual logical forms, the ontologist detemines what 
there is.
I shall not explore Davidson's theory of meaning any further than this! The 
important issues have already been defined by what has been written so far.
It is generally recognised that Davidson's convention T is insufficient as a 
guarantee that a theory of meaning M for a language L is a good theory of 
meaning for L. Platts summarises why this is.
'First, given a truth theory which serves up only true biconditionals, we can 
construct quite automatically any number of other truth-theories which also 
serve up only true biconditionals, yet which pair quite different metalanguage 
sentences with each object-language sentence. For example, we can construct 
a theory that yields on the RHS of each T-sentence the conjunction of that 
served up by the previous theory with a truth, say, 'Snow is white'. A 
moment's reflection shows that 'p' and 'p & snow is white' will agree in truth- 
value; so if the original truth-theory satisfied...[convention T]..., so will this 
new one.... The second objection is more evidently substantial... A theory of 
meaning, we have maintained throughout, must connect with speakers' under­
standing of their language. One concrete instance of this is that we should not 
credit them with an understanding they do not have. Now consider at 
backward community who have a term for 'water', but lacking a developed 
science, know nothing of its structure. Taking any sentence of theirs in which 
the term for water is used, we shall obtain a true T-sentence if on the RHS we
9 5
replace 'water' by 'h^O'; for 'water' and 'H2O' are extensionally equivalent. 
But to use the H2O sentence on the RHS is mistaken since it credits the native 
speakers with an understanding, a knowledge, they lack. '9
Platts [100] (65 - 66)
Criticisms like these have led Davies [41] to distinguish between a theory of 
truth for a language, which satisfies convention T, and a theory of meaning for 
a language which satisfies convention T and other criteria too. It is the 'other 
criteria' that prove the problem to the development of Davidson's work. 
McDowell [91] suggests that a good theory of meaning for a language L should 
represent L speakers as rational in their beliefs. But this is much too vague to 
pass muster.
These difficulties in Davidson's work are well known to those current with the 
literature. What does not attract interest, but what is also just as important, 
is whether the theory of meaning is the best framework within which to 
develop a theory of formalisation. The gulf between the old-style formalists 
such as Russell, Carnap, Goodman and Quine and the host of philosophical 
logicians at Oxford and elsewhere who practice formalisation in the wake of 
Davidson, could hardly be greater on this point. Yet it barely passes mention 
in the current literature. All of the formalists considered prior to Davidson 
did not consider preservation o f meaning to be a requirement of formalisation. 
The reason why this was, is that these philosophers, being grounded in 
mathematics and science in a way that their successors at Oxford are not, 
were aware that some of the most impressive formalisations, most particularly 
of mathematics, had shown no concern with meaning at all. The goal had 
always been to preserve what Russell loosely called the 'structure' of the 
original theories.
We have already seen two examples of structure-preserving formalisations of 
arithmetic in terms of cardinal and ordinal numbers. There are others. A case
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in point is Dedekind's and Cantor's rival constructions of the real numbers.
Dedekind defined a real number as a section or cut of the rationals. Peano and
Russell followed suit. Cantor however defined a real number as an
equivalence class of Cauchy sequences. Dedekind's and Cantor's approaches
are interestingly different since they use diverse set-theoretical constructions.
Neither Cantor nor Dedekind were interested in whether their approaches
captured the 'meaning' or the 'logical form' of sentences which mentioned real
numbers. Nor have the mathematicians who followed them been inclined to
sterile wrangling over the question of the logical form of real number
sentences. The question never arose. All that was important was whether
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these set-theoretical sentences mirrored the sorts of arithmetical properties 
of real numbers that mathematicians were interested in keeping. Both 
Dedekind and Cantor, in their different ways, were successful in accomplishing 
this task.
The issues here are plain enough to see for those with the ability to learn: 
meaning is not where the action is in formalisation. But there are ways in 
which Davidsonian disciples can try to wriggle off the hook. One way of 
evading the issues is to invoke the Quinean thesis of the Indeterminacy of 
Translation. The defence is as follows. Davidson accepts the Indeterminacy 
thesis and he accepts that there can be diverse theories of meaning for one 
object language, each such theory being fully satisfactory in itself. Why not 
regard Cantor's and Dedekind's rival treatments of real numbers as evidence 
for an Indeterminacy present in arithmetic?
There are two reasons why this reply will not do. The first is that if the 
Indeterminacy of Translation is taken into the Davidson theory of meaning, 
then the doctrine that each sentence has one and only one logical form has to 
go. Different, but equally satisfactory theories of meaning for an object 
language may (and will in some cases) assign competing formal sentences to 
the same object language sentence. But second, and more importantly, it is
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most implausible to view Dedekind's or Cantor's work with real numbers as 
being competing views on the proper interpretation of the meaning of real 
number sentences. At the time of their foundational work, mathematicians, as 
a linguistic community, were either mostly either ignorant of, uninterested in, 
or suspicious of the infant discipline of set theory. There is not the slightest 
reason to credit these men with utterances that presumed a deeper technical 
embrace of set theory than that they possessed.
Despite garbled attempts like Evans [43] to illuminate the concept of logical 
form, not a great deal of success has been achieved. The attempt to elucidate 
the logical forms of various natural language sentences has resembled Lewis 
Carroll's Hunting of the Snark. Not only is the beast mythical, but there is a 
lack of agreement amongst the participants about what they are supposed to 
be looking for. At Oxford the new parlour game of 'find the logical form' has 
replaced their previous preoccupation with the trivialities of ordinary use. 
The deficiencies of this approach are best illustrated by example. The field in 
contributors is a rich one. I will choose, at random, Kaplan's [73] treatment of 
propositional attitudes: his work illustrates the pitfalls as well as any other. 
Kaplan formalises 'There is someone Holmes believes to be the murderer' as :-
(3y)(3*<) [R(#<,y,Holmes) & Holmes B£<= the murderer"1] 
where
R = 'the name.........represents.......... to......'
6< = a variable ranging over names.
B = '...............believes........is true.
If it is true that Kaplan's formalisation does capture the logical form of 'There 
is someone Holmes believes to be the murderer' then the formal sentence 
above and the sentence of which it is the logical form ought to mean the same. 
In other words:
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'There is someone Holmes believes to be the murderer' means the same as 
'(3y)(3*)[R(i4y,Holmes) & Holmes B*k = the murderer*]1.
Is this true? To what authority can one appeal to establish its truth or falsity? 
Unreinforced intuition has nothing to say here. I cannot draw upon my 
resources as a competent speaker of English to settle the matter. Nor can the 
above statement be thought of as a report on the usage of words. If Kaplan 
had argued that the French word 'vin' means what the English word 'wine' 
means then it would become possible to draw some empirical content from his 
assertion. But plainly Kaplan is not reporting on a correlation in verbal 
behaviour between two language communities. Is he reporting on an identity 
of meaning between the sentence 'There is someone Holmes believes to be the 
murderer' as used by the ordinary English speaker and the formal sentence 
'(3yX3oO[R(<*,y,Holmes) & Holmes B*** = the murderer'*]' as used by Kaplan? If 
so, then what Kaplan has to say in his article belongs in his autobiography and 
not in a journal of philosophy.
In the final analysis, claims like Kaplan's to have isolated the logical form of 
various sentences often amount to pseudo-statements. We can only usefully 
claim an identity of meaning between one word or one sentence with another 
when there is one or more language communities in which those words or 
sentences have a use. Claims to the effect that word A and word B are 
synonymous are elliptical for predictions about the way those words are used 
in the communities in which they are understood. Statements about the 
logical form of various sentences do not cash in in terms of' linguistic 
observations of usage. We cannot hope to capture what ordinary people mean 
when they use belief-sentences, in the idiom of formal logic. Since the 
ordinary mpn knows no formal logic there is no possibility of comparing the 
usage of a complex logical sentence with a formally unstructured natural one. 
Nor can any philosopher predict how, if he learnt formal logic, the ordinary
man would choose to use formal language sentences. Research Into logical 
form, in this context, is largely a waste of paper.
2.7 Summary
This chapter opened with three questions.
(1) Why formalise?
(2) What makes a good formalisation?
(3) How does formalisation help determine an answer to the Ontological 
Question, 'What exists?'?
The table opposite summarises the contents of this chapter by comparing the 
responses of each of the five philosophers studied to the three questions above.
1 o o
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circumstances,
1 Frege made an exception in the case of geometry, which he regarded as a 
collection of synthetic apriori statements about the nature of space,, after the 
manner of Kant.
2 David Lewis [83] provides a very good unsolicited example of the weakness of 
Ryle’s analytical technique as applied to ontology. Lewis treats There are 
many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are' as a 
systematically misleading way of saying There are possible worlds different 
from the actual world'. Ryle would probably assert that it was the latter 
sentence which was systematically misleading. Who is right can only be 
settled by determining whether there are possible worlds.
3See appendix III for a worked example of this sort of technique as applied by 
Russell.
4In intuitive set theory, an ordinal number is also defined as an equivalence set 
of well-ordered sets under order isomorphism. See Hatcher [65] (146-148). 
The above is the definition in Z-F set theory.
5See Benecerraf [13].
*My emphasis.
7See especially the footnotes at the end of Harman [63] for an example of how 
transformational grammar is supposed to operate on formal sentences.
8There is more to Davidson that is stated here. For those interested in the 
more:- Davidson [37] is most important. There are discussions of Davidson's
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ideas on meaning in Harrison [64], Platts [99], Platts [100], Davies [41] and in 
Evans and Me Dowell's collection Essays on Semantics.
9 See Foster [45] and Putnam [107] for the originals of these criticisms.
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CHAPTER THREE
Model Worlds and Formal Frameworks
3.1 On Justification in General
Faced with any theory or statement the most challenging and important 
question we can ask of its proponent is 'Can you justify that?' In a very few 
pages the reader will be faced with my exposition of how ontology should be 
practised and it is natural that the same question should occur to him. Since 
the ideas introduced in this chapter are fundamental and their consequences 
continue until the very end of this work, it may not go amiss to say a few 
words on the subject of justification in general and how the justification of a 
theory or statement can proceed. In particular I want to distinguish between 
retrospective justification and consequential justification.
Retrospective justification is commonly found in mathematics, and less 
successfully in the great metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century 
rationalists. The technique of retrospective justification is to justify an 
assertion A, by deriving A by logic alone from a set of assumptions Bn
where Bi,.... Bn are statements whose truth is held to be beyond doubt. The 
theorems of Euclid were long held to be paradigms of the retrospective 
justification of many substantial statements about the nature of space. The 
Euclidean paradigm has had such a grip on the imagination of philosophers 
that, even today, the demand for justification sends philosophers racing to 
assemble the materials for a textbook logical argument.
Retrospective justification is sometimes successful, and it reaches its metier 
in mathematics where from stipulative definitions and simple axioms it is 
possible to derive an extraordinary fertility of substantive theorems. Outside 
mathematics, and particularly in philosophy, retrospective justification is 
notably less successful. It is rarely possible to derive an interesting and
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substantial proposition from a set of assumptions which are little better than 
truisms unless one is notably fortunate in picking on just the right propositions. 
Frequently such attempts turn out to depend on importing a number of 
suppressed premises, which later critics take delight and sustenance in 
pointing out. But there is another alternative to trying to build brick houses 
out of straw bales and this is consequential justification.
Consequential justification takes its beginning from the recognition that a
1
theory is a tool to solve a problem. What justifies the employment of any tool 
in preference to another is that it performs in its allotted task better than any 
other. Likewise what justifies our selecting a theory is very often the fact 
that that theory is an effective problem-solver: more effective than any 
alternative we have to hand. A theory is consequentially justified when we 
justify it by pointing out its success in resolving tangles, straightening out 
obscurities, and explaining phenomena that we had little place for previously. 
Consequential justification differs from retrospective justification in that we 
do not reason to the theory but from the theory to its consequences which 
either vindicate the theory's effectiveness or show it is ineffective. The 
thinking behind the consequential justification was embodied succinctly nearly 
two thousand years ago:- 'By their fruits ye shall know them' (Matthew VII, 20) 
It is by the fruits of this chapter that what is said therein stands or falls. 
Since it will require several chapters to develop those ideas and gather the 
fruits in, the best advice that I can offer to the prospective reader is to read 
carefully and sympathetically; bearing in mind that with consequential 
justification, reasons rarely come first.
3.2 The Elements of a New Metaontoloqy
I shall begin by laying down six of the most important elements of the 
metaontology here put forward and then discuss them in order.
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(1) Ontology is concerned with the devising and testing of ontological 
hypotheses. Formalisation does not end by extracting an ontology from 
natural language theories. Rather, an ontological hypothesis is where to begin 
and formalisation is an attempt to see if that hypothesis is tenable.
(2) There is no methodology for the formation of ontological hypotheses. 
Ontological hypotheses are chosen on the basis of their intuitive 
attractiveness.
(3) The proper object of formalisation is the entirety of organised human 
knowledge: that which we call ’science'. Since science is largely empirical, 
so, indirectly, is ontology.
(4) In formalisation, it is not necessary to preserve either the sense or the 
ontological commitments of the sentences under formalisation.
(5) In order to talk significantly about the putative entities of an ontology, a 
characterising language is required in order to express that talk. The 
expressions of this language must make sense, and therefore it must be 
possible to divine when a sentence of that language counts as true relative to 
the ontology it presupposes.
(6) Formalisation is achieved in the construction of formal frameworks. A 
formal framework is an axiomatic machine for correlating natural language 
sentences with formal language sentences. Since this is its sole purpose, 
construction of a formal framework need and should not presuppose any 
ontology. Formal frameworks merely talk about signs, that is, they are 
written in the formal mode.
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An ontological hypothesis is, in essence, an attempt to partition the universe 
set. Such a hypothesis has the form:-
(x)(K]x v .... v Knx); and for any i,j where -(i = j) and 1 < i < n, 1 < j < n, (yXKjy 3  
- Kjy); and Oz)K jz & ...... & (3.z)Knz.
The disjoint sorts K]_,...Kn that purport to exhaust the range of things that are, 
are sometimes dignified by the title of categories, and the scheme of 
categories chosen to partition what is, is also what individuates an ontology. 
An ontology is never founded on a logical truth. 'Only material objects exist', 
'Everything is either a mental object or a physical object' are ontological 
hypotheses determining ontologies. 'Everything is either a shoebox or not a 
shoebox' is not an ontological hypothesis since it is an instance of the valid 
theorem (x)Kx v -Kx. To proceed then, with the six main points of our 
hypothetical metaontology.
(1) 'Ontology is concerned with the devising and testing of ontological 
hypotheses. Formalisation does not end by extracting an ontology from 
natural language theories. Rather, an ontological hypothesis is where to 
begin.'
Many philosophical logicians have not taken the attitude expressed 
immediately above. The conventional view of formal ontology is that the 
ontologist, beginning with a corpus of natural language sentences deemed true, 
determines the shape of his ontology, by determining what he has to 
existentially quantify over in formalising those sentences. Formalisation then 
becomes a 'black box', receiving on an input, natural language sentences, and 
giving as an output, formal language sentences.
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This current model of formalisation that has impressed itself on so many of 
the best minds, has certain points of affinity with Francis Bacon's early model 
of scientific procedure, as set forth in his Novum Qrqanum. Stripped of much 
important detail, Bacon's scientific methodology was essentially a black box 
that received as inputs, observation-statements, and gave as an output the 
laws of nature. The contents of this black box were largely inductive 
principles. The philosophical problem that attaches to Bacon's approach is the 
Problem of Induction. The problem that attaches to the conventional model of 
formalisation is the Paradox of Formalisation. Both problems are too 
substantial to be ignored.
In place of the conventional model is the hypothetical model I present here. 
The ontologist does not approach his task devoid of ontological prejudices. He 
begins with a clear idea of what he takes to exist, in the form of an 
ontological hypothesis. Formalisation is a procedure for testing such a
hypothesis. In outline, this method is reminiscent of Popper's hypothetico- 
deductive method sufficient to deserve the parallels drawn out in diagram 3.
(2) 'There is no methodology for the formation of ontological hypothesis. 
Ontological hypotheses are chosen on the basis of their intuitive 
attractiveness.'
This point speaks for itself. There may be psychological reasons why one 
philosopher prefers to formulate an ontological hypothesis based on 
materialism, whereas another asserts dualism. But it is not part of 
metaontology to descriminate for or against any one ontology, or to suggest 
what steps a philosopher should take in the formalisation of an ontological 
hypothesis. Any hypothesis is welcome so long as it is properly put and subject 
to test.
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Diagram 3
CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF 
FORMALISATION
INDUCTIVIST METHODOLOGY
successful accurate
THEORIES OBSERVATIONS
are are collected, and confirm by
FORMALISED INDUCTION
to reveal their the truth of certain
ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS, SCIENTIFIC LAWS,
the totality of which the totality of which
determine what our determine what our
ONTOLOGY SCIENCE
shall be shall be
NEW MODEL OF FORMALISATION HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE
METHODOLOGY
freely chosen freely chosen
ONTOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESIS
is tested by being is tested by being
fitted against fitted against the
SUCCESSFUL THEORIES WORLD OF EXPERIENCE
by the by the
FORMALISATION DEDUCTION
of those theories. of observation statements from
The results of this enterprise the hypothesis given certain
determine boundary conditions. The results
what our determine what our
ONTOLOGY SCIENCE
shall be shall be
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(3) 'The proper object of formalisation is the entirety of organised human 
knowledge: that which we call 'science'. Since science is largely empirical, 
so, indirectly, is ontology.'
A scientific hypothesis gains in stature just insofar as it survives more 
searching and critical tests. A familiar occurrence in the history of science is 
one where a hypothesis, deemed true of all domains, applies only when the 
variables of that hypothesis are restricted to range over a limited domain. 
Consequently scientists are careful to test a hypothesis under as wide a range 
of conditions as they can muster. (Thus in Galilean mechanics, an object is 
deemed to have a uniform acceleration in a gravitational field. In Newtonian 
mechanics an object has increasing acceleration inversely to the distance of 
the object from the centre of the field. If the variables of both theories are 
restricted to objects in free fall close to the surface of the earth, both 
theories work almost equally well. Only in relation to bodies in free fall and 
celestial bodies in space, does Galilean mechanics go significantly astray).
The ontologist sets out to vindicate his ontological hypothesis by showing it 
can handle the widest range of successful theories that can be mustered. 
Suppose an ontologist successfully formalises a theory T: who knows - if he 
extended T in some way, either by adding to the assertions of T, or by 
enriching the vocabulary of T, perhaps the new theory T' so formed would 
prove resistant to the sort of formalisation carried out on T. Extrapolating 
this reasoning to its conclusion must force the admission that it is the entirety 
of science that is the object of formalisation. This point leads to two 
parenthetical remarks.
The first is that, in setting himself the task of formalising human science, the 
ontologist is free to choose the language that science is expressed in, as long 
as the language suffices to express our consensus theories. Therefore it is not
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necessarily required that the ontologist attempt to formalise every sentence 
of a natural language, but only as much as is strictly required for scientific 
research. For instance, the ontologist may shun attributives like 'large' on the 
grounds that they may be better replaced by statements of measure.
Demonstratives might be deported on the grounds that they are a formal 
nuisance and are only expedient in conversation. The definite article 'the' can 
be tightened up so as to imply uniqueness, and so on. Whether a kind of 
vocabulary is essential to science depends on whether its work can be carried 
out as well or better, by some other stretch of vocabulary, in terms of 
precision, clarity of meaning and information-content.
Given that the ontologist is ultimately engaged in the formalisation of science, 
then the results of ontology are inevitably going to share the same 
uncertainties that many of the sciences do. Science is inherently incomplete 
and provisional, subject to increment and amendment from second thought and 
experiment; and so, necessarily, ontology becomes the same. An ontology 
capable of accommodating mid-nineteenth century physics may be inadequate 
when faced with the physics of the late twentieth century. Though 
fundamental changes in our ontology are slow to transpire, and often depend 
on drastic changes in our scientific outlook, ontology remains an empirical 
subject whose results depend on the state of current science. It is the 
generality and foundational nature of ontological hypotheses, rather than their 
alleged apriori character, that makes them of interest to philosophers.
(4) 'In formalisation, it is not necessary to preserve either the sense or the 
ontological commitments of the sentences under formalisation.
An ontological hypothesis is a hypothesis which is not logically true stating 
that only certain specified disjoint things exist. According to anybody who 
accepts such a hypothesis, however provisionally, whenever a person makes a
true assertion about the universe he inhabits, he is referring to a configuration 
of objects recognised by the hypothesis. To maintain otherwise is to reject the 
hypothesis as false. But if an ontologist affirms such a hypothesis, then he is 
required to develop it. In particular, for each sentence S of a language L 
sufficient to express human science, it is required that the ontologist state 
what objects S purports to refer to. Most importantly, where S is true, we 
require some statement as to what objects of the hypothesis itself S refers to 
and in what configuration they are found. (Thus if S = 'The orbit of the moon 
is approximate to an ellipse' and the hypothesis is that only material objects 
exist, then we require that S be construed purely as a reference to material 
objects).
Preservation of sense is not a necessary condition of successful formalisation, 
and consequently, formalisation has nothing to do with the construction of a 
theory of meaning in Davidson's terms. To see this, we need only mark the 
Fregean distinction between sense and reference. Thus even though Reynolds 
= Russia's leading spy and the Blue Club = New York's most exclusive club, it 
does not follow that 'Reynolds is a member of the Blue Club' and 'Russia's 
leading spy is a member of New York's most exclusive club' have the same 
sense. It is not a necessary condition of two sentences concerned with the 
same objects that they have the same sense. So if an ontologist tries to 
vindicate an ontological hypothesis by transcribing L sentences into a formal 
language, preservation of sense is not a constraint on his exercise.
Preserving sense is not a requirement on formalisation. More surprisingly, 
neither is preserving ontological commitment.
For example, suppose that we accepted the ontology of physicalism. What 
physicalism amounts to is arguable, but let it be defined here as the doctrine 
that (i) the only entities that exist are those required by physics, (ii) and that 
all events (including actions of living organisms) that can be explained at all 
can be explained from the laws of physics. A small step towards clarifying the
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physicalist hypothesis would be to recast it as following. There is a formal 
language Lp, which can be identified as the language of physics; (to be 
thorough about this, we should have to give some effective means of 
determining the elements of Lp). The physicalist hypothesis entails that every 
true assertion can be formalised using only logical variables drawn from Lp.
The physicalist then is faced with the problem of formalising natural language 
sentences which use a vocabulary removed from Lp. For instance, 'Jones is in 
pain' may be a true assertion but neither 'Jones' nor 'in pain' may be elements 
of Lp. The physicalist may respond by redescribing Jones as, say, a cluster of 
space-time points forming a mereological whole. 'Jones' being in pain might 
be identified with a physical event, say excitation of the medulla oblongata. 
Thus let '(1 x) Fx' be taken to denote the mereological whole that is Jones 
scattered through space-time and let 'G' be a predicate true of an event when 
it is a pain-process occurring in the body. Using Goodman's [53] '<' as short for 
'is a proper part of', letting 'e' range over events, 'Jones is in pain' might 
emerge as:-
'(3e) G(e) & e < (ix ) Fx.'
'Jones is in pain' and the above formal sentence do not agree in sense; that is 
beside the point sofar as formalisation is concerned. Nor do they agree in 
respect of their ontological commitments. 'Jones is in pain' is committed to 
Jones and somebody who is in pain. There is no imputation of space-time 
coordinates, meredogical wholes, physical pain-processes etc., in this innocent 
statement; nor could the existence of such items be deduced from Jones being 
in pain. The physicalist will claim this does not matter. He will claim that, as 
a matter of fact, Jones is really just a cluster of space-time coordinates, pain 
is just a physical process and whether these facts are registered in 'Jones is in 
pain' is irrelevant.
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The physicalist is right to stand his ground. As observed in chapter one, 
ontological commitment is an intensional relation, and there is no 
inconsistency between two sentences reporting on precisely the same features 
of the universe but differing in their ontological commitments. Simply, the 
ontological commitments of a sentence are a function of its sense; and 
preserving sense is not the issue in formalisation.
This leads to an important consequential justification of our new 
metaontology. The Paradox of Formalisation that loomed so threateningly at 
the end of chapter one, is felled at its initial premiss. It ws essential to the 
formation of the Paradox, as stated, that it be assumed that in formalisation, 
ontological commitments be preserved. No such assumption is made in our 
new metaontology and in fact one would expect in most substantive 
formalisations the assumption would be false.
(5) 'In order to talk significantly about the putative entities of an ontology, a 
characterising language is required to express that talk. The expressions of 
that language must make sense; and therefore it must be possible to divine 
when a sentence of that language counts as true relative to the ontology it 
presupposes.1
This point requires rather more explanation than the preceding points. The 
issues involved are vital, but also somewhat more involved; I shall begin by 
example.
Voodoo (or voudon as the devotees prefer to call it) is a religion that resulted 
the combination of native African religions with Catholicism, by the slaves 
shipped to Haiti during the seventeenth century to work on the sugar 
plantations. As with many religions, Voodoo has evolved its own language and 
its own ontology. Amongst the entities recognised by the hounqans (priests) 
and mambos (priestesses) of Voodoo, are the loa or pagan deities. In the
115
Voodoo ceremony, a snake representing the loa is caged on an altar in a circle. 
The mambo seats herself on the box and is then 'penetrated* by the snake; 'she 
writhes, her whole body is convulsed and the oracle speaks from her mouth' 
according to the French observer, Moreau de Saint-Mery.
From the point of view of an observer of such a ceremony, coming to terms 
with the ontology and ceremony of Voodoo, there are two different 
perspectives from which he can view this ceremony. He can take the 
viewpoint of the hounqans or the mambos themselves and assent to sentences 
like 'The loa has taken possession of the mambo1 or equivalently 'It is true that 
the loa has taken possession of the mambo1. To use the language of voodoo 
disquotationaliy in the manner is to commit oneself to the ontology of voodoo. 
Alternatively the observer can be more circumspect. He can rather choose to 
say; 'Amongst Voodoo worshippers, in this situation, it is usual to say 'The loa 
has taken possession of the mambo''. Such a statement can be consistently 
qualified by 'But of course it is all nonsense, there are no loa'. In making his 
initial remark, the observer is not referring to loa, but to the customs, 
practices and language of Voodoo. His remark leaves it open to him to decide 
if he wants to accept the voodoo ontology or not. To use the language of 
Voodoo quotationally, or as I shall say in future, in the formal mode is to 
separate oneself from the beliefs of Voodoo and to place oneself outside its 
ontology.
To take another example, consider set theory. Set theory has its own ontology 
of abstract objects and its own language. To participate in the practice of set 
theory and to use its language is to commit oneself to the ontology that the 
language of set theory characterises. An ontologist cannot say 'There is only 
one empty set' or 'There are a denumerable number of finite ordinals' and then 
add 'But of course, really, there are no such things' without contradiction. On 
the other hand he can learn to say 'Amongst those who accept set theory and 
its practices, it is true to say 'There is only one empty set' and 'There are a
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denumerable number of finite ordinals" and then add 'But of course, really,
there are no such things' without contradiction.
In order to master the art of understanding when a judgement counts as true 
relative to an ontology presupposed, it is only necessary to learn the language 
used to characterise that ontology. For those skeptical of this ontology, this 
process of learning is akin to a game or a piece of anthropological study. The 
anthropologist who studies Voodoo worship has to master the sense of the 
special language of Voodoo in order to see when a judgement is deemed true 
relative to the native ontology. An anthropologist who studies colonies of 
university logicians can come to learn enough set theory to predict what will 
count as true in the characterising language of set-theory.
The point of learning to judge of truth in a characterising language comes out 
directly in formalisation. For instance, suppose an ontologist A is asked to 
formalise the sentence ■
'There are as many electrons as protons in every uncharged atom'.
A responds to the challenge by producing:-
'(x)( uncharged x & atom x ) y: electron y & y < xj y: proton y & y < x '^
This says that for any uncharged atom x, that the cardinalitiy of the set of all 
electrons that are parts of x is identical to the cardinality of the set of all 
protons that are part of x.
The natural language sentence 'There are as many protons as electrons in 
every uncharged atom' may not agree in sense with the above formal sentence; 
but that is not the point. Presumably though, A will wish to claim that both 
sentences are true in virtue of the very same state of affairs, and hence that 
they are at least materially equivalent. Now scientists inform us that there
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are as many electrons as protons in every uncharged atom; so the natural 
language sentence can be taken as true. But is the formal language sentence 
true? There is obviously a clear ontological commitment to sets in that 
formalisation, and if sets do not exist then the formal sentence is false. 
Therefore in order to be justified in asserting that the formal sentence is true, 
A should first be justified In asserting sets exist. But this is just the kind of 
justification that the procedures of ontology are supposed to provide.
The point of this example is not to raise the question of set theory's 
ontological qualifications. The point is that if a necessary condition of 
successful formalisation is that material equivalence be maintained between 
the formalising sentence and the natural language sentence formalised, 
inevitably the ontologist will be propelled into making some truth-value 
assessment of the formal language sentences. But these same formal language 
sentences are often ontologically biased in favour of certain ontologies. It 
then becomes impossible to make large scale decisions about their truth-value 
without first deciding for or against the ontologies they characterise. But 
such prejudged decisions mean, in effect, that the issues on which 
formalisation is supposed to pronounce, have already been pronounced upon.
The way out of this problem is to insist that the ontologist vindicate his 
ontology, by showing that he can systematically parse, not truths into truths 
and falsehoods into falsehoods; but instead truths as they are generally deemed 
within science into sentences which are true relative to his ontology (or true, 
in his characterising language). To put the matter most succinctly, the 
ontologist displays the merit of his ontological hypothesis by showing that 
whatever truth we want to claim of the world as it is, can be rewritten as a 
truth about the world as the ontologist conceives it to be.
There are two incremental points to make here. The first is that since an 
understanding of the sense of a characterising language is essential to grasping 
what counts as true in that characterising language, the study of how the
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elements of characterising languages can have sense is of great 
metaontological interest. Metaontology intersects with the primary goal of 
semantics in its interest in what gives a sign meaning. For the semanticist, 
the justification for this interest is that this is what semantics is about. For 
the metaontologist, the justification is that in studying the sense-conditions of 
formal language (the conditions under which their elements have sense) we 
learn what conditions a formal language has to satisfy in order for judgements 
about truth relative to an ontology (that characterising language), to apply. In 
the next chapter, the sense-conditions of first-order languages will be explored 
in depth.
The second point to make is about that fragment of some natural language 
used to express our science. The same remarks that were made about the 
language of Voodoo and set theory apply to this language too. Science, with 
its talk of vectors, chain-reactions, fields, drives and psychoses is shot through 
with as many apparent ontological commitments as set theory or Voodoo. It 
would be quite feasible to adopt an independant attitude to the language of 
science and talk of truth relative to the ontology it characterises. The facts 
are however, that I and whoever is likely to be reading this work, are both 
involved directly or indirectly with the community of beliefs and practices 
that constitute Western science. We do not use the language of scientific 
theorising in the formal mode, as observers of our own linguistic science. We 
use the language of science disquotationally as participants, experts or 
amateur, contributors or passive recipients, in the body of doctrine within 
which we have been raised. Whether this body of doctrine and practice is in 
any way superior to that of Voodoo is a question that would take us far beyond 
the confines of this essay into an examination of what Wittgenstein would call 
Forms of Life. Feyerabend [44] has intimated that as far as he is concerned 
the credentials of Voodoo are as good as those of science: neither has any 
rational foundation. I for one disagree, and though I recognise a difference in
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sense between 'true relative to the ontological presuppositions of modern
science' and 'true', in practice they will be taken here to be materially 
equivalent. To follow this course is to accept, however provisionally, what 
experts in their various fields take to be true. This is the price of employing 
the language of science disquotationally: that one accepts whatever ontology 
modern science requires.
(6) 'Formalisation is achieved in the construction of formal frameworks. A 
formal framework is an axiomatic machine for correlating natural language 
sentences with formal language sentences. Since this is its sole purpose, 
construction of a formal framework need and should not presuppose the 
correctness of any ontology. Formal frameworks merely talk about signs, that 
is, they are written in the formal mode.'
The task of the ontologist is to systematically associate each sentence of the 
(natural) language of science with a formal sentence of his chosen formal 
language. This chosen formal sentence is designed to represent what the 
natural language sentence is concerned with; but in an ontologically more 
perspicuos manner. Let us follow the practice of calling the formal sentence 
Sf that is placed to formalise the natural language sentence Sf, a formal image 
of Sn, and Sn an informal image of Sf. A formal framework is that which is 
designed to associate formal and informal images together.
There are a denumerable number of sentences in any natural language and it is 
to be expected that the language of science will be no less rich in this respect. 
The association of formal and informal images cannot proceed by enumeration 
alone, since such a procedure would be endless. But the means of associating 
sentences of denumerably rich languages together is essentially simple, if, as 
Tarski and Davidson have shown, an axiomatic approach is followed. From a 
finite number of axioms, an infinite number of theorems can be deduced. In
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order that a formal image be associated with an informal image, both would 
have to be brought together in a theorem. So let F be a formal framework, Sf 
is a formal image of Sn just when there is a theorem:-
*■ F (sn...... sf)
where '.......... ' indicates our ignorance, for the moment, of what the proper
form of such theorem might be.
Let Sn = 'There are as many protons as electrons in every uncharged atom' and 
let Sf = '(x)( uncharged x & atom x )I5/|y: proton y & y < » }  = 4 y : electron y
& y < x One possible candidate for completing '..... ' might be ' '. Thus there
would be:-
I- p There are as many protons as electrons in every uncharged atom 
S  (*)( uncharged x & atom x )D ^ ^ y : proton y & y < x^  = electron y
¿c y < x^
But this is not a convenient form for theorems of F to take. It cannot be 
determined if the above theorem is true without determining whether Sf is 
true. What is wanted is that Sn be true relative to the ontology of science iff 
Sp be true relative to our chosen ontology. But a very simple device will put 
this right. Encase both Sn and Sf in quotes, turning them into structural 
names. Append 'true in the ontology of science' to the structural name of Sn 
(or just 'trues' for short) and 'true in our ontology O' (or 'true0') to the 
structural name of Sf. Finally join the sentences thus generated by an 
equivalence sign to generate the archtypal form of a theorem of F:-
hp 'Sp is trues= 'S f ' is true0.
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It can then be determined whether this sort of equivalence is true, 
independently of what ontology we are prepared to accept.
The easiest way to show how an axiomatised theory can give theorems of this 
form is to construct such an axiomatised theory and then to draw attention to 
the salient features. This is how I will proceed.
3.2.1 A Fragment of a Formal Framework
The axiomatic theory shortly to be presented is not a formal framework in the 
truest sense. The range of sentences formalised falls far short of that 
required to express our science. Nevertheless it is sufficiently representative 
of what a formal framework would look like for it to be useful in illustrating 
the issues at stake.
Initially, a portion of natural language is required to be formalised. I call the 
language under formalisation the target language. Here, l_t is the target 
language. In sum, Lt consists of the following elements:-
(a) a list of English proper names ’Vesuvius, Italy, Leibnitz, Manhatten....’
(b) The copula ’is’
(c) The numerals '0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9'
(d) The nominalised adjective 'length'; also 'long'
(e) The prepositions 'in' and 'of'
(f) The unit of measure, 'miles'
The vocabulary of Lt permits the formation of sentences like the following:-
’Manhatten is 11 miles long'
'Manhatten is 11 miles in length'
'The length of Manhatten is 11 miles'
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'The length in miles of Manhatten is 11'
The formal language Lf that we shall use to formalise t_t is the canonical 
language of the formal framework. Here Lf is a first order language composed 
as follows:-
(a) The usual list of logical constants from the predicate calculus plus a 
plentiful supply of variables.
(b) Primitive closed terms divided into two classes
(i) the names found in Lt, 'Manhatten, Italy...' etc.
(ii) terms formed by joining a numeral to the word 'miles'; as in ' l l  
miles'.
(c) The 1 - place function-expression 'the length of'.
In addition to Lt and Lf, there is a third language required, Lm. Lm is the 
metalanguage of the formal framework; that is, the language used to talk 
about Lf and Lf. Lm is another first-order language composed as follows:-
(a) The usual list of logical constants from the predicate calculus plus a 
plentiful supply of variables.
(b) Primitive closed terms which are structural names of all the elements of 
Lt and Lf.
(c) The sign for concatanation W ; (this can be treated as a 2-place function 
expression)
(d) The 1-place predicates; 'true Lt' (meaning 'true in the characterising 
language Lt') and 'true Lf' (meaning 'true in the characterising language 
Lf') and'NAME'and'NUM'.
The axioms of the formal framework are as follows. First 11 axioms which 
define what a NUM (numeral) counts as:-
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(1) NUM 'O'
(2) NUM T
(3) NUM '2'
(4) NUM ’3'
(5) NUM '4*
(6) NUM '5'
(7) NUM '6'
(8) NUM '7'
(9) NUM '8'
(10) NUM '9'
(11) (xXy) (NUM x & NUM y) 3  NUM x~y
The second set of axioms defines the extension of 'NAME*. For simplicity, I 
shall use only one axiom;
(12) NAME 'Manhattan*;
although it would be easy to extend the list indefinitely to include other 
NAMES.
In l_t the sentences
'Manhatten is 11 miles long'
'Manhatten is 11 miles in length'
'The length of Manhatten is 11 miles'
'The length of Manhatten in miles is 11'
are treated as equivalent. Axioms (13)-(15) sum this up.
(13) (x)(y) (NAME x & NUM y )3  (trueLt (x^ 'is '^ m iles^ 'in ’^ 'length')
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r» n  a  o
S ’ true [_ (x 'is' y 'miles' 'long')
r\ rs r\ r* r\
(14) (x)(y) (NAME x & NUM y) 3  (truei_j. (x 'is' y 'miles' 'in' 'length')
^  (true|_t ('The' 'length' 'o f  x 'is'^y ^ miles')
„ n  n  n  r\ o  n
(15) (xXy) (NAME x & NUM y )o  true^ ('The' 'length' 'of' x 'is' y 'miles')
n  n  o  o  o  o
true[_t ('The' 'length' 'of' x 'in' 'miles' 'is' y)
(16) relates l_t sentences to Lf sentences.
(16) (xXy) (NAME x & NUM y )3  trueLt ('The^'length'^'of'x ^ is'^y ^ miles')
n  n  «-><-«
true[_  ^('the length of' x '=' y 'miles')
From (1) - (16), it emerges as a theorem that:-
trueLt 'Manhatten is 11 miles lon g 'js  true^  ’the length of (Manhatten) = 
11 miles'
Granted Manhatten is 11 miles long, then the equivalence is true if and only if 
'the length of Manhatten = 11 miles' is truef. Whether this will be so or not 
will depend on the ontology presupposed by the canonical language Lf. If this 
ontology includes impure numbers (of which 11 miles, 5 kilos, are examples) 
then it will be true (at least approximately) that 'the length of Manhatten = 11 
miles' is true. If on the other hand, the ontology under examination excludes 
impure numbers but includes natural numbers, then an alternative 
formalisation is called for - and an alternative canonical language.
To illustrate, let L[ and Lm be as before. However Lf is changed, as follows 
Lf now contains.
(i) The usual list of logical constants from the predicate calculus plus a 
plentiful supply of variables.
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(ii) Primitive closed terms divided into two classes.
(a) the proper names of l_t
(b) numerals
(iii) The 1 - place function expression, 'the length in miles of'
The axiomatisation is exactly the same as before except instead of axiom (16) 
we have:-
(16)' (x)(y) (NAME x & NUM y) 3  (true|_. ('The' 'length' 'of' x 'is' y 'miles')
r\ r*
truei_f ('the length in miles of' x '=' y))
From (1) - (16)' it follows as a theorem that
true L[ 'The length of Manhatten is 11 miles' S  true Lf 'the length in miles of 
Manhatten = 11'
This formalisation is suited to an ontology which countenances natural 
numbers.
In passing one obvious feature of formalisation is worth noticing. Though I 
have presented two formalisations, they are both formalisations of one target 
language. Statements of measure can be construed either to an ontology of 
impure numbers or to an ontology of natural numbers. The question of which 
formalisation best captures 'the logical form' of these statements is a spurious 
one that deserves no answer, and indeed has none. The capacity of a theory to 
sustain competing formalisations to different domains is a measure of the 
ontological elasticity of the theory. (Ontological elasticity will be examined 
in chapter 5).
An important feature of a formal framework is that since it is concerned 
merely with correlating sentences, it is purely metalinguistic, or as I shall say,
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it is written in the formal mode. The extensions of the variables in Lm are
purely concerned with syntactical items. A syntactical item is any fragment 
of a language, a letter, mark, sign, word, phrase, clause, sentence, or series of 
sentences. Where t is any first-order theory, t is in the formal mode if, and 
only if
(1) The range D of the bound variables of t (if any) includes only syntactical 
items
(2) Where v is any logical variable of t:- 
(x) xetf(EX(v))3 x is a syntactical item
i.e. every element of the set of ultimate factors of the extension of v is 
a syntactical item.
The requirement that formal frameworks be written in the formal mode poses 
certain constraints on the way axioms are laid down. For example, suppose 
that it is hypothesised that sets exist and the canonical language Lf contains 
the language of set theory. It may be desirable, in the interests of deriving 
substantive theorems in our formal framework, to include certain axioms of 
set theory. One such axiom is the Power Set Axiom.
(A)(3B)(C)(Ce B 3 C C  A)
Where ’A', ’B' and ’C' range over sets. But expressed in the form above, the 
Power Set Axiom is not in the formal mode. The Power Set Axiom cannot be 
accepted in its usual interpretation without providing at least some argument 
for recognising the existence of sets. Consequently the truth of any formal 
framework containing the Power Set Axiom, cannot be established unless it is 
first established that sets do exist. This is just the sort of circularity that 
must be avoided at all costs. It can be avoided if the Power Set Axiom is 
ontologically neutered by being put in the formal mode, thus:-
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'(A)(3B)(C)(Ce BO C C A )1 is truef
Another constraint that expression in the formal mode produces is that if we 
wish to reason about the canonical language, then the principles of reasoning 
have themselves to be stated. For instance we may wish to infer 'truef '(3x) 
x = 11 miles" (it is true in the ontology Lf characterises that 11 miles exists) 
from 'truef 'the length of Manhatten = 11 miles'. This cannot be done straight­
forwardly as in
truef 'the length of Manhatten = 11 miles' 
truef '(3x) x = 11 miles'
Since this has the form of a logically invalid argument Fa h Fb. Instead the 
principles of reasoning appropriate to Lf have to be stated axiomatically. 
Such an axiomatisation will state the permitted syntactical transformations 
used in Lf derivations. To give a fully worked example of such an 
axiomatisation would necessarily involve much space. Instead I shall give a 
partly worked example sufficient to illustrate the technique.
To expand the formal framework state previously so as to handle derivations in 
Lf the language Lm has to be expanded. Let Lm+ be the expansion of Lm, 
defined as follows.
Lm+ contains
0) l-m;
(ii) the 1 - place predicate 'VAR' where EX’VAR’ is the set of bindable 
variables of Lf
(¡ii) the 1 - place predicate 'CLT' where EX'CLT' is the set of closed terms of
Lf;
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(iv) the 1 - place predicate 'STR' where EX'STR' is the set of strings in Lf. A 
string in Lf is a concatanation of n (n > 0) elements of Lf. The blank 
string ' ' is a string in Lf;
(v) the 2 - place predicate 'OCC' where EX'OCC' is the set of ordered pairs 
<a,b> where a is a character and b is a string such that a is occurs in b;
(vi) the 3 - place function expression 'SUB' where EX'SUB' is a function such 
that SUB (a,b,c) is the result of substituting the string a for the string b 
throughout the string c. (e.g. SUB('ket','k','mark') = 'market').
The significance of 'VAR', 'CLT', 'STR', 'OCC', and 'SUB' would be stated 
axiomatically in the way that 'NAME' and 'NUM' were. Supposing this were 
alone, the rule of Existential Generalisation could be stated in Lm+ for Lf
(w)(xXy)(z)(VAR w & CLT x & STR y & STR z )3  (trueLf ( y V z )
(-OCC (wjy’Y 'z ) D truei_f (SUB (w,x, ' ( 3 z^ ' )' )
In semi-formal English, this axiom states:-
for any variable w, closed term x, and strings y and z; if x^z is true[_ ,^ then 
so is the result of substituting w for x throughout 'O ' w ')(' y x z ')' where w 
does not occur in y x z.
The constraints in expressing a formalisation in the formal mode may seem 
onerous; but the formal mode is good insurance against building ontological 
presuppositions into a formalisation. Expression in the formal mode also 
allows for an extremely simple criterion of adequacy in formalisation. This is 
that every theorem of a formal framework be true. By an adequate formal 
framework is meant one which satisfies this criterion. An adequate formal 
framework is, amongst other things, a true finitely axiomatised theory written 
in the formal mode.
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Let be any adequate formal framework and let the target language Lj- of 
f  be rich enough to express any scientific assertion we might reasonably wish 
to make. Let r be the set of all and only those sentences of Lt which are true. 
The set A is the set of all those sentences s of Lf where s is a formal image 
under of some element of T. Now let A be expanded to A' by rendering A' 
deductively closed in respect of A. A' will be what I call a model world.
Model worlds are extremely interesting both from an ontological and a 
metaontological point of view. Ontologically they are important because they 
represent the fruition of an ontological point of view or hypothesis. A model 
world purports to describe the contents of the universe; their properties, and 
the laws that regulate them. We can say that a model world is the ideal end of 
the ontologist's efforts: it reflects one way of answering, in depth, the 
question as to what there is. Metaontologically, model worlds are interesting 
because they offer a means of defining that extremely intractable concept, 
existence. In conjunction with ontological elasticity, looking at existence in 
terms of model worlds challenges some classically held opinions about the 
logical structure of the universe (see 5.422).
3.3 Problems and Tentative Theories
According to Popper [105] (164), there is a general structure to the evolution 
of human thinking which is represented by the schema:-
PX----- >-TT------EE----------- >. P2
Pi is an initial problem and TT is a tentative theory, designed to solve Pj. TT 
is then examined and criticised in the process of error exposure EE which 
throws up problem P2; the cycle then repeats itself.
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In this work, the problem P]_ has been to devise some methodology for 
answering the ontological question as to what there is. TT, the tentative 
theory, is the methodology outlined in this chapter.. In this section the focus 
is on EE, the process of criticism and evaluation, and on P2, the .problems 
which are generated as a result of error exposure. I should record here, for 
posterity, a debt to Dr. J.E. Tiles for his help in the process of error exposure. 
Any deficiencies in the tentative theories designed to meet the problems that 
error exposure generates are my responsibility.
The essence of the methodology suggested previously is that formalisation is a 
means of testing ontologies, in a manner analogous to the role that experiment 
and observation play in testing scientific hypotheses. In Popperian 
methodology of science, a scientific hypothesis is said to be corroborated, if 
the observations and experimental results that are made, are the ones that can 
be expected if the hypothesis is true. I say that an ontological hypothesis is 
corroborated just when the ontologist succeeds is systematically parsing our 
most successful theories into a notation of his own choosing, so that these 
theories are mapped to assertions which are true relative to his chosen 
ontology. But does corroboration of an ontological hypothesis entail 
verification of that hypothesis and does failure to corroborate the hypothesis 
entail falsification of that hypothesis? If not, can ontological hypotheses be 
verified or falsified at all? Again, if the answer is 'no', is there any point to 
the pursuit of ontology? There is a compelling argument to the effect that all 
these questions should be answered in the negative. I shall state it and then 
consider what its real significance is. The argument splits into two parts; the 
first establishing that corroboration does not entail verification, and the 
second that lack of corroboration does not entail falsification.
As regards the impossibility of verification, the argument runs as follows. 
Science is subject to change; new theories are suggested to replace old 
theories which have failed to compete as successfully, new observations are
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constantly made, improvements of measurement are recurrent and new ideas 
bring new expressions into the language of science. The ontologist who tries 
to vindicate his hypothesis H has to work within an artificially frozen model of 
science. The ontologist has to isolate a language Ls euphemistically called 
'the language of science' ignoring the influx of new vocabulary that is 
constantly occuring. The ontologist qua ontologist has to accept the current 
valuation of Ls sentences though he must be aware some of these valuations 
will be wrong. If he succeeds in constructing a 'satisfactory' framework then 
he will have had to make a number of presumptions prove to be wrong then his 
carefully constructed framework will be wrong too. Since it is never possible 
to be completely certain of the results of science one can never claim that an 
ontological hypothesis is verified i.e. proved to be true. All one is entitled to 
say is that such a hypothesis is compatible with all that is currently accepted 
in professional scientific circles as true.
As regards the impossibility of falsification, the argument continues: to fail 
to corroborate a hypothesis against current science is not to have that 
hypothesis falsified. First, it may be that the current state of sciences is 
wrong and wrong in some ontologically vital area of research where results 
seem to be inconsistent with the hypothesis. Second, failure to find an 
adequate formalisation enshrining the hypothesis does not entail there is not 
such a formalisation. Perhaps if the search proceeded for a little longer 
eventually the apparent difficulties would be solved. Since ontological 
hypotheses are neither verifiable or falsifiable, the argument winds up, they 
are not scientific hypotheses in the truest sense.
Now though I believe the conclusion of this argument to be unjustified by the 
observations that precede it, it must be admitted that the above criticism does 
raise epistemological questions of the first importance: the principal are 
being whether we are ever justified in ascribing a truth-value to a sentence in 
the absence of absolutely conclusive evidence as regards its truth or falshood.
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It is only right to begin by acknowledging that ontological hypotheses are 
neither verifiable nor falsifiable in the strong sense intended by the critic. I 
take this mean something like this: for any substantive ontological hypothesis 
H, and for any given moment t, we can never say with certainty that evidence 
will not be available after t which will lead to a réévaluation of truth-value 
assessment at t of H. However I also think precisely the same could be said of 
a great many theories of natural science and so if ontology is to be rejected on 
these grounds, it will at least go down in distinguished company.
That unlimited generalisations can always be overturned by unexpected 
observations is the foundation of the Problem of Induction and Popper's 
philosophy. This fact has let most philosophers to recognise that no matter 
how well corroborated a scientific theory is it can never be said to be verified 
and the supercession of Newton's by Einstein's theories of motion is often 
offered as a paradigm case of a well-corroborated theory turning out to be 
false. Falsification is often claimed to be asymmetrical to verification in this 
respect: that an unlimited generalisation can be falsified but not verified. 
Though of course it is true that the truth of any statement of the form (x) Fx 
Zi Gx is disproved by the truth of one of the form Fa & - Ga, it is an 
oversimplification to suppose that the refutation of any scientific theory can 
proceed in so direct a manner without any ancillary assumptions. Such 
ancillary assumptions often include assumptions as to the reliability of the 
scientist's equipment and its accuracy in performing its allotted task. 
Sometimes those assumptions go badly wrong as they did ith Kaufmann in his 
1901-1906 experiments of the relation of the inertial mass of electrons in 
relation to their velocity in terms of the speed of light. Apparently 
Kaufmann's results 'refuted' Einstein's theories on the subject. It was only ten 
years later that it was generally realised that Kaufmann's equipment was 
inadequate. Even the famous eclipse observations made in 1919 to test the 
fruits of Einstein's General Relativity Theory were equivocal. The Sobral data
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gave a displacement of the stars' light of 1.98 seconds with an error of + 12 
seconds while the Principe experiment gave a displacement of 1.61 with an 
error of + 30 seconds! (Einstein's prediction was 1.72 seconds). Nevertheless 
scientists like Eddington were prepared to abandon Newton for Einstein on the 
assumption that the data furnished was sufficient. (See Bernstein [15] (80-83, 
177-119)).
In other cases, the auxiliary assumptions relate not equipment, but to auxiliary 
hypotheses, which have been assumed in the apparent 'refutation'. A case 
instance was Prout's hypothesis of 1815: that the atomic weights of all pure 
chemical elements were whole numbers. The history of chemistry for the next 
100 years was of attempts to test Prout's hypothesis with discouraging results: 
the atomic weights of many elements were not whole numbers. Only in this 
century, with the discovery of isotopes was it realised that it was not possible 
to get a pure sample of any one isotope by purely chemical means. But before 
the existence of stable isotopes was demonstrated in 1912 by Thomson, many 
scientists such as Stas and Maxwell thought Prout's hypothesis had been 
refuted by the persistant lack of success that chemists had in finding pure 
samples by chemical means that had whole atomic weights. (See Lakatos [78] 
(53-54), Crosland [32] (269-279).
One may sum this up by saying that many observation statements are only 
falsifying under certain theoretical assumptions, and because of this fact, 
rejecting a theory on the basis of such observations is often to lay oneself open 
to contrary evidence against one's decision later. Both acceptance and 
rejection of a scientific theory often have to proceed in the knowledge that 
later evidence may prove decisions wrong; therefore acceptance and rejection 
must function independantly of verification and falsification as they have been 
defined here.
Precisely the same conclusion applies to ontology. We cannot reasonably hope 
for either total verification or a quick kill. What we do have the right to
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expect is that it be possible to make reasoned assessments of the truth-values 
of ontological hypotheses as we can do for scientific ones. In this respect our 
right to call an ontological hypothesis 'true' is founded on much the same 
general principles as any scientific hypothesis. If the ontological hypothesis 
successfully handles the data we have already got, then we are justified in 
accepting it as true as long as it continues to be successful.
In respect of calling an ontological hypothesis 'false* the issues are more 
complex. On the basis of what I call 'dogmatic falsification' theories are 
demarcated as scientific or unscientific according to the prescence of a set of 
falsifying basic statements (see Popper [103]). Popper, sometimes following 
dogmatic falsificationism, recognises that there are certain hypotheses which 
must consequently be ranked as unscientific. Indefinite existential statements 
such as 'There are tachyons' become unscientific, because no observation 
sentence is inconsistent with it. Similarly probability statements about the 
distribution of a property in a denumerable or very large population are, 
strictly speaking, unscientific, since no accessable sample can give results 
which are actually inconsistent with that hypothesis.
This is a mistake; fundamentally there are no falsifiable theories at all, and 
the appellations 'scientific' and 'unscientific' apply not to theories but to 
theorising and indirectly to theorists. To illustrate.
The field of paranormal psychology is one which lies, at the present, on the 
borders of respectable science. It is a subject which has always engendered 
fierce argument, and very roughly there have been three attitudes to it
(A) Total Scepticism. All 'paranormal phenomena are the result of concious 
or unconcious deceit or illusion.
(b) Partial Compromise. There are genuinely paranormal phenomena for 
which researchers at present have no explanation. But one day all such 
phenomena will be accommodated in a framework of explanation which
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uses principles which are part of natural science in the same way that 
comets and eclipses were gained for science from occultism.
(c) Total Acceptance. There are genuinely paranormal phenomena which 
can only be explained in the context of a spiritual or religous framework.
Professors X and Y are total sceptics. Over the years of patient research, X 
and Y uncover cases of honest mistake and dishonest fraud, X and Y uncover 
cases which are recalcitrant to interpretation in the light of total scepticism. 
Professor X admits that the total sceptical position looks to be false. 
Professor Y refuses to accept this conclusion and continues to believe, on the 
basis of past experience, that these cases are not cases of bona fide 
paranormal phenomena.
Question: is the hypothesis of total scepticism falsifiable or not?
The answer to this question is that there is no answer. We can say’As 
interpreted by X, it is falsifiable, but as interpreted by Y, probably not'. The 
actual syntactical form of the hypothesis - the fact it takes the shape of an 
unlimited generalisation - does not say how it is to be used. As Popper [104] 
has observed, any theory can be rescued from apparently falsifying evidence, 
if we are prepared to make the appropriate concessions. The natural corollary 
to this is that it is wrong to apply the criterion of falsif¡ability to a theory, but 
only to apply it to an interpretation or use of a theory, by a theorist. 
Methodological falsificationism refuses to play the game of dividing theories 
into falsifiable and nonfalsifiable, scientific and unscientific? Methodological 
falsificationism argues that it is theorists and not theories that are scientific 
or unscientific. Interpreted methodologically, the criterion says that a 
theorist A is scientific in respect of an adopted hypothesis H just when A is 
willing to specify some experimental situation E, such that if result R came 
from E, A would abandon H.
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A consequence of methodological falsificationism is that indefinite existential 
and probability statements are restored to respectability. A probability 
hypothesis H about the distribution of a property P amongst a very large S, 
may not be 'falsifiable' in the strict sense, (i.e. such a hypothesis may be
consistent with any set of observation statements we can reasonably be 
expected to evaluate). Nevertheless H can be used or treated scientifically, if 
it is stated clearly under what conditions H will be abandoned. Such a 
statement would state the minimum size of any sample of S sufficient to 
overturn H, and the minimum deviation from the predicted occurrence of P in 
that sample to overturn H. This minimum sample and minimum deviation need 
not entail the falsity of H.
Methodological falsificationism leads into the subject of epistemology, and, in 
particular, the rational determination of belief. To require that a hypothesis 
be accompanied by a statement of the conditions under which it should be 
abandoned, is not to state how those conditions, in general, are to be arrived 
at. Thus methodological falsificationism shifts interest away from the study 
of truth (and falsehood) conditions to that of assertability (and denial) 
conditions.
I believe that one of the principal problems of epistemology is to determine 
the general methodology whereby assertability and denial conditions are 
determined. Previous epistemology has concerned itself too much with a 
model of inviolate and celestial knowledge based on total evidence and too 
little with the rational determination of belief in the light of partial evidence. 
This is not a work in epistemology and so this is not the place to embark on 
such a grand design as the one suggested for epistemology. However as 
regards ontology, the methodology for arriving at the assertability and denial 
conditions of ontological hypotheses is very much within the ambit of 
meteontology. The ensuing remarks concerning the assertability and denial 
conditions of ontological hypotheses are, however, generalisable to other areas 
of human discovery.
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The model of the evolution of theory formation offered by Popper offers a 
good entry for this discussion. This model was represented by the schema:-
P l-------- >  TT--------- EE---------------P2-
The model is oversimplified in an important respect. In many problem 
situations where a problem Pi is a focus of interest, there is not one and only 
one tentative theory TT put forward but many tentative theories TTi, TT2»
TT3,..........  Each of these theories is subject to evaluation and each can
generate its own particular problems. Consequently, in place of Popper's 
simple linear model of problem and theory generation there is a more complex 
tree structure.
■>EEi
> E E 2
> ee3
>  Pi 
■» P2
- >  P3
In this kind of problem situation it frequently happens that for any TTj and 
TTj, where - (i = j), that TTj and TTj are inconsistent with each other. 
Consequently no competing theory can become established without doing so at 
the expense of its rivals. In other words the assertability and denial conditions 
of TTi, TT2> TT3, .... etc., are logically tied together to this extent:- that for 
any TTj, if TTj is warrantably assertable then for any TTj, TTj is warrantably 
deniable. This fact gives some ingress into the problem of determining under 
what conditions it is correct to (provisionally) deny an ontological hypothesis 
and under what conditions it is correct to affirm it.
Unlike certain hypotheses of empirical science, the denial conditions of an 
ontological hypothesis cannot be identified with a possible result R from a
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crucial experiment E. We cannot perform a laboratory test to detect the 
existence of sets or ideas in the way we might test for the existence of a new 
subatomic particle. Our suspicions that an ontological hypothesis is 
unworkable increase so long as efforts to construct an adequate formal 
framework enshrining it go unrewarded. But it cannot be said that any 
ontological hypothesis H ought to be abandoned, if, after x man-hours of 
effort, no satisfactory formal framework has been found to incorporate H. 
First, any value we fix for x will be more or less arbitrary. Second, there are 
other parameters which determine whether a formal framework of the right 
kind will be discovered e.g. the intelligence of the ontologist, his imagination, 
the degree of his application, the research facilities available to him. These 
parameters are not easily quantifiable, and it does not seem possible to state 
the denial conditions precisely in terms of them.
The solution is to define the denial and acceptability conditions of an 
ontological hypothesis in the context of a program of ontological research. In 
a program of ontological research a number of competing ontological 
hypotheses Hj, H2, H3,... are tested out in answer to the ontological problem 
as to what there is. The subject of formalisation is a natural language, or a 
fragment of such, of which there is a general agreement that that language is 
rich enough to formulate our consensus theories. The ontologist operating, 
from the standpoint of his chosen hypothesis, endeavours to represent the 
consensus theories by formal images which are true relative to his own 
ontology. Our confidence in his hypothesis grows as he shows that he can 
successfully accommodate more and more of our current science without 
overstepping the self-imposed boundaries of his ontology. But willingness to 
accept that hypothesis is constrained by the success of rival ontologists, 
working within the program, to formalise the same target language from the 
standpoint of rival hypotheses. The overall attitude of the rational observer is 
somewhat similar to that of the inscrupulous punter who charges his bets
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depending on which horse is in the lead. The assertability conditions of any
hypothesis are fulfilled just when it is first in encompassing the largest range
of consensus theories. Correspondingly the denial conditions of the trailing
pack are fulfilled as long as the pack continues to trail. To prefer an
ontological hypothesis on its ability to accommodate our currently most
successful theories in the largest number possible, is to reason in much the
same way as the empirical scientist who chooses a theory, on the basis of its
ability to organise and explain the widest range of empirical phenomena.
Denial and assertion, unlike falsification and verification, are essentially
revisable. An ontologist who assents to the recommended methodology
«
commits himself to denying any hypothesis, including his own, so long as it 
continues to be less successful than one which rivals it. But if an ontological 
hypothesis H thus fulfils its denial conditions then this need not mean that H 
should be dropped from the program of ontological research. The ontologist 
may continue to work at developing H; (metaontology issues no prescriptions 
on how to use up leisure time) in the hope that eventually H will assume the 
position of premiere hypothesis. Methodologically, it is advantageous to have 
a research program with many competing hypotheses as possible, so that 
survival of the fittest operates to best effect.
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1 In relation to what follows Popper [105] (106-150, 241-244) is relevant. 
Popper also views a theory as a problem-solving tool and has a number of 
interesting things to say.
* There is a modest but notable exception where metaontology does have an 
ontological verdict to pass: this is that physical objects exist. This conclusion 
puts paid to Idealism however (see 4.4).
* See again Lakatos [78]. I read Lakatos about midway in the evolution of this 
section, and the conclusions of his work were so in accordance with the 
development of my own thinking, that they more or less fused together.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Making Sense: how to construct a formal language
4.1 What this is all about
This chapter is about how to avoid talking nonsense; for the production of 
nonsense is a vice as besetting to philosophers as insincerity is to politicians. 
In both cases the vice is only dangerous if it goes undetected, and I hope that 
anybody who reads this chapter will be able to avoid some shortcomings and 
perhaps detect some new ones in contemporary philosophy.
The principal concern of this chapter is with formal languages, specifically 
first-order languages; the reasons are not hard to find. In formalisation we 
endeavour to systematically replace each sentence of L by a canonical 
sentence which formalises it. The canonical sentence is a sentence of a 
formal language and therefore it should have some sense; it should not be 
merely a collection of ink marks. Now syntactically, of course, there is 
nothing to distinguish a collection of meaningless ink marks, provided they are 
put together to form a grammatical sentence, from a meaningful sentence. 
This fact has been the foundation of much misfortune to philosophy and the 
only corrective I know of is to examine the conditions of sense, and, by 
carefully determining what they are, to avoid the mistakes that philosophers 
have embroiled themselves in. This means that we become involved in the 
study of the sense-conditions (if that is the right word) of first-order 
languages.
In order to study the sense-conditions of first-order languages we have to look 
sideways, occasionally, at natural languages, to discern the general principles 
by which expressions of these languages gain sense. An analogy may help 
clarify.
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Imagine that a man devoted himself to constructing the first heavier-than-air 
aircraft. He would be confronted with a task daunting even to the most 
persevering and heroic intelligence. He would be aware that there would 
likely be many parameters which would influence the airworthiness of any 
craft he built and that he knew hardly any of them. He would be confronted 
with the prospect of repeated bungles and painfully learnt lessons. Human 
intelligence, when confronted with titantic obstacles, naturally and rightly 
looks for a short way round them. One way in which our inventor might seek 
to circumvent some of the labour is by studying naturally occurring 'aircraft': 
that is, birds. By a judicious examination of naturally occurring flighted 
creatures he may learn enough to avoid some, if not all, of his worst bungles. 
He may for instance, reach the conclusion that his aircraft should have two 
slightly curved planes attached to some roughly cylindrical middle with a 
similar, but smaller plane at the back. Similarly In constructing artificial 
languages, it is useful to look at natural languages to see the sort of principles 
which should govern our construction. But a word of warning should intrude 
here. I am not about the dissection of the semantic principles of natural 
languages for their own sake. The kind of close, detailed examination of the 
usage and purpose of ordinary language idioms as is found in, say, Austin's How 
to Do Things with Words is not to be found here. Instead I am interested in the 
broadest and most significant features of natural languages: the ones that 
enable us to communicate at all. I shall deliberately ignore nuances, 
borderline cses, special instances and the like, in order to concentrate on what 
is important, (in a way that Austin might have frowned upon, were he alive 
today). Unlike Austin and some of his Oxford contemporaries who are still 
functioning, I do not place much value on linguistic observations carried out 
with no especial purpose but to make such observations. Philosophers, like 
scientists, should begin with a problem, and what observations about language 
are important are defined in relation to what is needed to solve the problem.
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The preceding sentence is a guide to what the construction of formal 
languages is about. An expression has sense when there is somebody ('is' in the 
timeless sense peculiar to philosophy) who grasps that sense. A language has 
sense (can be employed for communication) when there is a language- 
community who can find an employment for it. To show that a canonical 
language has sense and hence that the canonical sentences have sense, it is 
necessary to show that such a language-community is possible. It is an 
Aristotelean dictum that if a thing is, it is also possible. So the most direct 
way that an ontologist can discharge his obligation of showing that his 
canonical language has sense is to create a language community which 
understands his canonical language. Such a community I call a model language 
community and designate any such arbitrary community by the letter 'M'. The 
ontologist creates a model language community by teaching his canonical 
language.
Faced with such a task, the ontologist may demand that the metaontologist 
supply some effective procedure, or at least some detailed methodology, for 
constructing a model community. The metaontologist should resist his 
demand. There is no effective procedure for constructing such a community; 
nor is the problem of finding the best methodology a philosophical problem. 
There are many ways in which the sense of an expression can be taught, and 
which is best is dependant on the nature of the expression. In some cases the 
sense of an expression may be communicated by associating it with a decision 
procedure that effectively settles its application. Secondary school students 
in science are taught many of their basic concepts in this way, e.g., x is acid 
if and only if x turns litmus paper red. But not all expressions are effectively 
applicable. 'Is a theorem of first-order logic' is not effectively applicable; 
neither is 'is lying' or 'is thinking', nor, most significantly is 'true'. Ostensión is 
another popular device. But this technique is not suitable for 'is a proton', 'is a 
unicorn', 'is a unit set'.
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Effective procedures and ostensión are well-documented means of teaching 
parts of a language. There are others. Some of these belong in the realm of 
science-fiction, but may one day become fact; e.g., hypnotic learning, 
implantation of micro-translators in the brain, grafting speech-centres from 
one brain to another.
The question of how a language might or should be communicated is not a 
question of philosophy, but a question that concerns educationalists, 
psychologists and linguists. Wittgenstein in his classic, Philosophical 
Investigations, recognised and made use of the fact that there is no effective 
procedure for communicating the sense of an expression in order to refute 
representationalist theories of meaning. Whatever ceremony we imagine 
presented to the learner to help him grasp the sense of a word, it is always 
possible, Wittgenstein pointed out, for the learner to fail to grasp the point of 
the ceremony. In such a case the learner will fail to use the word 
appropriately. Once Wittgenstein's point is taken to heart, it is futile to 
search for an effective way of constructing a model community.
There is a task which the ontologist can and should require the metaontologist 
to undertake. The metaontologist should supply an account of the exact 
nature of the understanding that the members of the model community should 
have, in order to be truly said to understand the canonical language. Not how 
this understanding is produced (which is not a philosophical problem) but what 
such understanding amounts to (which is a philosophical problem).
The canonical languages that will be examined in this chapter are first-order 
languages, not only because first-order languages are accorded pride of place 
in logic and formal philosophy, but also because there is philosophical reason 
to do so (see chapter 7). The elements of the sentences of a first-order 
language are divided into logical constants like V , ’d ’, *=' etc., and logical
variables. The senses of the logical constants are unproblematic given their 
extensive use in logic and the widespread knowledge of their semantics. The
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ontologist may reasonably be excused from explaining the senses of 
expressions we already understand. His job is to teach the senses of the 
logical variables to members of M. The metaontologist has to lay down the 
conditions by which it can be assessed whether these variables have come to 
have an agreed sense amongst members of M. The specific question the 
metaontologist addresses himself to is, 'What is it to grasp the sense of a 
variable?' Answers to this specific question vary according to the nature of 
the variable, as will become clear in subsequent sections.
4.2 E variables
Logical variables can be partitioned into predicates, function-expressions and 
names. The simplest way in which any person can display a grasp of the sense 
of a variable is through being able to identify the objects that fall under the 
extension of the variable. Variables whose sense is understood by X only when 
X has the capacity to identify items of their extension, I call 'extensionally 
accessable variables' or 'E variables' for short. The grasp of sense appropriate 
to E variables is the sort of grasp parents try to produce in their children when 
teaching them their earliest words. Unless a child recognises that a car is 
correctly described by 'car' then adults take it that he does not grasp what 
'car' means. This sort of case is so familiar that it tends to produce a 
philosophical blindness to the important aspects of E variables. Consequently 
a step back or two into abstraction is useful in restoring the proper 
perspective.
In order for a variable V in a model language community M to have a sense 
within M, V must be usable in an act of communication or speech-act between 
two members of M. In any act of communication there are at least two 
participants, namely a speaker S and a hearer H. In order for 5 to 
communicate successfully with H via a speech-act which uses V there are 4 
conditions which must be satisfied.
(1) S must attach a sense to V.
(2) H must attach a sense to V.
(3) The senses S and H attach to V must be the same.
(4) H must know (1), (2) and (3).
These conditions are evident after a little thought. If S should remark 'The 
snurd needs repairing' to H, and S attaches no sense to 'snurd' then no act of 
communication has taken place. Even if S does mean something by 'snurd', if 
H attaches no sense to the word, communication has broken down. Supposing 
that S and H do attach a sense to 'snurd', but that the sense each attaches is 
different, the H will misinterpret what S has said. Lastly, even supposing that 
S and H do mean the same by 'snurd', meaning door, unless H knows that S 
means 'door' then H will not be able to infer 'S said that the door need 
repairing'. H will not have the ability to extract the information-content from 
S's phonic act.
'Snurd' in this imaginary case is an E variable since 'snurd' means door and 
doors are easily recognised. The key features of the use of 'snurd' in relation 
to the 4 conditions laid out above are as follows:-
(1) S attaches a sense to 'snurd'
Comment; If this is true it is because S's usage of 'snurd' is regulated to 
particular items (i.e. doors) and it therefore predictable, as opposed to 
random, and unconsidered. A corollary of this is that if S attaches a 
sense to an E variable like 'snurd' then the outside observer can predict 
his usage of 'snurd' and thus acquire the same use of 'snurd' as S. 
Therefore a condition of S attaching a sense to an E variable is that it is 
possible to know what that sense is.
(2) H attaches a sense to 'snurd'.
Comment: As (1) with 'H' replacing 'S'.
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(3) The senses S and H attach to 'snurd' must be the same.
Comment: If (3)' holds it is because S and H will identify the same 
objects as snurds even if screened from one another under laboratory 
conditions. If it is true to say of 'snurd' that it means door, this will be 
because members of M independently identify the same objects, doors, as 
snurds and identify the same objects as non-snurds. Conversely if 'snurd' 
has no uniformity in its application by members of M then it cannot be 
said to have a sense (though it may have a sense for a given speaker). 
Following Harrison [64] (3 - 21) I call the ability of a sign to have a 
meaning independent of any meaning fancy may attribute to it the 
autonomy of that sign. The autonomy of an E variable consists in the 
fact that members of the model community in which that variable has a 
use apply that sign to the same kinds of objects.
(4) H knows (1), (2), (3).
Comment: (4) is satisfied, if it is satisfied at all, because H has the 
ability to observe another's use of the word 'snurd' and to determine 
whether he applies the word to just the same objects H would. This goes 
for S too. Corollary: unless it was possible for H to recognise that S 
took as snurds the same objects as H did, (4) would not be satisfied. Call 
any object for which it is possible to determine that a language-user has 
referred to or Identified that object, a public object. Unless the objects 
of the extension of an E variable were public objects, that E variable 
could not be used in an act of communication; it would be senseless.
Two important conditions of an E variable having sense, then, is that its sense
be autonomous and its extension include public objects. These twin conditions
will figure largely in the discussions that follow.
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E predicates like 'car', 'boy', ’dog' have so far come under examination, but the 
case for E function-expressions is similar. The sense of an E function- 
expression is grasped only by being able to demarcate its extension: what 
counts as an argument to the function it denotes and what value is associated 
with that argument. The 2-place arithmetical function-expression V  is an E 
function-expression. The sense of '+' is understood by anybody who knows how 
to add. Computable functions are in general signified by E function- 
expressions. Anybody who possesses the appropriate specification of 
computable function also has the means to effectively determine the value 
that function gives for any argument.
The later Wittgenstein possessed an advantage over his predecessors, 
especially Frege, in understanding how it was the E function-expressions stood 
for functions. Frege's explanation was that it was the sense of the function- 
expression that determined its reference; where the sense of an expression was 
an abstract object, i.e.
sense
The broken line represents the indirect relation of referring whereby the sign 
is connected to its reference by its sense.
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Frege's model Is deficient in one vital respect that completely nullifies its 
explanatory value. There is no explanation of what binds a sign to its sense (or 
for that matter what binds the sense to the reference). On Fregean grounds 
we can either postulate a third entity to stand between a sign and its sense to 
bind the two together; but this would obviously begin a vicious regress; or we 
can say that the relation between a sign and its sense is ultimate and 
unanalysable. But in the latter case if we take this way out then we might as 
well say that the relations between the sign and its reference is ultimate and 
unanalysable and dispense with the assumption of a third mediating entity 
called a sense.
The later Wittgenstein recognised that for some arithmetical expressions what 
'glued' the expressions to their extension was a human agreement as to what 
fell under the extension of that expression. Commenting on this sort of case, 
Wittgenstein remarked:-
"But are not the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?' - The 
question contains a mistake.
We use the expression: 'The steps are determined by the formula....' How is it 
used? - We may perhaps refer to the fact that people are taught by their 
education (training) so to use the formula 'y = x2', that they all work out the 
same number of 'y* when they substitute the same number for 'x'. Or we might 
say: 'These people are so trained that they all take the same step at the same 
time when they receive the order 'add 3". We might express this by saying 
that for these people, the order 'add 3' completely determines every step from 
one number to the next'.
Wittgenstein [150] (185)
In natural languages, names are the odd kind out of the three different kind of 
E variable that obtain. First, names do not have a meaning in the way the
150
predicates or function-expressions do. There is no synonym for 'George 
Washington’. Nevertheless names do have a sense. Names can be inserted into 
sentence-frames to make sentences and the truth-values of any declarative 
sentence so formed depends on the name used. If Dummett is right in saying 
that an expression has sense when it contributes to the truth-conditions of the 
declarative sentences in which it is used, then names have sense.
Second, in natural languages a name cannot be classed as either an E variable 
or a non-E variable. For example the name Joseph Stalin may have been an E 
variable to contemporary Party members such as Lenin or Trotsky. Either of 
these gentleman might have been able to identify Stalin or have given 
directions for the location of Stalin in a certain office of the Politburo. But 
nobody at this present time grasps the sense of 'Josef Stalin' as an E variable. 
A contemporary of today has to grasp the sense of 'Josef Stalin' through their 
historical knowledge of Stalin. The name 'Josef Stalin' itself is neither an E 
variable nor a non - E variable. Of a name in a natural language we can only 
ask of a given person at a given time, whether he grasps the sense of that 
name as an E variable or not.
What is involved in grasping the sense of a name as an E variable? The 
unproblematic answer is: being able to pick out the nominatum. But this 
answer is too facile. It is better that this question be approached obliquely. 
Imagine that S walks up to a dog, points at it, and says 'Snapper!', and walks 
away. What has S done? Here are some possibilities.
S was marking the dog as dangerous.
S was identifying the breed.
S was trying to get the dog to sit up and beg.
S was trying to get the dog to bark.
S was scolding the dog.
S was naming the dog 'Snapper'.
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The bare description of S's act leaves all of these possibilities open. Whether 
an act of baptism takes place then, depends on more than the circumstantial 
details surrounding the act. Whether S actually named the dog 'Snapper' or not 
depends on the use to which he puts his action and 'Snapper'. Wittgenstein, 
with his ability to cleave through illusion to the essential, saw this too.
'It is quite true that, in giving the ostensive definition, for instance, we often 
point to the object named and say the name.... This is connected with the 
conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a 
queer connexion of a word with an object...'
Wittgenstein [150] (38)
'....naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this 
is preparatory for the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?'
Wittgenstein [150] (26)
If S has really named the dog 'Snapper' then this is a preparation for using the 
name as a subject-term in a series of subject-predicate sentences. We might 
say: the ceremony of naming is only possible in a language which has the 
resources to employ names; and this means employing them in conjunction 
with general expressions. A language that consisted only of names would be 
impossible. Now if we think of what makes an expression a name as not being 
the product of the occult process of naming, but more a function of how it is 
employed in the sentences, then we will be less inclined to thinks that the 
paradigm case of grasping the sense of a name consists of pointing at the 
nominatum and saying the name. Instead the attention will be focussed on the 
use that a person makes of the name in his assertions. The question that 
should be addressed here is: what sort of ability with sentences containing a
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name N do we expect of a person who grasps the sense of N as an E variable 
(that is to say, who has effective access to the nominatum)?
Returning to S for a moment, and supposing that S did name the dog 'Snapper', 
let the previous question be addressed to this situation. S has Snapper in front 
of him, and this means that S is in a privileged position to answer certain 
questions about Snapper. For instance S should be able to tell us whether 
Snapper is large, small or middling, whether his coat is long or short, curly or 
straight, what colour his eyes are, perhaps even the breed if S has any 
knowledge of dogs. S will not be able to speak with such authority on whether 
Snapper's mother is still alive, when Snapper was last taken to the vet and who 
his owner or his 'real' name might be. S will be able to confidently allocate 
truth-values to sentences which make straightforward observational reports 
about Snapper, but sentences which require collateral information S will be 
more spotty on. Reflecting on this position it becomes clear that the 
sentences containing 'Snapper' which S is qualified to pronounce on the truth- 
value of, in virtue of his grasp of 'Snapper' as an E variable, are just those 
sentences which concatanate 'Snapper' to an E predicate. To have effective 
access to Snapper is to be able to settle what E predicates are true of him and 
which are not. To grasp the sense of a name N as an E variable is to be able to 
decide correctly on the truth-values of atomic sentences containing N that 
employ only E variables.
This covers what it is for 'Snapper' to be a name and what it is for S to grasp 
the sense of 'Snapper' as an E variable. But what is it that binds 'Snapper' to 
Snapper and makes 'Snapper' the name of the dog that S named? The answer is 
that it is by reference to the properties of the dog he named that S settles the 
truth-value of sentences that join 'Snapper' to some E predicate. We could 
say: it is what S is prepared to allow as true about sentences of this form that 
individuates the dog he named as the nominatum of 'Snapper'. Consequently if 
S should go on to found a model language community M, in which each member
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grasped the sense of 'Snapper' as an E name, then what would make 'Snapper' 
the name of a particular dog (the one S named) for M would be an agreement 
amongst M members as to what E predicates it was correct to adjoin to 
'Snapper'; and the dog named would be that dog which satisfied all those 
predicates. The ability of 'Snapper' to have sense (within M), that is to have 
autonomy, depends on an independant agreement on when it is truly employed 
in a range of sentences which use only E variables.
E variables may therefore be characterised as variables whose sense is not 
only grasped by identifying their extensions; but also as variables an 
agreement as to what their extensions are is the foundation of their having 
autonomy.
An ontologist who introduces a canonical language C is required to state 
precisely which variables of C he takes as E variables. Having made this 
decision he is then required to show that the members of his model community 
M had a grasp of the sense of these variables appropriate to their status as E 
variables. For instance if $  was a predicate classified as an E predicate we 
would expect members of M to identify the same objects, independantly of one 
another, as falling under 4>-
One difficulty in testing for whether an E variable like <|> is appropriately 
understood by M members is specifying the conditions under which we would 
accept that it is so understood. For example we could specify the 
acceptability conditions as follows,
*0 is validated as an E variable amongst M members if and only if for any 
x,y,z, if x and y are M members, and z is any object, and z is presented to x 
and y independantly, then x agrees z satisfies 0  if and only if y agrees z 
satisfies <t>'
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But this condition is too demanding, for human error and borderline cases will 
create less than perfect agreement. Plainly what is required is a numerical 
measure of agreement that will circumvent recourse to vagaries like 'most' or 
'a substantial majority'. Such numerical standards can be attained with a 
semantic matrix test.
To validate <t> as an E variable amongst M members, two samples are required: 
an object sample and a subject sample. The object sample consists of a 
heterogenous array of objects; the subject sample consists of a section of M. 
Each element of the subject sample is presented, in isolation from other 
elements of the subject sample, with each element of the object sample. For 
each such object, the subject is required to state whether or not the object 
falls under $ . The collected results for all subjects can be displayed in a 
semantic matrix. A specimen of such a matrix is given below.
Subject sample
<1> A B C D E F
a 1 0 0 0 0 0
b 0 1 1 1 1 0
Object Sample c 1 1 1 0 0 0
d 0 1 0 1 1 1
e 0 1 0 1 1 1
f 1 1 1 0 1 0
*1' indicates the subject classified the object as falling under 4>. Thus above, C 
classifed as b as satisfying $ . 'O' indicates that the subject classified the
object as not falling under $  . (Abstention is not aliowed). Thus A classified b 
as not satisfying <fc,
The closer to perfect agreement in the employment of the users of the subject 
sample approach, the more nearly a semantic matrix for has rows which
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consist either entirely of 'l's or entirely of '0's. The more random the us 
the more nearly '0's and ’l's in any row tend to balance each other in n 
This simple fact can be used to construct an effective statistical pro 
which ends in giving a numerical value for the agreement in use of< -^thl: 
is the index of autonomy of $ , as calculated from a given semantic r 
The index of autonomy is designated by the letter ’ i ' (iota); a su 
indicating the variable in question and a superscript indicating the se 
matrix from which the index is calculated. Thus i| is the index of aul 
calculated for <t> from semantic matrix S. The effective meth 
calculating i| is as follows.
(1) Let ri, T2, r3,...rn be the rows of S. Let ri< be any row where 1 <
Let the number of ’l's in rj< be a|<, and the number of '0's be b|<.
defined as following.
(2) If a  ^> bfc then xj< = a  ^- b|<
(3) If b|< > a|< then X|< = b|< - a[<
(4) If a  ^= bfc then x  ^= 0
(5) Let t be the number of members of the subject sample and u the 1 
of members of the object sample.
(6) The index is given by the following formula:-
Example: Let S be the semantic matrix illustrated on the previous p 
has rows rj, T2 , tj, T4, r5, rg. We have:-
aj = 1 and b  ^ = 5 
a2 = 4 and b2 = 2 therefore X2
therefore
a3 = 3 and b3 = 3 therefore x3 = 0
a4 = 4 and b4 = 2 therefore *4 = 2
a5 = 4 and b5 = 2 therefore x5 = 2
a6 = 4 and b6 = 2 therefore x6 = 2
t = 6 and u = 6. Putting these values into the formula
i. = y  ■ I x we derive:
9 t u
sld> = ¿ y a l x = 4 + 2 + 0 + 2 + 2 + 2 =12 = 0.3
t u 6 x 6  3S
The value of for any <|> and for any S is always between and inclusive of 0
and 1. The closer the value to 0, the more random the use of <t>; the closer the
value to 1 the index returns, the more uniform the use of ct>. By setting the
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minimum acceptable level of to a given value (eg. 0.9), precise conditions 
for the determination of whether the use of <t> shows an acceptable uniformity 
can be laid down. The use of a semantic matrix test is subject to the usual 
abuses and warnings that statistical tests are subject to: the larger and the 
more varied the sampling, the more authoratative the results. Semantic 
matrix tests vary according to the nature of the variable tested in a way that I 
will now describe.
The simplest case is that where the test variable is a 1-place predicate whose 
extension includes only physical objects. Here the test procedure consists 
simply of a presentation of various physical objects with the accompanying 
standing question as to whether each such object satisfies the variable or not. 
Physicalistic predicates of n places, where n>l, demand that the presentations 
consist of n objects, placed in some kind of ordering, with the appropriate 
standing question. Physicalistic function-expressions require a similar 
treatment; if a function-expression of this kind contains n argument places, 
then a presentation will consist of n objects, placed in order, with an n+lth
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object and the standing question will be whether the n objects, so ordered,
constitute an argument to the appropriate function and whether the n+lth
object is a value to that argument. Names denoting physical individuals which
are classified as E-variables receive a slightly different treatment from the
foregoing. The mark of grasping the sense of a name as an E variable is the
capacity to judge the truth-values of atomic sentences containing that name
which use only E -variables. Call an atomic sentence which contains only
E variables an atomic E sentence. Then the test for a name N being an E
variable amongst members of M, is that they should independantly agree on
the truth-values of atomic E-sentences containing N. Objects of the object
sample are atomic E-sentences containing N, and the standing question of each
1
such object is 'Does this sentence count as true?' Assent is registered by '1', 
dissent by 'O'.
Nothing has been said so far about E variables which are taken to include non­
physical objects such as numbers; the predicate 'is odd' being an example. 
Such predicates do raise profound metaphysical and epistemological issues 
which will be the subject of discussion for the next three sections. The 
immediate problem is how such a predicate can be tested in a semantic matrix 
since the objects which satisfy it, odd numbers, cannot be presented in the way 
that physical objects can. The solution is to use terms that purport to refer to 
such objects, namely numerals, in place of numbers. Instead of presenting the 
number 2 and asking 'Does this number satsify 'is odd'?' we enquire 'Is the 
atomic sentence '2 is odd' true in the characterising language of arithmetic?' 
Assent is registered by '1', dissent by 'O'. The treatment of non-physicalistic 
variables (or non P variables) is then similar to the treatment of physicalistic 
names (or P names) in that the elements of the object sample are atomic 
E sentences rather than non-linguistic objects. The treatment of other non 
P variables that are also classified as E variables is very similar too.
So far, with adaptations, semantic matrices have proved remarkably flexible in
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providing the means by which the autonomy of E variables can be tested. It is 
time that we begin to grapple with some of the philosophical problems that 
have been submerged in discussion so far. Putting this previous discussion to 
one side for the moment; consider the following case.
S and H are two members of the ontologist's model community M. The 
ontologist endorses an ontology including natural numbers as unreduced 
objects, and in order to characterise his ontology he uses a canonical language 
incorporating many arithmetical expressions. Amongst these expressions is 
the predicate 'is odd' which the ontologist classifies as an E predicate. The 
ontologist claims that S and H, amongst others of M, attach the same sense to 
'is odd' because, if they are asked to write down odd numbers beginning with 1 
until told to stop, they both independently write:-
'1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29 ..... '.
Ignoring the inductive uncertainties of the test, (the fact that either S or H 
can go 'off the rails' if asked to carry on the series past a certain point), does 
the test establish that S and H attach the same sense to 'is odd'? On the 
realist view of mathematics which the ontologist adopts, which distinguishes 
between numbers and numerals, the test is only convincing if S and H denote 
the same numbers by the same numerals. But do they? Is it not possible that 
S and H may have fixed their attention on different numbers using the same 
numerals? In such a case their 'agreement' is merely a verbal one of no 
substance whatsoever (just as a man in England may agree it is 4p.m. and so 
might a man in America and yet agree to different things). This philosophical 
doubt here cannot be dispelled by asking S and H purely arithmetical questions 
like 'Is 5 prime?', 'Does 3 + 7 = 11?', 'What is the square root of 49?'. Even if S 
and H both answer '5 is prime’, '3 + 7 = 11', ' 49 = 7*', these answers only mark 
a genuine agreement if S and H mean the same by 'prime''+' and ' ( )2'. These
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suppositions can be tested by asking S and H questions about the extension of 
'prime, +' and '( )*', but then the answers S and H provide will use numerals; 
therefore any agreement in these answers will depend on whether S and H in 
fact denote the same numbers by the same numerals. Of course this is where 
the doubts began.
The problem that has issued here is the problem of demonstrating that 
numbers are public objects. Only if the extension of an E variable consists 
only of public objects can we say that E variable has sense. To be a public 
object O has to be recoqnisably referred to by two separate speakers by use of 
some individuating apparatus. Unless numbers are public objects, then 
arithmetical sentences will consist only of senseless marks. The vindication of 
realist mathematics as even tenable, depends on demonstrating that numbers 
as abstract objects are public objects.
There is a far older problem for realism in mathematics, which might be 
termed 'the Problem of Epistemic Access'. The problem is most easily put 
forward as a sceptical argument.
Human beings are physical beings, animals equipped to detect limited kinds of 
radiation and limited frequencies of sound, evolutionally prepared to survive in 
a macroscopic physical world. By access to electron microscopes, X-ray 
diffraction photographs, cloud chambers and the like, humans have improved 
their epistemic access to areas of the physical world which are not within the 
reach of their unaided senses. However the possibility of human beings doing 
such things depends on the existence of causal interactions from the 
microscopic and submicroscopic worlds to the domain of perceptual objects 
and events. Without such causal interactions, human beings would be shut off 
from events outside the domain of the perceptual and they would be restricted 
in their knowledge to what is perceivable.
Now the realist mathematician believes in a domain of abstract objects: 
numbers. Being abstract objects, numbers exist neither in space or time.
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Consequently it is impossible that events should take place in the domain of 
numbers, or that there should be causal links between the domain of numbers 
and the perceptual domain. Therefore knowledge of the properties of numbers 
and mathematical knowledge in general is impossible. But this is absurd, since 
plainly we do possess a great deal of arithmetical knowledge about so-called 
'numbers'. Therefore the realist mathematician is wrong.
Both the problem of the publicity of numbers and epistemic access challenge 
the realist mathematician for answers; though the problem of publicity is 
prior. If we cannot even talk of numbers, then how we come to know of them 
hardly arises. The problems have been formulated for realist mathematics; 
but they could be extended to cover many kinds of non-physical ontologies. 
Seeing how these problems can be met in general is an important 
metaontological task.
4.3 First Epistemological Interlude: the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye
One of the oldest answers to these problems is the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye. 
This doctrine maintains that, in addition to their five physical senses, human 
beings have a sixth sense which is purely intellectual and directed towards 
such objects of reflection as numbers and propositions. The adherents of the 
doctrine insist that intellectual perception is responsible for human beings' 
capacity to talk and know about abstract objects.
Sight being the principal sense of human beings, and also the source of much of 
their knowledge, it is not surprising that the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye has 
been a popular answer to the problems just aired. It would have been stranger 
(but perhaps not much stranger) if the doctrine had been that we had the 
capacity to intellectually smell abstract objects!
How old the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye actually is, is partly conjectural. The 
earliest generally accepted authority for the doctrine is Plato. In The
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Republic, Socrates poses the doctrine to Glaucon.
Socrates: '...we say that the particulars are objects of sight but not of 
intelligence, while the Forms are the objects of intelligence but not of sight.' 
Glaucon: 'Certainly'.
Socrates: 'And with what part of ourselves do we see?'
Glaucon: 'With our sight'
Socrates: 'Apply the analogy to the mind. When the mind's eye is fixed on 
objects illuminated by truth and reality, it understands and knows them and its 
possession of intelligence is evident; but when it is fixed on the twilight world 
of change and decay [the physical world] its vision is confused and its opinions 
shifting and it seems to lack intelligence'.
Plato [99] (Stephanus pages 567b - 508d)
Ancient though it is, the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye is by no means defunct. 
Many able mathematicians have held to the doctrine more or less in the form 
that Plato taught it. Elements of the doctrine are to be found in Frege [48] 
and Russell [124], In Frege's system, every significant sentence expresses a 
thought (qedanke) which is the sense of the sentence. This thought is an 
abstract object which is grasped or perceived by anybody who understands that 
sentence. In Russell, the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' deals exclusively with universals 
with which we are acquainted; our apriori knowledge of the truth of this 
sentence is founded on our ability to be directly acquainted with universals. 
G.W. Hardy, speaking in 1940, remarked:-
•For me, and I suppose for most mathematicians, there is another reality, 
which I call 'mathematical reality'; and there is no sort of argument about the 
nature of mathematical reality among either mathematicians or philosophers...
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A man who could give a convincing account of mathematical reality among 
either mathematicians or philosophers would have solved very many of the 
most difficult problems of metaphysics... I believe that mathematical reality 
lies outside us, that our function is to discover or observe it, and that the 
theorems we prove, and which we describe grandiloquently as our ’creations' 
are simply notes of our observations. This view has been held, in one form or 
another by many philosophers of high reputation from Plato onwards.’
Hardy [61]
Kurt Godel, writing in 1964, defended the ancient Doctrine of the Mind's Eye.
'I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of 
perception I.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which 
induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future sense 
perceptions will agree with them and, moreover, to believe that a question not 
decidable now has meaning and may be decided in the future. The set- 
theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than 
deceptions of the senses are for physics.'
Godel [50]
In assessing the claims of these various mathematicians as to how we perceive 
the properties of numbers, a comparison with the facts of physical perception 
is called for.
In humans, sight is the ability to distinguish the size and shape of objects 
without actually touching them. A beginning is made at explaining sight when 
physiology is applied to the phenomena. Physiologists tell us that physical 
objects generally reflect light of certain wavelengths which enter the human 
eye. This light is focussed by the lens in the eye onto the retina. The rods and 
cones in the retina respond to the bombardment of photons of light, by
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transmitting electrical impulses via the optic nerve to the brain. The brain 
then transmits electrical impulses along the efferent nerves to the muscles. 
The muscles then move the body in a way appropriate to the behaviour of a 
sighted organism.
One significant feature of the physiological explanation is that the facts it is 
designed to explain (the behaviour of a sighted person) are significantly 
distinct from the facts used in the explanation itself (the transmission of light 
to the eye; the connection of the brain to the eye by the optic nerve; the 
connection of the brain to the muscles of the body). A certain kind of pseudo­
explanation occurs when the 'explanation' is simply a reaffirmation of what has 
to be explained. An 'explanation' of this kind was provided by Moliere's 
medical doctor in his satire Les Malades Imaqinaires. When asked to explain 
why opium makes people sleepy, the doctor replied, to general applause, that a 
virtus dormitiva in opium was responsible. Effectively the doctor had replied 
that opium makes people sleepy because there is something in opium that 
makes people sleepy!
The Doctrine of the Mind's Eye is another pseudo-explanation from the same 
stable. There is no independent physiological account of 'seeing with the 
Mind's Eye' to explain our appreciation of abstract objects, of the kind that 
physiology has provided to explain our appreciation of physical objects. 
'Intellectual perception' has the same explanatory value as 'virtus dormitiva'. 
To say that S knows 5 is prime because S perceives 5 is prime does not advance 
our understanding of mathematical knowledge. In respect of mathematical 
knowledge, the Doctrine of the Mind’s Eye fails to link together the processes 
of proof and calculation, by which we gain mathematical knowledge, with the 
occult faculty of intellectual perception.
For example, Lindemann proved that n was a transcendental number many 
years after transcendental numbers had been defined. Prior to Lindemann 
nobody knew whether transcendental numbers existed or not. How are we to
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explain a century or so of ignorance from the perspective of the Doctrine of 
the Mind's Eye. Why did so many mathematicians fail to see the 
transcendality of tt . Did they fail to look hard enough? What role did 
Lindemann's faculty of intellectual perception play in his discovery?
One way of telling the story is as follows: Lindemann was a brilliant 
mathematician so his intellectual vision for mathematical objects was very 
acute. Lindemann perceived that tt was transcendental in a way that his less 
able colleagues could not. Realising that many mathematicians did not have 
his vision, Lindemann constructed a proof of the transcendental nature of tt , 
based on easily observable characteristics of tt. The proof was a means of 
boosting the intellectual vision of other mathematicians like a telescope may 
improve the powers of the naked eye. The situation is analogous to that where 
a long-sighted man points out a distant object (e.g. a horse) to a near-sighted 
friend and presents him with a telescope to verify what he has seen.
The analogy has a certain gloss. Mathematicians and logicians are familiar 
with first feeling that a given proposition is true and then looking for a proof 
of it. But the gloss is thin and patchy and fails to disguise the elements of 
disanalogy. Consider the physical analogy where the long-sighted man sees 
and identifies a distant horse and says, with the directness and simplicity 
common only to small children and philosophers: 'I know I am looking at a 
horse'. The short-sighted companion queries the claim and is handed the 
telescope. The claim is verified.
Now suppose Lindemann had, without possessing proof, claimed before an 
assembly of his colleagues: 'I know tt is transcendental'. Asked to give a 
proof, Lindemann replies he has no proof and his claim is based on intellectual 
perception. No mathematician would accept a claim like this on such a basis. 
Now further suppose that, at a later meeting, Lindemann turns up with a proof 
of the transcendental nature of. tt. Would this proof verify his earlier claim to 
knowledge at the time that claim was made? No. Unlike the telescope,
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the proof does not verify the earlier claim to knowledge because the proof was 
not in Lindemann's possession when the claim was made. Proof does not verify 
our claims to know through intuition, though it may verify what we intuit. 
Intellectual perception is not a sufficient condition of mathematical
knowledge; neither is it a necessary condition. If the act of intellectually 
perceiving is a private mental act, then it is logically distinguishable from the 
physical acts of calculation and proof. It is therefore quite possible, logically 
speaking, that Lindemann may have lacked the faculty of intellectual
perception, though in all apparent respects he was an extremely competent 
mathematician. In such a case, would Lindemanns proof that n was
transcendental verify his claim to know or not? If we say ’yes' then
intellectual perception is not a necessary condition of mathematical
knowledge. If we say 'no' then we would be saying that a man could be, in all 
respects that we could ever observe, extraordinarily gifted at mathematics 
and yet fail to know the first piece of mathematics! Such a view leads to a 
queer sort of mathematical solipsism; i.e. nobody could have reason to believe 
anybody but himself understood mathematics.
What sort of explanation does the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye afford of the 
publicity of abstract objects and numbers in particular? In miniature, the 
explanation is that when S writes or utters '5', he concentrates his intellectual 
attention on 5 and H does the same. Obviously there is something 
unsatisfactorily mystifying about this concentration of intellectual attention 
on an abstract object. But even if this is put aside, the explanation still fails 
to give numbers the status of public objects. Intellectual perception is a 
private mental act. How then can it be known that S and H focus their 
intellectual perception on the same abstract object when writing or uttering 
'5'? Neither as an analysis, nor as an explanation of our knowledge of abstract 
objects, does the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye succeed in its purpose.
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4.4 Individuating Relations: the Refutation of Idealism
Out of the many philosophical positions that Wittgenstein examined with such 
penetration in the Philosophical Investigations, one of these was the doctrine 
that all mental processes are essentially private, and therefore known directly 
only to the person who has them. A consequence of this view is that 
expressions which describe such mental processes are learnt by each person in 
relation to his own mental processes. Wittgenstein argued that, if this were 
indeed true, then expressions descriptive of mental processes could have no 
sense: they could play no part in an act of communication.
'If I say of myself it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' 
means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I 
generalise the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! - 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one 
can look into anyone elses box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is 
only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to 
have something different in his box. On might even imagine such a thing 
constantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's 
language? -If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the 
box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the 
box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the 
box; it cancels out, whatever it is.'
Wittgenstein [150] (293)
Wittgenstein argued that in order for ascriptions of thought and sensaton to 
oneself to be significant, they had to be correlated to public and observable 
behaviour and actions. These public happenings defined the 'inner process'. It
follows that these behavioural traits could be used to ascribe thought and 
sensations to others. So a condition of sensibly talking about one's own 
thoughts and sensations is that one can, at least in some cases, recognise them 
in others.
'..........if anyone said 'I do not know if what I have got is pain or something
else', we should think something like, he does not know what the English word 
'pain' means; and we should explain it to him. - How? Perhaps by means of 
gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and sayings 'See, that's what pain is!' 
This explanation, like any other, he might understand right, wrong or not at 
all. And he will show which he does by the use of the word, in this as in other 
cases.
If he now said, for example: 'Oh, I know what 'pain' means; what I don't know 
is whether this, that I have now, is pain' - we should merely shake our heads 
and be forced to regard his words as a queer reaction which we have no idea 
what to do with.'
Wittgenstein [150] (288)
Wittgenstein's point is that the sensation of pain is personal to the person who 
has it - nobody can feel m^ pain except me - the concept of being in pain has 
to be defined in relation to observable behaviour and events. So we identify 
pain as that sensation which is produced in normal human beings by injuries of 
various kinds. The sense of the word 'pain' is taught to novices in connection 
with these sorts of scenarios. When we tell a crying infant who has grazed his 
knee that he feels pain and try to console him, we are in effect saying to him 
that he is to recognise as pain whatever sensation is qualitatively similar to 
the sensation he feels in his knee. Because pain is defined in this way, it is 
futile to speculate whether what one feels, having been hurt, is pain. Pain and 
hurt are logically tied together. (Which is why in English we say 'Does it hurt
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(give you pain)? and 'Where (on your body) are you hurt?) The thread of 
Wittgenstein's reasoning can be summed up in a dictum which deserves to be 
engraved on the mind of every ontologist.
Objects and processes that would otherwise be private become public objects 
by being defined through their public relations to public objects and processes.
Applying this dictum to ontology in general, we conclude something like this.
If an ontologist wishes to introduce a kind K into his ontology, and Ks look to
be private objects of which nothing useful can be said, then he requires
another kind Kj, to define Ks, by virtue of their relation to Ks. But if Kis are
similarly placed as Ks; that is, their publicity is in doubt, then Kjs will need
another kind K2 by which their publicity can be guaranteed. If circularity and
infinite regress are both to be avoided then there must be a kind Kn whose
elements are guaranteed to be public. The elements of Kn will fund the
reference to all other entities of the ontologist's ontology. The elements of
2
Kn I call basic objects.
The category of basic objects is nothing more than the category of physical 
(i.e. spatio-temporal) objects. The evidence for identifying physical objects as 
basic is extremely strong. Only physical objects satisfy the following three 
conditions.
(1) There is no reasonable doubt as to the existence of physical objects. 
Traditional philosophical arguments to show that our epistemic access to 
physical objects is problematic are unsound.3
(2) Physical objects are objects which we already perceive and refer to. 
There are no grounds to doubt their publicity.
(3) Since the problem of publicity rose over non-physical objects, it would be 
a petitio to identify as basic anything else but concrete objects.
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Protagonists of the Idealist and Phenomenalist traditions in philosophy will 
disagree with these remarks. According to the phenomenalist tradition, all 
that a human being actually perceives are sense-data (sounds, colours etc) in 
his own private space. Gnce the phenomenalist position is accepted then a
whole range of philosophical problems arise. For example, how can a person 
ever know of the existence of things outside his mind since all he sees is a 
picture show of his perceptions? Locke adopted the representationalist view: 
what the mind sees is a representation, accurate in parts, of what lies beyond. 
Berkeley, the archtype Idealist, rejected Locke’s account and argued that 
there was nothing beyond except other minds; God's in particular. Hume 
declared the whole debate insoluble and advocated backgammon. Kant 
concocted a noumenal world as the beyond, in which space and time did not 
exist. Carnap in the Aufbau tried to merge what lay beyond and what 
appeared before, by analysing reports about what lay beyond as reports about 
experience or possible experience.
All these programs were flawed from their very inception, since the 
assumption on which all were constructed was false. If the only objects with 
which humans are acquainted are private mental percepts then it would be 
impossible ever to say anything of sense about those percepts. If S should 
make the statement 'I am now experiencing a yellowish sense-datum' it would 
be utterly unclear what S meant. S could be talking about anything in his 
private mental box. Even 'yellowish', if taken to be meant by S to refer to his 
private percepts, could have any meaning. In order for remarks about sense- 
data to be more significant than disturbances in the atmosphere, sense-data 
must be defined in relation to public objects. S can say his sense-datum is like 
a yellow dot on a piece of paper, or it is the sort of thing that is caused by 
looking at sodium lamps or sunflowers. But however sense-data are defined, 
remarks about sense-data only make sense because there is a public physical 
world to anchor sense-datum language to. Idealism is therefore false, for if it
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were true, language would not be possible. A minimum ontology must 
recognise the existence of physical objects.
Applying these ideas to the case of numbers is a good way of illustrating the 
concepts involved. Numbers are in danger of being classed as ineffable private 
objects; therefore they require to be defined in relation to public objects.
One way this could be done is by defining numbers in relation to physical 
objects. The choice of physical objects is somewhat important if we are to 
avoid Frege's objections to viewing number as a property of physical objects 
(which was Locke's mistake). We cannot say, for example, that my right hand 
has any number associated with it. For this reason, Frege preferred to say 
number was a property of concepts rather than of objects. Thus the concept 
moons of Venus is numbered by zero, though the moons of Venus themselves, 
since there are none, are not numbered by anything. For more modest 
ontological purposes, open sentences can be used in place of concepts. Thus 
zero numbers the open sentence 'moon of Venus x' and four numbers the open 
sentence 'finger of my right hand x'. Open sentences are to thought of as 
either events (when uttered) or material objects (when written). Either way 
they are physical objects in our sense of the word.
Once numbers are defined as objects linked to open sentences in this manner, 
numbers can be individuated by their relations to open sentences. No two 
numbers number the same open sentences and so we can test whether S 
associates the same numbers with the same numerals that H does by asking 
what numbers S and H take to number various open sentences. For instance, if 
S and H independently agree that the answers to questions liker-
'What numbers the open sentence 'toe of my right foot x',
'What numbers the open sentence 'side of the figure following x';
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is '5', then they attach the same sense to *5'. For the denotation of '5' is 
defined as just that thing which numbers those sorts of open sentences. The 
question 'Yes, they both know that it is right to say '5 is the object which 
numbers these open sentences', but do they really mean the same by '5'?' would 
be, in Wittgenstein's words, 'a queer reaction which we have no idea what to do 
with'.
There are a number of salient features of this case which are philosophically 
of great importance. First, we introduced a domain of public objects by which 
numbers were to be defined; these were open sentences. Then there were the 
numbers themselves whose publicity had to be demonstrated. Finally there 
was the relation of numbering itself which bound the two domains together. 
Technical vocabulary is required here: call the process by which putative 
entities of an ontology are proved public, publification (not to be confused 
with publication); the public objects we invoke to aid publification, discharged 
objects; the objects whose publicity we seek to demonstrate prototype objects; 
and the relation that we introduce to bind the two together, the individuating 
relation. In the specimen publification, open sentences were discharged, 
objects, numbers were prototype objects, and the relation 8 numbers 5 was the 
individuating relation.
The essential features of publification can be laid down in numbered form.
(1) The discharged objects must be public objects.
(2) The individuating relation must individuate the prototype objects. It is
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the foundation of reference to, and identify criteria for, the prototype 
objects.
(3) The individuating relation may be metaphysically nonempirical but it 
must be epistemically empirical.
The discharged objects must be public. We do nothing in the way of publifying 
a kind K of objects if our reference to them is cashed in terms of objects 
whose publicity is just as much in doubt as Ks. So for example, if we tried to 
show that possible worlds are public objects by individuating them in terms of 
their possible contents, the attempt would be a failure. Possible individuals 
are as much in need of publification as possible worlds.
To demand that the discharged objects be public objects is not to demand that 
they be physical objects though of course it they are physical objects they will 
be public. The discharged objects may be prototype objects of a previous 
successful publification. For instance, an ontologist may wish to include 
propositions in his ontology, and also sentence-types. If he publifies sentence- 
types he can use them as discharged objects to publify propositions. 
Propositions might then be publified as entities which sentence-types express. 
It will, however, be true that since physical objects are basic (i.e. public 
without need of being publified), then the chain of dependancy will end in 
them.
The individuating relation must individuate the prototype objects. Suppose it 
did not: thenwe would have the following scenario. A domain D of discharged 
objects, a domain P of prototype objects, and an individuating relation R 
running, say, from the elements of P to those of D. There are at least two 
distinct elements of P which have the same R-relations to every element of D. 
Formally:-
(3 x,y; x e P, y e P)(z; z e D)(-(x = y) & (Rxz =  Ryz))
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In such a case if speakers S and H identified an element of P in terms of its R- 
relations to D elements it would still be an open question whether they were 
referring to the same element or not. For instance, if two distinct numbers 
could number the same open sentences then it would be no evidence that S and 
H were referring to the same number that they associated it with the same 
open sentences. Rejecting this sort of case means rejecting the formula 
above; or, equivalently, accepting its negation:-
(x,y; x e P, y c P)(z; z c DXRxzS R yz)o  x = y
This formula is the schematic form of a criterion of identity, whose 
importance will become clear in the appendix I.
The individuating relation may be metaphysically nonempirical but it must be 
epistemically empirical; this remark has certain Kantian overtones that need 
explanation. Kant at one place in the Critique of Pure Reason remarked that 
space and time are transcendentally ideal but empirically real. Kant meant 
that outside of the human mind, space and time did not exist; that is to say, 
the noumenal world is one where the concepts applicable to spatio-temporal 
objects do not apply. Nevertheless, space and time are empirically real. They 
are forms imposed on the raw stuff of the noumenal world by the faculty of 
intuition, and because the faculty of intuition is the same for everyone, the 
properties of space and time are objective for us and determinable 
independent of our fancy.
A relation is metaphysically unempirical when it includes objects which are 
not objects of experience. We cannot perceive numbers in any way at all, and 
advocates of the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye have achieved little but obscurity 
in supposing that we can. The relation 9 > 5, interpreted over the domain of 
positive numbers is metaphysically unempirical since the elements of its 
domain and range are not objects of experience. The individuating relation
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8 numbers 5 which holds between numbers and open sentences is also
metaphysically unempirical since the elements of its domain are not objects of 
experience.
But although 8 numbers 6 is metaphysically unempirical, it is epistemically 
empirical. For instance, we cannot determine if, say, 5 bears the relation 
8 numbers 5 to 'toe on my right foot x' by empirically inspecting 5 and the open 
sentence in question to see if this is so. The procedure involved is not at all 
like standing two men side by side to see who is taller. Nevertheless if 
8 numbers 6 is to be useful as an individuating relation there must be some way 
of telling when a number bears that relation to an open sentence. This 
requires that we be capable of carrying out some empirical procedure within 
the range of our experience to settle if, for example, 5 and 'toe on my right 
foot x' are respective arguments to 8 numbers 5. This empirical procedure is 
the simple one of counting the toes on my right foot. Consequently though 
8 numbers 6 is metaphysically unempirical, the evidence for its holding 
between two arguments is empirical. Unless 8 numbers5 was epistemically 
empirical, it would not be usable as an individuating relation to test our 
reference to numbers.
Roughly then, there are four important_ aspects of a publification; these are;- 
the prototype objects, the discharged objects, the individuating relation and 
the empirical techniques used to determine when the individuating relation 
holds between a prototype object and a discharged object. The table opposite 
shows some different kinds of prototype and discharged objects and their 
associated individuating relations. Question marks show where, in my opinion, 
there are doubts left unsettled.
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Diagram 4
Prototype
Objects
Individuating
Relation
Discharged
Objects
Associated Empirical 
Procedure
numbers enumerates open sentences counting
pain-
sensations
causal accidents & injuries behavioural observation
sets e
various; includes 
all discharged 
objects
determination of 
the identity and/or 
properties of the 
discharged objects
word-types token of word-tokens observation of the 
shape of word-tokens.
sense-data causal? stimuli to the 
body?
observation of 
stimuli?
propositions expressed
by
sentences determination of 
meaning of sentences
possible
worlds
? 7 7
facts ? ? ?
spatial points is part of volumes of space? spatial observation
instants is at? events? temporal observation
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4.5 The Introduction of non-P variables
The previous section examined the ways in which we could aspire to make 
sense of terms that purported to refer to non-physical objects without 
recourse to flights of fancy like the Doctrine of the Mind's Eye. In this 
section, the task is to adapt the conclusions of the previous section towards 
specifying the conditions that a non-P-variable has to satisfy in order to be 
introduced into the canonical language. This is an opportune moment to usher 
forward another technical concept, one that, hopefully, will come to seem 
natural and easy to use in context; this is the concept of being well- 
introduced.
Briefly, a variable is well-introduced when it is demonstrated to have sense. 
The whole of this chapter is concerned with the conditions of well-introduction 
for various kinds of logical variable. We have already seen the conditions of 
well-introduction for a specific class of logical variable, namely those 
variables which are both P (physicalistic) variables and E variables. These 
variables are well-introduced when their index of autonomy in a semantic 
matrix test comes up to a designated minimum. How a semantic matrix test is 
performed is a matter of record in 4.2. Performing a semantic matrix test for 
variables which are both non-P variables and E variables is, in many respects, 
similar to semantic matrix tests for P variables which are also E variables. 
The difference is that we are not capable of presenting the objects of the 
variables' extension to the elements of the subject sample; instead we present 
atomic E sentences and enquire after their truth-value relative to the ontology 
characterised. Thus in well-introducing, 'x is prime’, we do not present 2 and 
ask if it is prime; we ask instead the question "Is '2 is prime' true in the 
characterising language of arithmetic?' Agreements in valuations of this kind 
is the hallmark of such variables being well-introduced.
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We observed in 4.2 that the problem with non-P variables lay in showing that 
non-P terms had an agreement in sense between two speakers as to what they 
are supposed to signify. In order for any such agreement to be manifest, the 
objects signified by those terms, the prototype objects, had to be publified. 
Here what we have to do is translate the requirements of the publification of 
prototype objects into the requirements of well-introduction for the non-P 
terms that are supposed to signify them.
Essentially this means a switch from the material to the formal mode of 
speech. In order to avoid the proliferation of unnecessary jargon, I shall carry 
over as far as possible, the technical vocabulary used to characterise 
publification over to well-introduction. Thus instead of publification, I talk of 
well-introduction. Instead of discharged objects, I talk of well-introduced 
terms. Instead of prototype objects, I talk of prototype terms; and instead of 
individuating relations, I talk of individuating predicates.
The extention of a canonical language to include variables which purport to 
range over a kind K of non-P objects begins with a statement, by the 
ontologist, of the E variables he is going to use to characterise Ks. These will 
naturally divide into predicates, function-expressions and names. None of 
these expressions will be as yet well-introduced and the ontologist's second 
task will be to show that the names are well-introduced. In order to do this he 
will draw upon a stock S of well-introduced terms and an individuating 2-place 
predicate p. p will have two Important characteristics.
First, p will be the foundation for the individuation of and reference to, the 
prototype objects. Translated into the formal mode, this means that the 
ontologist assents to a formula which says that no two prototype objects have 
the same p relations to the discharged objects.
Second, p must be epistemically empirical. This means that members of M 
must agree on the truth-value (relative to the assumption of the existence of 
Ks) of atomic sentences formed out of (i) p (ii) a prototype name (¡0 a
member of S. Such agreement is readily quantifiable in a semantic matrix 
test.
Once p is demonstrated to have these characteristics it can be held to be well- 
introduced and the prototype names are well-introduced too. The well- 
introduction of the rest of the vocabulary used to characterise Ks follows 
orthodox lines in the form of semantic matrix tests.
4.6 Second Epistemological Interlude; the Problem of Epistemic Access
The problem of Epistemic Access was that of explaining our knowledge of 
abstract objects given that we are perceptually divorced from them. The 
problem as stated splits naturally into two parts:-
(1) How do we know (if we do) of the existence of abstract objects?
(2) If we do, how do we know (if we do) of what properties they have?
The answer to the first question was provided by Quine: we are compelled to 
recognise the existence of a kind K of abstract objects if we are required to 
quantify over Ks in the formalisation of a true theory. The answer to the 
second question demands a little more thought than recourse to a cut-and- 
dried stock response. Once this answer is provided, the stock response to (1) is 
leavened by a little more freshness.
To begin indirectly on the job of answering (2) it is instructive to start with 
Locke's remarks in Book IV of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding on 
the possibility of knowledge of atoms and their properties.
'If a great, nay, for the greatest part of several bodies in the universe escape 
our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are not less concealed 
from us by their minuteness. These insensible corpuscles being the active
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parts of matter and the great instruments of nature on which depend not only 
all their secondary qualities but also most of their natural operations, our want 
of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable 
ignorance of what we desire to know about them... Whilst we are destitute of 
senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies and to give us 
ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of 
their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any 
further than some few trials we are able to reach.... And therefore I am apt 
to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and 
experimental philosophy in physical things, [knowledge] scientifical will still be 
out of reach...'
Locke [84] (160 - 161)
Locke is expressing a doubt that must be natural to any intelligent 
commentator who is first confronted with the atomic hypothesis: if atoms are 
so minute as to be invisible, how can we come to have knowledge of them? 
Locke thought we could not.
But Locke's prognosis of progress in 'physical things scientifical' turned out to 
be wrong. What overturned Locke's reasoning in the passage above? In the 
first instance, Locke could not have foreseen the development of scientific 
apparatus for the pursuit of atomic physics such as X-ray diffraction, mass 
spectroscopy and particle accelerators that modern technology has provided. 
But in the second (and more important) instance, Locke placed too much 
emphasis on the importance of observation and too little on the importance of 
the hypothetico-deductive method in advancing the progress of science. It is 
true that the scientist cannot directly observe the behaviour and properties of 
atoms; but he can ask himself what properties atoms must have in order to 
explain his macroscopic observations.
A classic instance of such reasoning in action is Rutherford's theory of atomic 
structure, derived from his famous gold foil experiment of 1911 in which 
Rutherford directed a stream of «¿particles at a piece of gold foil (see diagram 
5). Rutherford noticed that whereas most of the particles passed straight
through the foil, there were others which were deflected by as much as 180°. 
In order to explain these observations, Rutherford abandoned the atomic model 
of J.J. Thomson. Thomson believed that solid objects consisted of atoms 
joined together. But this model was incapable of explaining how the 
o< particles had managed to pass through the foil.
Rutherford supposed instead that the atoms of which the foil was composed 
were, in fact, widely spaced, and in consequence most of the o< particles 
passed straight through. The few deflections that occured were explained by 
supposing that the P< particles had collided with the atoms themselves.4 
Rutherford's reasoning is a beautiful example of black box reasoning. A black 
box is a domain of entities which are not directly accessable to human 
investigations or observation. The methodology of black box reasoning is to 
hypothesise what might be in the box and the general properties of the same, 
and to infer what is then to be expected from the black box. In this way the 
scientist tries to recover the macroscopic output of the black box from his 
hypothesis.
The means by which an ontologist comes to attribute properties to abstract 
objects is very similar. Let us take as an example, set theory. Sets are 
abstract objects and they are not observable. An ontologist who postulates 
that there is a domain of sets has created a black box, since there is no 
perceptual access to this domain. The ontologist introduces his hypothesis in 
order to provide an ontology for pure mathematics.
Approaching the subject in this way, the ontologist quickly discovers that in 
order that sets play the explanatory role he has assigned them in mathematical 
reasoning, certain fundamental axioms have to be assumed. For instance, if he
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wishes to underpin the mathematical assumption that any countable domain of 
objects can be well-ordered then he will have to assume the Axiom of Choice 
or one of its equivalents5. Like the scientist, the ontologist will try to adopt 
the simplest and most economical axiom set to support mathematical thought. 
The logical structure of this approach is illustrated in diagram 6.
This way of arriving at the axioms of set theory is much the way that 
mathematical logicians chose to develop the subject; that is, they assumed as 
axioms all those formulae which were necessary to establish set theory as the 
foundation for mathematical thought. However this methodology does leave 
open questions behind it; as to the truth of the Generalised Continuum 
Hypothesis, for example.
The Generalised Continuum Hypothesis states that there is no set of a 
cardinality greater than Nn and less than Nn+i  for any positive integer n. A 
consequence of this hypothesis is that there is no set of a cardinality greater 
than the set of natural numbers but less than that of the real numbers, since 
/ n = Nb and R = The consistency of the Generalised Continuum
Hypothesis with ZF was proved in 1939 by Godel, and its independance of ZF 
by Cohen in 1963. The Axiom of Choice is likewise independent of the rest of 
ZF. However, unlike the Axiom of Choice the Generalised Continuum 
Hypothesis is not required as an assumption to fund mathematical reasoning. 
Black box reasoning fails to reach a verdict on the Continuum Hypothesis? 
There are at least two possible conclusions to be drawn from this.
The first conclusion is that the black box which is the world of sets, cannot be 
thoroughly explored by black box reasoning. The conclusion will the be that, 
although the Continuum Hypothesis is either true or false, human reason may 
never be able to determine which. Parenthetically, it should be said that the 
present indecision regarding the Continuum Hypothesis need not last forever. 
Advances in mathematics and, (especially) maths-related disciplines like 
physics may throw the spotlight of application on the purest of mathematics.
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Should it ever transpire that transfinite arithmetic becomes useful in this way, 
it may be that some purpose will be found in assuming the Continuum 
Hypothesis.
A second possible conclusion is that the very failure of black box reasoning to 
pronounce on the Continuum Hypothesis shows something about the black box 
of sets: namely that the Continuum Hypothesis is neither true nor false. The 
idea is that what obtains in a black box is to be identified with what can be in 
principle inferred to obtain in the box. What cannot be inferred is not there to 
be inferred (As Wittgenstein once remarked '..a nothing would serve just as 
well as a something about which nothing could be said'). Such a conclusion 
flies in the face of classical logic, with its insistence on LEM and PB. But we 
shall see in chapter 5, strong philosophical reasons which argue for the 
existence of just such a kind of ontological indeterminacy.
4.7 Non - E variables
Only E variables have been so far considered. Many variables are not E - 
variables. The function-expression 'g', here defined, is not an E variable
n + 1 if there are n consecutive 7s in the decimal expansion
‘ O f  I T
 ^ n - 1 otherwise.
g is uncomputable. If there are not n consecutive 7s in the expansion of it , 
there is no effective method of determining g(n). Nevertheless, we assume 
that the above definition gives *g’ a sehse. But how 'g' acquires a sense cannot 
be explained by the hypothesis that human beings associate the same values to 
the same arguments to g. This hypothesis is false: we simply cannot compute 
such values as the arguments rise in magnitude.
g (n) =
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Uncomputable functions may generate one kind of non - E variable. There are 
others. The predicate 'x is an atom' is a non - E variable. Human beings 
cannot straightforwardly indicate atoms and it is not expected of a person who 
claims he grasps the sense that he, per impossible, should be required to pick 
out individual atoms.
Atomic theory had its earliest sponsors in Leucippus and Democritus who lived 
in the Golden Age of Greek Civilisation. We can imagine a sophist, Skeptikos, 
confronting Leucippus with the following argument.
'My dear Leucippus; I find your atomic theory and your cosmogony quite 
fascinating:- but I must confess that your use of the word 'atoms' (aTo^o^) 
perplexes me. You admit that atoms are too small to be seen and so you 
cannot point them out to me. How then am I to know what sense you attach to 
this word 'atom'? For all I know, what you have in your mind when you talk of 
atoms may be quite different from what I have in mind. There really can be 
no communication between us on this topic because no meaning can be 
attached to this word 'atom' at all.'
If Leucippus were alert to a reply, then he might offer the following.
'You are right, Skeptikos, in saying that my atoms are too small to be seen. 
You are right in saying I cannot point them out to you. But you are wrong in 
insisting we cannot come to appreciate what they are. What I mean by 'atom' 
is a particle of the shape of a round smooth stone, but unbreakable, and of a 
thousandth part or less of a grain of sand. I am sure that when I have defined 
'atom' for you in this way, that you will appreciate as well as I, what I mean by 
'atom'. You know how to pick out a round, smooth stone and you have seen 
amphorae of wine broken. You have seen moneylenders weighing gold in the 
market and know what a thousandth part by weight looks like. Well then, you
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understood everything you need to know in order to understand what I mean by 
'atom'.'
The strength of this reply hinges on the ability of Leucippus to define 'atom' in 
terms which Skeptikos has to agree he understands.
A similar sort of technique can be used to well-introduce 'g'. Suppose that 
both S and H attach the same sense to 'g'. Whether this is true or not, the 
supposition cannot be tested by asking them to write out the extension of 'g'. 
However, it can be concluded that S and H attach the same sense to 'g' if they 
attach the same sense to the definienda of 'g'; i.e. if S and H mean the same by 
'decimal expansion', 'successive', '+' and so on. In short, the ability to test 
whether a non - E variable like 'g' or 'atom' has the same sense for all speakers 
depends on being able to give some account of what the non - E variable means 
in terms of E variables.
In the context of a canonical language an ontologist who introduces a non - E 
variable § , shows that § is well-introduced if, and only if, he can offer a set of 
constructional definitions which allow for the decomposition of § into E 
variables and logical constants alone. Formally, where S, is any sentence of 
the canonical language containing a non - E variable; D is the set of all 
constructional definitions for the canonical language are all well-introduced 
iff:-
Si -JHd S2S'
where S2 is a canonical sentence that contains no non - E variables.
Example: the ontologist lists 'proton x' as a non - E variable. He lists 
'qualitatively identical x,y', 'cathode plate x’, 'deflected towards x,y, 'numbers 
the mass in kg x,y', 'x > y', 'x < y', 'x', '1.8', '1.6', '10-27»  ^ag e* variables. Within 
D, his set of constructional definitions, he has the following axioms.
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(x) proton x positive x & (3y)(y < 1.8 x 10-27 & y > 1.6 x 10“27 
particle & numbers the mass in kg. (y,x))
(x) positive x 
particle
(3y)(3z)(cathode plate y & deflected towards (z,y) 
& qualitatively identical (z,x)
These two axioms allow for the decomposition of 'proton x' into variables 
listed as E variables and logical constants. Consequently 'proton x' is well- 
introduced by the principles that allow for the construction of first-order 
languages.
Within the context of a canonical language, every non - E variable listed will 
be formally analysable into E variables with the aid of constructional 
definitions. However in deciding in what way a given non - E variable is to be 
introduced in a canonical language, it is not necessary to believe that there is 
one and only one proper analysis of the variable in question.
As a case in point consider the expression 'hydrogen' (meaning water gas) 
which has had a use in chemistry since the eighteenth century. There are 
many properties which can be used to define 'hydrogen'; e.g. hydrogen is the 
gas evolved at the cathode in the electrolysis of water; hydrogen is the gas 
evolved by the action of dilute mineral acids on iron, zinc or aluminium; 
hydrogen is the element with only one proton in the nucleus of the atom. 
Faced with a multiplicity of ways of fixing the sense of 'hydrogen' there is no 
reason to believe the word has only one correct analysis. The same holds true 
of names introduced as non - E variables: there is no reason to suppose that 
such names can be fixed in sense by only one description. However, in the 
context of a canonical language, uncertainties in meaning like this are 
conventionally eliminated by selecting some one analysis. Having made this 
selection, the analysis then fixes the sense of the sign.
1 8 8
APPENDIX I
No Entity without Identity
Within ontology it is said that to include some novel sort K of entities as 
amongst the things that exist is to be obliged to provide an identity criterion 
for Ks. This maxim raises two immediate questions which it is the purpose of 
this appendix to answer.
(1) Why do we need identity criteria?
(2) If we do, what form should they take?
The first question is logically prior to the second. If we can see exactly why 
we need identity criteria - what task we need them to perform - then we will 
also know what constitutes a good criterion of identity and how it should be 
formed. Understanding what form any human construction should take 
depends first on understanding its purpose.
Frege is recognised to be the original source of the demand for identity 
criteria, though what he says is limited to a very short passage.
*.....we have already settled that number words are to be understood as
standing for self-subsistent objects. And that is enough to give us a class of 
propositions which must have a sense, namely those that express our 
recognition of a number as the same again. If we are to use a symbol a to 
signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b 
is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion.'
Frege [46] (62)
The argument, as I understand it, is as follows: if we regard 'a' and 'b' as
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denoting individuals then we must regard 'a = b' as true or false and hence 
meaningful. In order to claim 'a = b' is meaningful we have to state the truth- 
conditions of 'a = b'. Such a statement is a criterion of identity.
Frege's argument leaves very little clue as to how such a criterion should be
framed? Would 'a = b 3  (F) F a s  Fb' count as a criterion? If not, why not? As 
Frege's alleged leading interpreter it is natural to turn to Dummett to justify 
and expand Frege's position:-
'If we are to understand an expression as standing for an object, then we must 
be able, in Frege's vivid phrase, 'to recognise the object as the same again' we 
must, that is, know under what conditions some other term will stand for the 
same object. If, for instance, I am told 'This is the River Windrush' and I have 
no idea of how to determine whether it would be right, at some other place or 
time or both, to say once more 'This is the River Windrush' then I know nothing 
about the expression 'the River Windrush' save the bare fact that it was right 
to say 'This is the River Windrush' at that very time and place. I thus do not 
know what object was being named, or, indeed that the expression was being 
employed as a name of an object at all. It could have meant, 'This is beautiful' 
or anything.... To the extent that I am uncertain of how to 'recognise the 
object as the same again', not only can I not be said to know what object it is, 
but I also do not know what is true of it.'
Dummett [42] (73 - 74)
Aside of the historical inaccuracy in interpreting Frege in this manner, what 
Dummett says here is wrong.
For example, suppose I have a box of qualitatively identical ball-bearings. I 
pick one ball-bearing out of the box and baptise it 'Henry'. I return Henry to 
the box and closing the lid shake the box vigourously. Looking at the mass of 
ball-bearings now at the bottom of the box I have no idea which one is Henry.
Not only have I no idea which one is Henry, but I have no idea how to go about 
finding which is Henry. But it does not follow the name 'Henry1 makes no 
sense to me and that I cannot understand what is true of Henry. I know Henry 
is in the box; I know Henry is a ball-bearing; where a,b,c...,n are all the ball­
bearings in the box, I know that (a = Henry) v (b = Henry) v (c = Henry)....v (n = 
Henry). (Dummett chooses to ignore an important rider to Frege's demand for 
an identity criterion:- namely it need not always be withn our power to apply 
such a criterion; or even know how it could be applied for every case).
Wiggins in Sameness and Substance also has his own views on why criteria of 
identity are important.
'The real and abiding interest of Frege's demand for the criterion of identity 
seems to me to be this: whenever we suppose that entities of kind f exist we 
are committed to ascribing some point to typical identity questions about 
particular fs; and, in so far as identity is a puzzling or problematic relation, 
the first concern of the philosopher of any subject matter must be to enhance 
our powers of finding the elucidation.... for its disputed identity questions.'
Wiggins [148] (53 - 54)
Much of the vagueness that attached to Frege's original exposition is preserved 
by Wiggins. Wiggins does not make clear why identity questions are so 
significant bar saying that we are committed to ascribing some point (what 
point?) to typical identity qustions. If Wiggins had made clear what this point 
was then his case would have been considerably advanced. Perhaps the 
suspicion of a justification lies in his remark that identity is or can be a 
puzzling relation. Now if 'puzzling' is intended to mean confusing, paradoxical 
or obscure to men in general then I do not think what Wiggins says is true. If I 
said 'Caesar was the Roman general who with his army crossed the Rubicon in 
55 B.C.' then this statement is neither puzzling, paradoxical or obscure to
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anybody who grasps plain English. On the other hand if Wiggins means 
puzzling to those with special interests in philosophy then he may be right. 
But then, we are entitled to some explanation of what the puzzle or the 
problem might be, and this is something Wiggins does not provide. Though it 
would be possible to multiply the instances of philosophers who have thought 
that criteria of identity are good things to have, without knowing why, such 
multiplication would not advance our understanding.
Understanding why criteria of identity are necessary starts with realising that 
a kind K of entity is always introduced into an ontology under a sortal 
expression. A sortal expression is an expression of which we can ask how many 
things there are which fall under that expression. 'Table', 'natural number', 
'star', 'human beings presently (i.e. at 3.20 p.m. on the 11th July 1984) alive' 
are all sortal expressions. In each case we can sensibly ask 'how many?':- how 
many tables are there?; How many natural numbers? How many stars? How 
many living human beings? In each case the objects that fall under these 
expressions are rightfully deemed as entities if we accept they exist. In fact 
we can say that the properties which are essential to an entity qua entity are 
those inferrable from its falling under a sortal expression.
When a kind K of putative entities is introduced into an ontology the first 
requirement is to show that Ks have even the right to be considered as entities 
which could exist; that is to say, we are required to show that, where ^  is the 
expression used to denote Ks, that if anything falls under ^  then it is an 
entity of some sort. Thus if we suppose possible worlds to exist we need to 
show that, if they did exist, they would be entities of some kind. To be an 
entity is to either fall under, or be capable of falling under, a sortal 
expression. Therefore the obligation to show that Ks could ever be entities is 
discharged when i|n, is shown to be a sortal expression.
A sortal expression is one to which we can sensibly attach a 'How many?’ 
question. This means it is sensible to suppose that there are a distinct number
of things, individuated one from another, which fall under the sortal expression 
and are therfore countable, if not by ourselves then perhaps by a being of 
greater powers e.g. God.
There are at least 3 distinct abilities presupposed in counting a collection of 
entities of kind K. If I wish to count the collection of all Ks then, first, I must 
know when I am counting in a K rather than a non-K. I must be able to 
discriminate Ks from non-Ks. Second, I must know when I am assigning a 
number to one K or more than one K. I have to assign the number 1 to one K, 
2 to another, 3 to a third and so on. I must not get confused as to where one K 
begins and another leaves off. I must be able to distinguish one K from 
another. Third, and last, I must never count the same K twice. If I came to a
K that I have counted in, I must not count it in again. I must be able to
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recognise the same K I met before. Even if we cannot, for practical reasons, 
actually count the numbers of entities that fall under a sortal expression, still 
we can only make sense of the idea that there is a definite number to that 
collection by analogical extention of our own counting abilities. These 
abilities presuppose possession of criteria of demarcation (distinguishing Ks 
from non-Ks), also of differentiation (distinguishing one K from another) and 
finally of persistance (seeing when one K is numerically the same as a K 
encountered previously). Thus if we succeed in associating with +|< criteria of 
demarcation, differentiation and persistance then we will have shown ÿk 
collects a countable collection and hence that i|»k is a sortal expression. This 
is what is also needed to show that Ks could even be entities.
We have established a connection between the concepts entity, sortal 
expression, and criteria of demarcation, differentiation and persistance. We 
can add to the family, sets and quantification.
In set theory it is commonly assumed that every set has a definite cardinality 
(in ZF this is demonstrable from the Axiom for Cardinal Numbers; (see Suppes 
[140] (111)) and it is also common to denote sets by a set-abstract of the form
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'{v: FVJ' where Fv is an open sentence. The set denoted is the set of all and 
only those things collected by Fv. Now unless Fv were a sortal expression, the 
collection that Fv collected would not be countable and '{v: Fvj' would not 
have any definite cardinality. Consequently it is a condition on the 
employment of set abstracts that only sortal expression be used within the 
braces
The connection of sortal expressions to set theory leaks over into 
quantification in two ways. First, we can easily pass over from set-theory into 
the schema 'C3 v)Fv =5 (3 v^) £-£/: FVJ\ The restrictions on the sortal nature
of Fv are then transmitted into quantification. But, second, the relation 
between quantification and sortal predicates lies in the semantics for first- 
order languages themselves. In order to turn an uninterpreted first-order 
formula into something that constitutes a declarative sentence, the formula 
requires an interpretation. Thus we attach a domain D as a range of the bound 
variables, an element of D to each individual constant of the formula, an n-ary 
function on D to each n-place function letter and a subset of Dn to each n- 
place predicate letter. The truth-conditions of the resulting sentence are 
easily determinable given a grasp of the sense of the logical constants used. 
Essentially, any sentence which can be generated from a first-order formula 
can be generated in this way. Even if we should rather choose to replace the 
predicate-letters by predicates, the individual constants by denoting names 
and the function letters by function expressions, still we are only doing, in an 
indirect way, what is done in assigning an interpretation to the logical 
variables themselves. The only difference is that the symbols we supplant the 
logical variables of the formula with, carry with them their attendant 
interpretations. But unless these interpretations were of the appropriate kind, 
what would result would be not a declarative sentence but nonsense. To 
demand a predicate i|i carry with it the appropriate interpretation to allow it 
to substitute for a predicate letter is to demand it carry a set as its extension.
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But since every set has a cardinality, it follows that if i|i is appropriate, it 
must be a sortal term. Only sortal predicates may be attached to objectually 
bound variables.
(This raises obvious problems if the task is to formalise sentences containing 
mass predicates. Our reasoning forbids us to formalise 'Water exists' as 'Ox) 
water x'. In order to handle mass predicates with objectual quantifiers, the 
mass predicates must be converted into sortal predicates. This conversion 
involves the use of what Griffin [57] calls a SAN (sortalising auxiliary noun). A 
SAN is a sequence of signs that constitutes a sortal forming operator on mass 
expressions.
e.g. SAN Mass Expression
is a molecule of hydrogen
is the fusion of all water
Once a mass predicate has been sortalised, then the resulting complex sortal 
predicate can be formalised in the standard manner. So 'Water exists' might 
appear as '(3x) x is a molecule of water.')
To sum up then, criteria of demarcation, differentiation (identity) and 
persistence are what needed to show an expression is a sortal expression. 
Sortal expressions themselves play a significant part in ontology in at least 
three ways; (i) to demonstrate that an expression is a sortal expession is to 
demonstrate that whatever falls under that expression is an entity, (ii) to 
demonstrate that an expression is a sortal expression is to show it can be used 
in set-theoretical reasoning; (iii) to demonstrate that an expression is a sortal 
expression is to legitimise the procedure of quantification. To fail to provide 
the appropriate criteria and yet to make full use of the machinery of set 
theory and quantification is 'symbol pushing* of the lowest kind. Readers of 
the current literature on possible world semantics will know who to number 
amongst the guilty.
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For an ontologist who has already guaranteed that his canonical variables are 
well-introduced by the standards of chapter 4, the requirement to produce the 
appropriate criteria of demarcation, identity and persistance will have been 
largely fulfilled. To take each in turn:-
Criteria of Demarcation
To demonstrate that a variable v has a high index of autonomy is to show that 
there must be some criterion for demarcating what falls under v and what does 
not. If there was not such a criterion, then members of M would be lost as 
when to classify objects under v and when not. Criteria of demarcation are 
thus subsumed by semantic matrix tests.
Criteria of Identity (Differentiation)
The gap between a criterion of identity and one of differentiation is a 
marginal one that can be bridged in a few logical steps. Given a criterion of 
differentiation for Ks of the form:-
(x,y; Kx, Ky) -(x = y ) = ................;
elementary logical reasoning allows us to construct a criterion of identity of 
the form:-
(x,y; Kx, Ky) x = y = ................;
and conversely. The process of purification referred to in chapter 4, 
required, amongst other things, an individuating relation. It was pointed out 
that one of the most significant aspects of an individuating relation R for a 
class of prototype objects K was that it permitted the individuation of 
elements of K by their R-relations to elements of the domain D of discharged 
objects. In formal terms:
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(x,y; Kx, Ky) (z; Dz) (R xz=R yz) O x = y.
The converse of this formula; i.e:-
(x,y; Kx, Ky) (z; Dz) x = y 3  (Rxz =  Ryz);
is of course logically true. Putting the two together gives a criterion of 
identity
(x,y; Kx, Ky) x = y =■ (z; Dz) Rxz =  Ryz.
Criteria of Persistance
To give a criterion of persistance for a kind K is to give some indication of 
what it is any K-element x at a time t to be identical with a K-element y at a 
time t + 1. This involves saying what the essential properties of x are i.e. 
those properties x cannot cease to have without ceasing to exist.
Criteria of persistance are indirectly subsumed under the principles of well- 
introduction; but the importance of such criteria vary enormously according to 
the nature of the objects introduced. In the case of abstract objects, criteria 
of persistance are trivially obtained from criteria of identity. For instance a 
number n]_, is identical to a number n2 iff nj, and n2 number the same open 
sentences: this is true irrespective of temporal considerations. In the case of 
non-abstract objects (e.g. sense data) criteria of persistence are more 
significant. 'How long may a sense-datum persist?' and 'What are the 
conditions of its persistance?' are questions that demand a criterion of 
persistance for sense-data. Criteria of persistance may be conventional in 
such cases.
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APPENDIX II
Substitutional Quantification and Ontology
There is a feeling amongst many philosophical logicians that there is 
something underhand about substitutional quantification. It is felt that by 
employing substitutional quantifiers we abjure our responsibilities to talk 
about the world and end up talking about language instead. Some worried 
authorities see in substitutional quantification, the downfall of ontology itself. 
Whenever an ontologist looks in danger of committing himself, he need only 
escape into substitutional quantification until the danger is past. This is the 
way Quine sees it.
'Where substitutional quantification serves, ontology lacks point.'
Quine [ ] ( )
Perhaps such a consequence is in itself an acceptable reason for not using 
substitutional quantification. But other less acceptable reasons are sometimes 
given. Quine, for instance, claims there are an indenumerably large number of 
objects (the real numbers between 0 and 1, the elements of the power set of 
the natural numbers) and there is at best only a denumerable number of names. 
Since there will be some (nameless) objects whose existence cannot be 
registered by substitutional quantification, substitutional quantification can 
never replace objectual quantification. Fortunate indeed that Cantor took an 
interest in infinity, otherwise philosophers would be faced with a universe 
containing only names! Henkin [66] (390-397), however, presented a notation 
for naming real numbers which allowed for infinite decimal expansions as 
names for real numbers.
Substitutional quantification has even been defined away! The argument is as 
follows: the substituends for substitutionally bound variables are names. A
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name is something that can be replaced by an existentially and objectually 
bound variable. Therefore any true name is something to which the Law of 
Existential Generalisation applies and so it must denote substitutional 
existential generalisation implies objectual existential quantification, since
substitutional existential quantification claims a name is fit to replace the 
free variable(s) in the relevant open sentence to create a truth. But reject the 
authoritarian restriction on the use of 'name' and the argument collapses. 
Contrived arguments against substitutional quantification do little to dispel 
the fear that substitutional quantification is inimical to the serious study of 
ontology. Understanding the ontological limitations of substitutional 
quantification first depends on understanding substitutional quantification 
itself. When this understanding is achieved, the threat of substitutional 
quantification to ontology is seen to be bogus.
With substitutional quantification as with objectual quantification, a 
quantified wff has a truth-value only when the wff has a range attached to its 
bound variables as well as interpretations for all its non-logical constants. In 
the case of an objectual quantifier, the range is some non-empty set. For a 
substitutional quantifier the range is some substitution set of meaningful signs. 
So write the objectual existential quantifier '3 '  and the objectual universal 
quantifier 'V': let D be the range of the bound variables and let 'F' be some 
dummy predicate, then:-
'(3x)Fx' is true iff there is some element d, where d E D and Fd 
•(Vx)Fx' is true iff for any element d, if d fcD then Fd.
Let and * XT' be the substitutional existential and universal quantifiers 
respectively. Let S be the substitution set assigned to the substitutionally 
bound variables, then:-
1 9 9
'(Zx)Fx' is true iff there is some element s, where s c S and 'F '^s is true
'CJTjOFx' is true iff for any element s, if s e S then 'F' s is true.
From now on I adopt the convention of referring to the elements of a 
substitution set as substituends. The result of replacing all the variables in an 
open sentence by substituends is a substitution instance.
In first-order substitutional quantification only definite singular terms are 
substituends. In second-order substitutional quantification the substitutional 
quantifiers also bind variables which stand where predicates may stand. In 
regard to first-order substitutional quantification there are two different kinds 
of case. The substitution set may include only denoting singular terms or it 
may not. Call the first kind 'denoting substitutional quantification' and the 
second 'vacuous substitutional quantification'. So we end up with the 
classification illustrated below
Substitutional
Quantification
Second Order First Order
Substitution set includes predicates; Substitution set includes only 
singular terms; substitutionally 
bound variables only occur where 
terms may stand.
substitutionally bound variables can
occur where predicates may stand.
Denoting Vacuous
Substitution set includes only denoting Substitution set includes at least
terms. one vacuous term.
l o o
Denoting substitutional quantification presents no ontological threat; it is
unequivocally a medium where ontological commitments occur. Say that '.....
is a winged horse1 can be completed by a denoting singular term to create a 
truth and you have said as good as 'There are winged horses'. Second order
substitutional quantification might pose a threat to those who see an ontology 
of universals in sentences like 'Everything has at least one property' and would 
prefer to see this as grounds for quantifying over universals as in 
•(VxXOFXFx))' rather than '(TTxXZF X F x))'. But here we touch on a specific 
issue and it is not clear the case for universals is strong enough to bar the 
employment of second-order substitutional quantification.
Back to generalities. Where the feathers fly is over vacuous substitutional 
quantification, for there ontological issues look as if they could be avoided. It 
is said we need only employ vacuous substitutional quantification throughout a 
canonical language to shirk all ontological commitments. This is true in a 
superficial way. Given '(Ix)Fx' and a substitution set that includes at least one 
vacuous term, no conclusion can be drawn as to the existence or non-existence 
of Fs. The stage seems set for some sinister ontological evasion.
But before anything happens the ontologist must say what substitution set is 
allotted to the substitutionally bound variables. In addition, the ontologist has 
an obligation to give an explanation of the senses of the substituends. This 
explanation will explain the truth-conditions of any substitution-instance in 
which a substitutuend plays a part. Such an explanation must be provided for 
each and every substituend, whether that substituend is a denoting or a 
vacuous term.
In the case of denoting terms this is no problem. The result of substituting a 
denoting term t j  for 'x' in 'Fx' is true just when the object t j  denotes satisfies 
F. This schematic account provides not only an account of the sense of t j 
(how it contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences it occurs in), it also
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provides the beginning of semantic descent away from talk of truth to talk 
about the world.
No similar account is available for vacuous terms. Where <}> is any predicate of 
our canonical language, we explain nothing by saying that the result of
substituting a vacuous term tv for 'x' in «t^x' is true iff ^ ; v is true. What we 
need is an account of what it is for ^ ^ t v to be true. This account should 
allow us to complete
4»^ tv is true ==............
without mention of truth.
To move from the general to the specific: if we introduce the name 'Pegasus' 
into our substitution set, we have to explain why we count 'Pegasus is a winged 
horse' as true but 'Pegasus is a small red cube' as false. Such an account 
should hopefully be generalisable to provide an explanation of the truth- 
conditions of 'Pegasus-sentences' as a whole. A formalised explanation of this 
kind would begin 'For the given predicate 0 ,0 ^ *  'Pegasus' is true if and only
if..... ' and then provide a completion which would enable us to eliminate 'true'
as a semantic primitive.
Vacuous names in ordinary speech provide the basis for a good example o f’such 
an explanation. Vacuous names are of two kinds. There are names of 
mythology and names of fiction. Names of mythology are vacuous names 
which originated from a community which believed they denoted. Names of 
fiction are names that originated from a person or persons who recognised that 
they were vacuous. 'Zeus' is an example of a mythological name; 'Sherlock 
Holmes' of a fictitous one. In each case the truth-conditions for atomic 
sentences containing these names are similar. For mythological names 
(outside of sentences like 'Zeus was believed to be a god by the Ancient 
Greeks'), the truth-conditions are dictated by what classical authors and others
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have written. 'Zeus was the husband of Hera' is true because of what classical 
authors have recorded of the ancient Greek religion. 'Sherlock Holmes lived at 
22b Baker Street' is true because of what Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote. 
These observations could be generalised for a wide class S of predicates.
i.e. For any memberi|> of S
'Zeus' is true iff H» 'Zeus’ is entailed by the contents of The Greek Myths 
Vol I - II by Robert Graves
/'" N
'Sherlock Holmes' is true iff 1)1 'Sherlock Holmes' is entailed by the
written works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.
Consider an actual case where vacuous substitutional quantification is used to 
try to avoid ontological issues: substitutional set theory. Suppose an 
ontologist wished to quantify using set-theoretic terminology, but at the same 
time to avoid a commitment to sets. Instead of writing a formula of the kind:-
C3XXGYXX C Y))j
where 'X' and 'Y' range over sets; he writes:- 
(ZXXCEYXX C Y)).
But he is nonetheless obliged to say what substitution set S of singular terms is 
allotted to 'X' and 'Y' in the formula immediately above. Presumably the 
ontologist will define S to be the totality of all set-abstracts, with certain 
restrictions, perhaps, to prevent the inclusion of set-abstracts which may have 
paradoxical consequences (e.g. '[X: X^Xj', which is the foundation of Russell's 
Paradox). Having done so, the ontologist is then faced with the task of
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explaining the senses of the substituends. Such an explanation should provide 
us with an explanation of the truth-conditions of any atomic sentence which is 
also a substitution-instance; i.e. an atomic sentence derived by removing all 
the binding variables from a substitutionally quantified wff and replacing any 
free variables so obtained by elements from S.
If the ontologist is successfully to continue his program of practising set 
theory but avoiding sets, his explanation of the truth-conditions of these 
atomic sentences cannot refer back to sets. This means that a homophonic 
explanation of the truth-conditions of these atomic sentences is ruled out 
immediately. The ontologist cannot, for example, complete:-
' 'AC£x: x = x j ' is true i f f ...............,'
without admitting the existence of the empty set and the universe set.
Dr. J.E. Tiles has suggested in correspondence to me, a non-homophonic 
explanation of these atomic sentences. Tiles' suggestion is to anchor the 
predicate 'is true' by 'is provable in ZF', he points out that ZF set theory is 
written in a formal language which determines whether a given expression is a 
well-formed singular term (wfst). When these terms are used to close open 
sentences expressed in the language of ZF, one can tell in a finite number of 
steps whether any finite sentence of wffs constitutes a proof of the sequence 
thus formed. Tiles then interprets the truth-conditions of the substitutionally 
quantified formulae thus.
'(Ex) 4>x' is true iff for some wfst, t, i|/t is provable in ZF 
'(TTx) »|»x' is true iff for any wfst, t, +t is provable in ZF
by
¿ 0 4
Where this suggestion falters, I believe, is in application to set-theoretical 
sentences outside the scope of ZF. Consider the set-theoretical assertion that 
the power-set of the set of all philosophers has a least two elements:-
QxXHyXx^y & x e p [ z: philosopher zj & y e p£z: philosopher zj)
A Platonistic and entirely natural interpretation of the above formula takes it 
to report on the existence of at least two abstract objects, sets, (e.g. {QuineJ, 
^Peircej) which are both members of P^z: philosopher zj. Exchanging 'J' for '3 ' 
allows the ontological commitments to be postponed; but at the cost of 
specifying a substitution-set and giving an account of the truth-conditions of 
the substitution instances. Following Tiles, we might give as the substitution 
set, the set of all wfsts and substitute 'provability in ZF' for 'true'. But then 
the formula:-
(IxXZyXx^ y & x c p£z: philosopher zj & y e p|z: philosopher zj)
turns out to be false. The language of ZF does not permit us to construct 
wfsts which will substitute for the bound variables in this formula to create a 
truth. Even if we increase the stock of wfsts to allow for, e.g. ' Quine ' and ' 
Peirce the formula will still be false; for it is not provable in ZF that ^Quine j  
f i  ^Piercej&^Duinej e p|z: philosopher zj & jpeirceje p £z: philosopher zj. The 
price of relativising the truth-conditions of the sentences of substitutional set 
theory to one of the standard axiomatised set theories, is that we find no place 
for substitutional assertions outside of these axiomatisations. Only from the 
view of the purest of pure mathematicians, could a set theory which offered 
no scope for application outside of mathematics seem a tenable option.
What began as a simple and expedient way of practising set-theory without 
sets, turns into a major operation. Whatever device the substitutional set
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theorist finally seizes on to anchor the truth-conditions of his substitution- 
instances, it is clear he has a formidable task in front of him. He must:-
(a) explain the truth-conditions of the substitution instances. The concept 
'true' as applied to these instances must not remain a semantic primitive.
(b) Do (a) without appealing to the existence of sets and y e t ...
(c) ...succeed in preserving the truth-values not only of those set-theoretical 
assertions that receive valuations in pure mathematics, but also preserve 
the truth-value of those which are the result of applying the set-theory 
to the physical world.
If the substitutional set theorist succeeds in (a), (b) and (c) I expect that he 
will have accomplished something very like an ontological reduction of sets 
and not just an ontological evasion.
The point can be generalised. Introduction of vacuous substitutional 
quantification introduces an obligation to explain the senses of the vacuous 
terms used. This obligation is discharged when the concept of a sentence 
which contains any such vacuous name being true is shown not to be 
semantically primitive. The ontologist has to explain this concept by 
reference to the world alone. This is the point when deferred ontological 
responsibilities come home to roost. Substitutional quantification is not an 
easy way out: it is hard work.
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’ Actually, to be ontologically neutral the question should rather be 'Does this 
sentence count as true-in-the-characterising language?' In the case of 
physical objects however, the ontological evidence for their existence seems 
so overwhelming that it seems futile to maintain the distinction between 'true' 
and 'true in any ontology of physical objects'. See 4.4 for a defence of the 
existence of physical objects and an attack on Idealism.
2 Compare Strawson [136] (13)
3To run through those arguments would take more space than can be spared 
here, though I do not wish to give the impression that the issues are too trite 
to worth mention. Russell [124], and Price [106] are good sources of these 
arguments. Austin [4] conducts a very able attack on them.
4Rutherford's hypothesis had been anticipated in 1901 by Jean Perrin, who 
supposed the atom to be a miniature Solar System in which electrons revolved 
round a positive nucleus. See Silva and Lochak [132] (82).
5 See Suppes [140] for a statement of the Axiom of Choice and its equivalents. 
Makinson [86] contains a brief survey of the important axioms of set theory.'
*See Suppes [140],
7 For a good review of how mass predicates have been handled see Pelletier 
[97]. Some of Pelletier's conclusions are suspect, however, since he presumes 
formalisation preserves meaning.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Ontological Elasticity
Ontological elasticity is the property that a theory displays when the domain 
of discourse of that theory can be identified with different domains. 
Competing, but equally satisfactory recursive reductions of a single 
axiomatised theory (such as the axioms for number theory), offer the best 
known and most spectacular examples of ontological elasticity. The 
phenomenon can, however, be extended to natural language theories through 
the graces of formal frameworks. In chapter three, we saw a limited instance 
of ontological elasticity in respect of sentences of measure. This elasticity 
was proven by alternative formalisations of sentences of measure: one which 
represented these sentences as concerned with impure numbers, the other 
which represented them as concerned with pure numbers.
The usefulness of ontological elasticity to the working ontologist is that it 
enables him to refute unwanted charges of ontological commitment. For 
instance, faced with the charge that he is committed to impure numbers in 
accepting statements of measure, the ontologist can appeal to a formalisation 
which makes no use of an ontology of impure numbers. Ontological elasticity 
is as fundamental to ontology as energy is to physics or valency to chemistry. 
But like many such philosophically significant concepts, the proper analysis of 
ontological elasticity is frought with problems, to which we now turn.
5.1 The Analysis of Ontological Elasticity
I wish to consider the question 'What is it for a theory to be ontologically 
elastic?' and the answers that will be considered fall roughly into three broad
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groups: (a) answers which attempt to define ontological elasticity in proof- 
theoretic or syntactic terms; (b) answers which attempt to define ontological 
elasticity in model-theoretic terms; (c) answers which define ontological 
elasticity in intensional terms. Of each sort of answer, only the last group 
has, I believe, any chance of real success. At the same time, recognising 
ontological elasticity as intensional has the depressing consequence that our 
philosophical understanding of ontological elasticity must wait on the 
elucidation of disputed concepts in the theory of meaning.
Since formal frameworks are the modus operandi of ontology, it is both natural 
and legitimate to try to exploit them in defining ontological elasticity. An 
initial attempt to bring such a definition to fruit is this one. A theory T 
(where T can be written in either formal or natural language) is ontologically 
elastic just when, if T is incorporated into a target language, there is more 
than one extensionally adequate formal framework capable of accommodating 
the language in which T is expressed.
The definition raises two problems. The first arises out of the syntactic 
nature of the definition offered. Formal frameworks are a species of first- 
order theory, and like all first-order theories, are individuated according to the 
formulae deducible from them. Trivial syntactical changes in the choice of 
signs used to express a chosen ontology will, strictly speaking, generate a new 
formal framework just as much as a more fundamental change in ontology 
itself will. This weakness besets another definition of ontological elasticity in 
respect of formal theories; that is, the definition that a first-order theory is 
ontologically elastic if and only if it is recursively reducible to more than one 
other theory. Syntax, uninformed with any commentary about the meanings 
of the signs used, simply fails to separate the noise from the pure signal.
A second, rather deeper problem, lies in the nature of formal frameworks 
themselves. That different formalisations of the same target language
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obtain, even supposing that these formalisations are not merely syntactical 
variants, does not entail that a given target language theory T is itself 
ontologically elastic. To reason thus would be to reason as a mechanic who 
erroneously infers that since the engine is faulty and the ignition is part of the 
engine, then the ignition is faulty as well. The ability to construct 
significantly distinct formal frameworks show that ontological elasticity is at 
work somewhere, but does not help to localise it.
A thought is that perhaps the solution to this lack of localisation is to be more 
modest in the choice of a medium of formalisation, or else to try to construct 
some test whereby, like diligent mechanics, we can try to trace the 
ontological elasticity can be traced down to some one component in the 
machinary of a formal framework. As for the first alternative we might try to 
determine the ontological elasticity of a piece of theory by constructing a 
mini-framework whose target language was only just rich enough to express it. 
The presence of many non-trivially different mini-frameworks with a common 
target language would prove the elasticity of our piece of theory. But this 
modest way of formalising is inaccurate in principle. It simply does not follow 
from being able successfully to formalise a piece of theory that that 
formalisation will be sustained when it is incorporated into the wider 
perspective. A good formalisation of pure mathematics should also be 
extendable to sentences of applied mathematics and from thence to the 
sciences in general. There are simply no self-contained language-games to be 
found short of that language-game within which all our moves can be made. 
Mini-frameworks can reveal an illusory range of possible trails that peter out 
when viewed from a height of a formal framework.
Can formal frameworks themselves be used to localise the elasticity? It may, 
perhaps seem that they can. Merely by contrasting different formal 
frameworks and seeing where they differ (i.e. to what target language 
sentences they assign different formal sentences to) surely one could see
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where the elasticity fell? But sadly, this test is inaccurate too, for any theory 
can be rendered ontologically elastic in this way. Thus let F be an 
extensionally adequate formal framework to which T is a target language 
theory; to construct a new extensionally adequate framework F , increment 
each sentence used to formalise any true sentence S of T by p, where p is true 
in the canonical language of F, or -p if S is false. T will now be formalised 
differently whatever value for T. Only by binding formal frameworks by 
tighter intensional conditions like synonymy, can such evasions be ruled out. 
But to introduce these restrictions is to subvert the very purpose of formal 
frameworks themselves: formalisation need not preserve meaning. Perhaps 
the fault is not so much in the formal frameworks' failing to localise 
accurately ontological commitment, but in the fact that the very idea of 
localising ontological elasticity may be fundamentally misconceived.
The ontological elasticity which is credited to arithmetic is sometimes put 
down to the plenitude of its non-standard models. Is ontological elasticity, 
then, merely a matter of a theory having more than one model? This would be 
conveniently simple if it were true. But it would also have alarming 
consequences if it did obtain, for then ontological elasticity would be 
commonplace in practically every consistent theory. Ontological elasticity on 
this scale would discharge practically every theory of its ontological 
commitments, since for whatever model we found to convict a theory of 
certain ontological commitments, there would be another close by to pardon 
it.
Consequences like this have been seen in the Lowenheim - Skolem theorem by 
various philosophers and mathematical logicians. This theorem states that 
every consistent theory has a model with a denumerable domain. This theorem 
is the basis of Skolem's Paradox. The paradox is that there seem to exist 
consistent first-order theories which claim the existence of indenumerable 
sets. (Cantor's proof of the indenumerability of P(N), the power set of the
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natural numbers, being one example); but nevertheless the Lowenheim -Skolem 
theorem proves that these theories have models which do not require the 
existence of indenumerable domains.1
Skolem's Paradox is not a paradox in the true sense of the word: it is not 
centred (unlike Russell's Paradox) on a statement which is true if and only if it 
is false. The natural question is to ask why 'Skolem's Paradox' is felt to be a 
paradox at all.
I believe that one reason for this is that mathematical logicians have tended to
harbour a suppressed premiss by which ontological commitment is defined
model-theoretically. If this premiss is brought to the surface, and expanded, it
runs somewhat as follows. If every model J = <D,i> of a first-order theory T is
such that (3x)Kx & x e D, then T must be treated as ontologically committed 
*
to Ks. Conversely if there is a model K = <D',i'>, where -(3x)Kx & x c D*, and 
K is a model of T, then T is not ontologically committed to Ks. This reasoning 
issues in a definition of ontological commitment somewhat as follows:-
for any theory T and sort K, and where n > 1;
T oc K iff (D)(i) <D,i> is a model of T 3  [(3x)(Kx & xc D) v (3x)Kx & x C Dn)]
/ *
Now, formally, it might appear as if there is a genuine contradiction to be 
derived from Skolem's Paradox, because (a) we want to claim that there are 
consistent theories with commitments to indenumerable domains (b) that 
nonetheless any consistent first-order theory has a model in a denumerable 
domain, and also (c) that a theory has commitments of the kind mentioned in 
(b) just when every model of that theory contains an indenumerable domain. 
There are several things wrong with this line of thinking, not the least of 
which is the model-theoretic definition of ontological commitment given 
above. But to begin modestly, it is perhaps useful to note that the phrase 
'model contains a denumerable domain' is ambiguos: and the ambiguity centres 
about the use of 'contains' which can mean, in context, either one of
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two things, (a) It can mean (and is generally used to mean) that where 3 = 
<D,i>,^D =Afo5 (b) can mean that where 3 = <D,i>, (3x) x e D dc^^x = Af£,. It 
may be that if T is consistent, then there is some model of T with a 
denumerable domain in sense (a): which is what the Lowenheim - Skolem 
theorem asserts. But this is quite consistent with every model of T being 
'indenumerable' either in the sense that the domain of that model has an 
indenumerable number of elements or else in the sense that some element of 
the domain of that model is indenumerable. In such a case T will be 
ontologically committed to the existence of an indenumerable item, even by 
the model-theoretic definition of ontological commitment given previously. 
One way of restoring Skolem's paradox is to invoke a stronger form of the 
Lowenheim - Skolem theorem. A stronger theorem states that every 
consistent first-order theory has a model in the domain of natural numbers. 
Treating natural numbers as unreduced (i.e. non-set theoretical) objects it 
follows that for any consistent first-order theory there is a model which does 
not contain an indenumerable set either in sense (a) or (b) of ’contain'. This 
restores Skolem's Paradox.
It also brings in a lot more: specifically the spectre of Pythaqoreanism - the 
view that only numbers exist. If other things than numbers exist, then there 
must be some true first-order theory T which is ontologically committed to 
non-numbers. Let us suppose there is some such theory T, where T is 
committed to something which is neither a number or a set containing numbers 
0(3 x) mountain x' would be such a theory). From the definition of ontological 
commitment given, we derive
'(3x) mountain x 'o c  mountains iff
(D)(i) <D,i> is a model of '(3x) mountain x'
[(3x)(mountain x & xe D) v (3x)(mountain x & x C Dn)]
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Plainly since mountains are not sets, - (3 x) mountain x & x C Dn for all D? 
Therefore it follows from the above that:-
'(3x) mountain x' oc mountains iff (D)(i) <D,i> is a model of '(3x) mountain x'
3  (3x)(mountain x & x e D).
But by the strong Lowenheim - Skolem theorem, (3D)(3i) <D,i> is a model of 
'(3x) mountain x' & (x)x c D D  natural number x. Since mountains are not 
natural numbers, there is a model of '(3x) mountain x' which shows it not to be 
committed to mountains!
There is an atmosphere of absurdity about this conclusion which surely must 
show that the model-theoretic definition of ontological commitment given 
previously is wrong. Indeed it is wrong; for it can be formally proved from the 
definition as given that no consistent theory is committed to something which 
does not exist! The proof is as follows:-
1. T oc K Hyp
2. - (3x) Kx Hyp
3. T o cK s(D )(i)  <D,i> is a model of T Hyp
[(3x)(Kx & x c D) v (3xXKx & x t Dn)]
4. T is consistent^ (3D)(3 i) <D,i> is a model of T Hyp
(Completeness Theorem)
5. T is consistent Hyp
6. 0D)(3i) <D,i> is a model of T 4,5 Taut
7. (D)(i) <D,i> is a model of T 1,3 Taut
:D [(3x)(Kx & x e D) v (3x)(Kx & x e Dn)]
By 6, for some D and i
8. <D,i> is a model of T
9. <D,i> is a model of T3  [(3x)(Kx & x e D) 7 UI
v (3x)(Kx & x C Dn^
10. (3x)(Kx & x c D) v (3x)(Kx & x C Dn) 8,9 Taut
From 10 it follows by elementary first-order reasoning that:-
11. (3x)Kx
12. ( 3x)Kx & - (3x)Kx 2,11 Taut
therefore by reductio ad absurdum
13. - (T is consistent)
The conclusion of this argument rests on T oc K, - ( 3x) Kx, the definition of 
ontological commitment given, and the Completeness Theorem for first-order 
logic. Since the first two assumptions are true by hypothesis and the last is a 
well-established theorem of mathematical logic, the culprit must be the 
definition of ontological commitment given. Ontological commitment is not a 
model-theoretic concept.
Granted this, then the ability to prove the existence of non-standard models of 
a theory does not reflect on the ontological commitments of that theory. Nor 
does the existence of non-standard models prove that theory to be 
ontologically elastic: more is needed. What that more is, can be seen by 
reflecting on the strong Lowenheim - Skolem theorem and why it fails to 
reduce our ontology to a Pythagorean ontology.
For let T be any true (and hence consistent) first-order theory written in a 
language L. Suppose T carries prima facie ontological commitments to 
entities of a non-Pythagorean nature. In order to reduce T, by our standards 
of a recursive reduction, to the terms of a non-Pythagorean ontology, a 
recursive function would have to be given from the domain of L sentences into 
the domain of !_1 sentences, where L l is some arithmetical language. 
Moreover this recursive function would not only have to map T into a body of 
arithmetical truths: we should also be certain that T was an exhaustive
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description of the entities of its own domain of discourse. The strong
Lowenheim - Skolem theorem falls a long way short of supplying the materials
for such a project. The theorem itself guarantees only the existence of an
arithmetical model for each consistent theory: it supposes no effective means
2
for finding that model.
If model-theoretic and proof-theoretic accounts of ontological elasticity do 
not work, then the prospects for a formally rigourous account of the concept 
look dim indeed. A return to the idiom of formal frameworks is needed.
As observed formal frameworks do not successfully localise ontological 
elasticity. Perhaps the lesson to be learnt from this is that ontological 
commitment is, sui generis, to be counted as a holistic concept, applying to 
nothing less than the totality of human science. If so, then perhaps formal 
frameworks do offer some ingress into the concept of ontological elasticity, if 
the enquiry is conducted at the highest level of generality. At this level 
ontological elasticity can be seen in the presence of alternative model worlds; 
each capable of representing the results of the empirical sciences.
Formally, a model world is a deductively closed set of formulae generated 
from the set of all formulae, any of which is a formal image of some true 
target language sentence. Philosophically a model world is a representation of 
the contents of the universe and the principles that describe their behaviour, 
as developed from an initial ontological hypothesis. Ontological elasticity 
reveals itself when there is a model world |i and a model world ji , where, for 
some kind K, quantifies over Ks but \i does not.
The use of 'quantification over' serves to hide an intensionality implicit in this 
account. Quantification over Ks cannot be identified proof-theoretically, with 
'( 3 x) Kx' being a theorem or an element of the theory. For example, 
quantification over numbers does not require '( 3x) number x' as a theorem. 
Any synonym such as '(3x) nombre x' will do. Nor does the variable 'number' or 
any synonym actually have to appear in a theory, for that theory to be
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committed to numbers. '( 3x) x = 3’ and '( 3x) prime x' both quantify over 
numbers without specifically mentioning numbers. Quantification over Ks can 
only be explained by a theory entailing (3x) Kx and entailment is an intensional 
concept belonging to the theory of meaning. In this respect, ontological
commitment and ontological elasticity are much alike. The possibility of 
giving a formally precise, extensional definition of either concept depends on 
the how well philosophers of language succeed in absorbing the theory of 
meaning into the theory of reference.
This is a depressing conclusion for some; but it is not altogether unsurprising. 
Frequently it turns out that the most important and central concepts in a 
subject turn out to be resistant to formal definition. It is altogether perverse 
to reject these types of concepts merely because they resist systematic 
treatment, for their employment and examination can be extremely rewarding. 
Similarly, with ontological elasticity, the importance of this concept is too 
great for it to be bypassed without further ado.
In what follows, the concept of ontological elasticity is taken for granted, and 
the consequences of accepting the phenomenon of ontological elasticity are 
examined. Three such areas of consequence are here examined; they are as 
follows.
(i) The relation of ontological elasticity to philosophical taxonomy:- that 
area of philosophy which enquires after the proper classification of 
fundamental kinds of object.
(ii) The relation of ontological elasticity to the concept of existence. In 
particular, the consequences for classical logic of the influence of 
ontological elasticity on our ideas of what the universe must be like.
(iii) The relation of ontological elasticity to the concept of truth. In 
particular, the consequences for the Correspondence Theory of Truth and 
the Principle of Bivalence.
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5.2 Ontological Elasticity and Philosophical Taxonomy
One of the most popular forms of philosophical interrogation after questions 
beginning 'What is' are questions beginning 'What are'. What completes the 
first kind of question is a nominalised adjective; (e.g. 'What is truth?', 'What is 
justice?', 'What is goodness?', 'What is beauty?') What completes the second is 
some sortal term; (e.g. 'What are numbers?', 'What are truths (or falsehoods)?', 
'What are thoughts?').
Questions of the second kind are the concern of what can be called 
philosophical taxonomy, which attempts to provide some species and general 
classification of the fundamental kinds of being.
Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic is a classic work of philosophical 
taxonomy. At the introduction of his book, Frege defines the topic of enquiry 
as the nature of numbers.
'When we ask ourselves what the number one is, or what the symbol '1' means, 
we get as a rule the answer 'Why a thing'. And if we go on to point out that 
the proposition
'the number one is a thing'
is not a definition because it has the definite article on one side and the 
indefinite article on the other.... then we shall likely be invited to select 
something for ourselves - anything we please - to call one ....
Questions like these catch even mathematicians for that matter, or most of 
them, unprepared with any satisfactory answer. Yet is it not a scandal that 
our science should be so unclear about the first and foremost among its 
objects, and one which is apparently so simple? Small hope, then, that we 
shall be able to say what number is.'
Frege [4] (i - ii)
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Debates in philosophical taxonomy have continued up to contemporary times. 
Strawson and Austin, in a Tweedledum - Tweedledee sort of fashion, argued 
over the nature of facts for fifteen years. Questions of philosophical 
taxonomy are capable of maintaining long-standing disagreements - a fact that 
suggests such questions may have been wrongly posed in a first place.
A question of philosophical taxonomy is generally posed in the material mode 
of speech: that is, it is posed as a question about the status of a particular 
kind of object under some genus. It is not a question that presents itself in any 
essential way as connected to language: that is, it is usually not posed as a 
question in the formal mode. On the face of it, a question like ’What are the 
facts?’ is no more concerned with language than the questions ’What are 
aardvarks?' or 'What are Drysophila?'. In fact, appearances here are truly 
deceptive and because taxonomic questions in philosophy are usually wrongly 
posed in the material mode, the result is fruitless wrangling.
A question of philosophical taxonomy like 'What are numbers?' is better 
rephrased as 'What are we talking about (if anything) when we practice 
arithmetic, algebra or number theory?'. At first glance, changing the style of 
questioning brings the desired solutions no closer. Perhaps. But the change in 
style does serve to bring out certain presuppositions of interrogation in the 
material mode.
The first of these presuppositions is concerned with the way that Ks are 
identified in questions of the form 'What are Ks?'. If an interrogator should 
enquire 'What are numbers?', we are entitled to respond 'What do you mean by 
'numbers'?' If he should respond that he has no idea what he means by 
'numbers' then we can reply that if he attaches no sense to 'numbers' in his 
question then how can we be expected to give a sensible answer? On the other 
hand, if he should respond by giving a precise account of what he means by 
'number' then we can reply that he has already answered his own question, so 
why is he bothering us? To the harassed questioner there is only one way of
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phrasing his question so as to get it across. He can define numbers as the 
elements of the domain of discourse of a particular style of language, for 
example, of arithmetic, and then enquire as to the status of numbers. In this 
way he avoids the dilemma of either admitting he does not understand his own
question or else admitting he already has the answer. Treating questions of 
philosophical taxonomy in this manner means that important domains of items 
are defined relative to certain kinds of discourse. Numbers are the elements 
of the domain of discourse of arithmetic, facts are the elements of the domain 
of discourse of ordinary language sentences that mention the word 'fact' or 
some synonym. These are discourse-relative definitions. Here is the principal 
difference between questions of philosophical taxonomy and questions of say, 
biological taxonomy. If I enquire 'What are penguins?' then it is always open to 
me or another to define penguins ostensively. This means that the concept of 
being a penguin need not been defined in a discourse-relative fashion.
Defining numbers, facts, thoughts etc discourse-relatively throws up the 
second presupposition. To define numbers as the elements of the domain of 
arithmetic is to presuppose the truth of a uniqueness claim: namely there is 
one and only one domain of elements to which arithmetic can be interpreted. 
This presupposition is, of course, false. Therefore the questions 'What are 
numbers?' and its cash-value equivalent 'What is the domain of discourse of 
arithmetic?' are both ill-conceived: they both commit the Fallacy of Many 
Questions . Frege's opening questions of the Foundations were improperly 
formulated. In order to reset Frege's enquiry along modern lines we should 
have to ask 'How may arithmetic be formalised?'; and the answer comes back 
'In various ways: such as that of Zermelo, Von Neumann .... and, of course, 
Frege himself.'
What this all amounts to is that questions of philosophical taxonomy cannot be 
properly asked in the material mode in the presence of ontological elasticity. 
To pose a question of philosophical taxonomy in the material mode, we should
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be justifiably certain that our discourse-relative definition does not falsely 
presuppose a lack of ontological elasticity. Alternatively, a simpler and 
altogether better solution would be to abandon the material mode altogether? 
This departure from tradition would be a major conceptual revolution in the 
way human beings have so far pursued their research of the universe and the 
long-term consequences of adopting this method of enquiry would have to be 
pursued by the experts in their various fields. What I have to say, therefore, is 
general in the extreme and is somewhat akin to the authority with which 
amateur meteorologists deliver long-range weather forecasts by gazing at the 
clouds.
The most immediate, and I think, merciful effects of rephrasing all questions 
of philosophical taxonomy in the formal mode (i.e. of asking 'How may K-talk 
be formalised?' rather than 'What are Ks?') is an end to sterile and 
interminable arguments about the nature of Ks. A case in point is the debate 
on the nature of truth-bearers: truth bearers have been identified variously 
with propositions, statements, ordered n-tuples of word-tokens, sets of 
possible worlds, equivalence sets of synonymous declarative sentences etc... It 
is quite possible, given time and acumen, that at least some of these 
suggestions could be made to work in the context of formalisation. Asking 
'How may talk of what is true or false be formalised?' helps to dispel the idea 
that there is only one uniquely right answer to the question. Asking 'What are 
truth-bearers?' merely entrenches the discussion in a muddy (and roughly 
circular) rut in which the disputants reason that since truth-bearers are 
determinate somethings of some kind, at most only one answer to the question 
can be right.
Of all the natural sciences, modern physics offers perhaps the greatest scope 
for formalisation and ontological elasticity. The progression of physics has 
been, for over a hundred years, towards the study of systems which are more 
and more remote from human experience or even human imagination,
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probability waves and electromagnetic fields being two examples. Despite the
enormous increase in sophistication of the new physics over what little theory
prevailed in ancient times, the philosophical tenor of the modern research
/phsicist's enquiries is still transmitted from the mental outlook that 
characterised the Pre-Socratics. This outlook insists that the physical 
universe is determinate in the way it is constructed, and hence that, of any 
two representations of one and the same part, at most only one will be right. 
Thus the modern physicist would still approach a question about the internal 
architecture of atoms with the same presupposition of investigating a 
determinate something that motivated the early Greek cosmologists in their 
speculations about the nature of matter. But if atoms and electrons are 
defined in a discourse-relative fashion, that is to say, as the elements of the 
domain of discourse of our most currently successful atomic theories, then it 
is at least conceptually possible that such theories might enjoy different 
representations as to the elements of their domains. In such a case, physicists 
might well ponder whether it is not as mistaken to ask after the nature and 
identity of atoms as it was for mathematicians like Frege to ask after the 
nature and identity of numbers. Since (both) Russell and Whitehead each 
succeeded in finding different domains to represent all that men wished to say 
about instants of time, the possibility of ontological elasticity in modern 
physics seems worth bearing in mind.
5.3 Ontological Elasticity and Existence
'To be is to be required to be by some true theory' is about the shortest 
account of existence short of total triviality that is is possible to attain. The 
reply comes in different flavours, 'To be is to be required to be existentially 
quantified over in the formalisation of some true theory' is another: but only a 
variant of the first. It is, at first sight, the most innocuous of all accounts of
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existence; but joined to the doctrine of ontological elasticity, together they 
rebound with some considerable force into some classical ideas about how the 
universe must be.
The doctrine of ontological elasticity states that for at least one theory T (and 
probably for many), T can be formalised in various different ways, each 
equally valid, but each requiring assent to the existence of (and quantification 
over) the elements of a different domain. In such a case, T is ontologically 
elastic and there is no sense in enquiring after i the elements of the domain of 
T. Thus suppose that T can be formalised so as to be concerned with K^s, K£S 
or K3S but nothing else. It makes no sense to ask which domain T is concerned 
even though it would be right to say in the absence of all of Kj_, K2 or K3 , T 
would be false. Accepting the truth of T compels, by the definition of 
existence given previously, the recognition of the existence of all that T 
requires to be true. But we cannot say that because T is true, that the 
universe must contain K^s, or it must contain K2S, or it must contain K3S for 
T can be legitimately asserted in the absence of any one (or indeed two) of 
them.
But here is the nub. If we can accept that a single true theory can display 
ontological elasticity, then it must also be accepted that this ontological 
elasticity will be maintained even if this theory is incorporated into a wider 
corpus of truths. Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion it follows that 
different formalisations will be possible even of a completed science in which 
nothing more remains to be discovered. By our definition of existence, what 
exists will be what is required to exist by this completed science and nothing 
else. But given this completed science is ontoloqically elastic, the objects 
that are to be counted into the universe will .be as under-determined as the 
objects which are to be counted into 'the' domain of objects with which such a 
completed science is concerned. In fact, the two kinds of underdeterminacy 
are really the same.
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It is important to grasp that this underdeterminacy is not a underdeterminacy 
in human knowledge, but an underdeterminacy as to the things that are. The 
radical conclusion is not that it may well be that human beings can never 
arrive at a determinate knowledge of just what is, but rather that because 
what is is not determined, there is no such determinate knowledge to be had.
A metaontology of this kind reflects on many philosophical arguments of 
lasting duration. For example, the differences between the opinions of 
Platonists in the philosophy of language who insist that we should recognise 
the existence of universals and those of their nominalist opponents who say 
philosophers should stay clear of such commitments, may, in the end, be a 
reflection of differing ways of legitimately interpreting the domains of 
discourse of various natural language sentences. There may be no answer to 
the question 'Who is right?' and no side to choose. One casualty of this 
thinking is classical logic with its insistance on the exclusive rightness of 
either a statement or its denial.
The conclusions of the foregoing argument can be conveniently restated in the 
jargon of chapter three. In that chapter, a model world was introduced as a 
set of formulae each of which was a formal image of some true object 
sentence of science. Philosophically, a model world is a detailed 
representation of the way the world stands which is compatible with scientific 
truth defined relative to the object language. Ontological elasticity requires 
that different model worlds can be constructed to fit all the evidence. What 
exists will be what is common to all those model worlds so that Ks exist if and 
only if each model world quantifies over Ks and Ks do not exist, if and only if 
no model world quantifies over Ks. Where model worlds disagree, there lies 
uncovered the ontological underdeterminacy.
As observed, classical logic kicks hard against this sort of definition. Classical 
logic insists that each kind either exists or it does not, and nothing in between. 
So much the worse for classical logic is one reply; and the next question must
2 25
be what logic is most appropriate to the doctrine of ontological under- 
determinacy.
Given the large range of deviant logics currently extant* I can see no easy 
answer to this problem. The questionis, to my mind, not so much the formal 
one of whether a logic can be found to accommodate philosophical intuition, 
but whether philosophical intuition can be sharpened and justified so as to 
select just one logic. There are various logics for example, Heyting's and 
Johansson's intuitionist propositional calculi, and Lukasiewiez' and Kleene's 3- 
valued calculi, which lack LEM and are compatible with ontological under- 
determinacy in that respect.
A promising line of pursuit seems to me to originate from a Hintikka [61] 
model set approach, and ancestrally from Carnap's [22] use of state- 
descriptions. The idea of Carnap's approach is to specify sets of formulae 
(state-descriptions), each set sharing a common language L, and each bound in 
conformance with certain rules of membership. Intuitively each such state- 
description represents a possible world and the formulae common to all such 
state-descriptions are the formulae recognised as valid. Borrowing this 
technique from Carnap, what would be required would be a domain of sets 
representing model worlds, each set having a membership bound in 
conformance with certain rules.
Of a range of such systems investigated in the course of this research one 
seems to me of sufficient interest to be mentioned. This system I call 'System 
4' (because is was the fourth of ten different systems investigated). In System 
4, model worlds are represented by sets of formulae written in a language L. 
Each element of every set is either (a) an atomic formula or (b) the negation 
of an atomic formula. Each such set is consistent; i.e. where p is any formula 
and S any such set, if p c S then - p S. However completeness is not a 
requirement and so p /  S and - p y f S is permissible. Each such set is 
expanded to a conforming set by means of the following rules. Where is any
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conforming set generated in this way, and p and q any formulae of L; if p e p 
then - p e p  and:-
(i) - - p e p  iff p c p
(ii) p v q e p iff p e p or q e p
(iii) p & q e p  iff p e p  and q e p
(iv) p p q c  p iff p /  p or q e p
(v) - (p v q) c p iff - p e p and - q e p
(vi) - (p & q) e p iff - p e p or - q e p
(vii) - ( p a q ) c  p iff p e p and - q e p
The set of conforming sets is just the set of sets generated in this manner. A 
formula is valid if and only if it is an element of every conforming set and a 
rule of inference is validity - preserving if and only if it derives only valid 
formulae from valid formulae.
It turns out that System 4 characterises a logic in which modus ponens is 
validity preserving. It also turns out that the Deduction Theorem is provable 
of this logic since modus ponens is admitted and so are the formulae:-
(p 3 (q a p ))i
(p 3  (q r)) 3  (Cp D q ) o ( p o  r)).
By a proof by Herbrand (see Mendelson [90] (32)), any logic admitting these 
two formulae, plus modus ponens, has the Deduction Theorem true of it. 
Unlike intuitionist logics, the Law of Double Negation is admitted. But like 
intuitionist logics, LEM is not a valid formula since it will fail to hold of 
conforming sets generated from incomplete sets. Since the Law of Double 
Negation is reckoned to be instrumental in the generation of LEM, how exactly 
does System 4 retain DN and reject LEM?
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The answer is that there is an important classical principle that is not retained 
under System 4: that of reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof. Neither of 
the following formulae:-
((p 3  - q) & (p 3  q) )3  - p 
(p Z3 (q & - q)) 3  - p
turns out to be valid. I would conjecture that if either of these formulae were 
added to the valid formulae of System 4 and modus ponens, the resulting 
theorems would be wholly classical. If so, then there is an interesting parallel 
with Heyting's propositional calculus. Heyting's calculus turns out to collapse 
into the classical propositional calculus with the addition of — p 3  p as an 
axiom.
5.4 Ontological Elasticity and Truth
It is part of the conventional wisdom attached to set theory that ordered pairs 
are mathematically reducible to sets. Weiner suggested one way: treat <x,y> 
as [x ,^ ,y ]j. Kuratowski suggested another: treat <x,y> as £x Both
these fulfill the identity criteria for ordered pairs
(i) <x,y> = <w,z> iff x = w and y = z
As far as mathematics goes, both Wiener's and Kuratowski's approaches are 
successful. Quine puts the case for the mathematical status quo, ^
commenting:-
’Which is right? All are; all fulfil (i), and conflict with one another only out 
amongst the don't cares. Any air of paradox comes only of supposing that 
there is a unique right analysis - a mistake that is encouraged by the practice,
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otherwise convenient, of using the term 'ordered pair' for each version. On 
this and other points, the nature of explication as illustrated by the ordered 
pair may be made wholly evident by retelling the story of Wiener, Kuratowski 
and the ordered pair in a modified terminology. In the beginning there was the 
notion of the ordered pair, defective and perplexing but serviceable. Then 
men found that whatever good had been accomplished by talking of the 
ordered pair <x,y> could be acomplished instead by talking of the class £x >[y>Aj^
- or, for that matter, of £x >^x>yJ^
Quine [119] (260)
The point of epistemological interest is the 'don't cares'. The facts of logical 
life are that Wiener's and Kuratowski's competing formalisations demand 
incompatible valuations of certain set theoretical sentences. For instance the 
sentence 1 [x>yj c x^>y^ ' *s recognised as true under the formalisation of 
Kuratowski since it is equivalent to '^ »y j c jx ,^<,y|j'. But under Wiener's 
formalisation '£x,yj € <x>y>' emerges as '|x,y^e x^ which is false. If we
accept that '£x,yje <x»y>' *s determinately true or false for each x and for each 
y, then we must also accept that either Wiener or Kuratowski is wrong: and 
that is contrary to the council of mathematical tolerance preached by Quine. 
By modus tollens, accepting the tolerant attitude means rejecting the 
determinacy of truth-values of sentences like ’^XjyJc <x,y>\
The rejection of the view that every well-formed declarative sentence is 
either true or false, is, as I understand it, a rejection of the Principle of 
Bivalence, and this is what is recognition of ontological elasticity demands. 
The Principle of Bivalence is historically, but not inevitably, associated with 
Correspondence theories of truth. A Correspondence theorist, archetypically, 
believes there is a completely determinate collection of states of affairs or 
facts. There is also a range of truth-bearers, sometimes presented as 
propositions, which either correspond or do not correspond to the facts. If a
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proposition corresponds to the facts, it is true: if not, false. The 
epistemological problem is that theories of truth which follow this general 
pattern (theories handed to us by such imposing authorities as Aristotle, 
Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and Tarski) leave no room for ontological
elasticity or its philosophical consequences. Ontological elasticity teaches us 
not to think of the world as a collection of facts with determinate relations to 
what we surmise. On the contrary, ontological elasticity enjoins that we 
accept that there are domains in which it is drastically underdetermined just 
what exactly the properties of the elements of these domains are. Ontological 
elasticity teaches us that certain questions about the nature of various kinds 
are radically misplaced and that in certain areas the very existence of certain 
would be objects may be left unsettled. For ontological elasticity to be 
accommodated, the Correspondence picture of the world as a collection of 
given facts has to go in favour of something more flexible. We are forced to 
recognise that if statements about Kgs are legitimately formalised as 
statements about K^s, or K2S, then liberality must be used as regards the 
valuation of sentences that attribute to Kgs, properties reserved for K]S, or 
which attribute to Kgs, properties reserved for K2S. Just as ontological 
elasticity demands its own logic, so it also demands its own theory of truth. 
The detailed exegesis of such a theory of truth belongs by right to a 
substantial work in epistemology. This is not such a work and so what follows 
is not a detailed exegesis, but rather the elements for the construction of such 
an exegesis.
Within any language there is a solid core of sentences which are either 
determinately true or else determinately false. The domain of such sentences 
has been the domain of classical logic and within this domain the canons of 
classical logic hold good. Such declarative sentences I call core sentences. 
Outside the solid core is a domain of fringe sentences. Fringe sentences are 
characterised by their resistance to any conceivable means of allocating them
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a truth-value and constitute the 'don't cares' of Quine's quoted comment. 
Examples of such fringe sentences include '^1,2  ^£, <1,2>', 'the cardinality of a 
point is N0', and possibly 'My thoughts are in my brain'. In formalisation an 
ontologist is expected to take note of the truth-values of core-sentences, for
these are the sentences which place constraints of his formalisation. The 
fringe sentence are the 'don't cares' which can be played fast and loose with: 
these sentences lack truth-value, but can be conventionally given a truth-value 
if the formalisation requires it. So we get a diagrammatic picture like this:-
FRINGESENTENCES
CORE SENTENCES
The fringe-core distinction raises two questions:-
(1) What, more precisely, places a sentence in the fringe rather 
than the core?
(2) Can a sentence move from one to the other?
I shall take these questions in turn.
In a sense, the first question has received something of an answer in saying 
that a fringe sentence is a sentence that reveals no significant consequence
whatever its valuation. But the answer can, I think, be pressed a little further 
and I shall try to do so.
The pursuit of truth or knowledge, can be thought of in terms of a model in 
which sentences are processed through what can be called an epistemic filter. 
An epistemic filter embodies our principal modes of epistemic inquiry: that is 
to say, our important ways of assessing the truth or likely truth, falsehood or 
likely falsehood, of various declarative sentences. The elements of our 
cultural epistemic filter range from the simplest decision-effective procedures 
(like deciding the truth of a sentence of elementary arithmetic) to the most 
abstract methodologies such as the Popperian scheme for the pursuit of 
science. Epistemic filters are not fixed in nature; that is to say an epistemic 
filter is a growth system rather than a pre-wired system incapable of change. 
Some parts (e.g. logic and mathematics) of an epistemic filter do, by reason of 
their recurrent usefulness in many cases, acquire the status of being fixed and 
unassailable necessary truths. But in general, the cultural epistemic filter 
changes and evolves from generation to generation. This is simply because an 
epistemic filter is being constantly modified by its own output. To make the 
point simply, as an epistemic filter is used to separate out truths from 
falsehoods, so certain declarative sentences that become thus well-established 
and become part of the epistemic filter itself. Thus Newton's equation for 
gravitational attraction F = G minr^/d2, where F is the gravitational force, 
m i and m2 the masses of the bodies, d the distance between the bodies and G 
the gravitational constant, was once the object of investigation to the 
epistemic filter of seventeenth-century physics. Subject to its corroboration, 
it became in due course, part of the epistemic filter of physics itself and was 
used to evaluate reports on the masses of the planets.
In describing an epistemic filter as a growth system rather than a prewired 
system, it does not follow that epistemic filters do not tend, as most growth 
systems do, to a stable state where growth ceases or becomes slowed to a
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minimum and the system becomes in all essential respects a fixed-wire 
system.
An example of such a growth system would be that of a computer programmed 
to play chess, but also programmed to change its programme as its experience 
of the game grew. Such a computer would never play the same losing game 
twice. Over a period of time the computer would lose fewer and fewer games 
and consequently modifications to its programme would grow less too. The 
stable state to which the computer would gravitate would be one where it 
played the best possible move in any chess situation. In this way the concept 
of 'the best chess move' could be defined as the move the computer would 
make in its ideal stable state. Though the rate of the computer towards its 
stable state would be, to an extent unpredictable, depending in part on the 
quality of the opposition, the stable state would itself be determinate.
In a similar fashion an epistemic filter would move towards a stable state and 
the concept of truth could be defined in relation to such a stable state: a 
sentence is true if and only if it is classified as such when input to a stable- 
state epistemic filter and false when it is classified as such by the same filter. 
Sentences left unclassified would be fringe sentences. Apart from the use of 
the terminology of cybernetics, the spirit of this account of truth was 
captured by Peirce in his definition of truth: The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth...’
Are fringe sentences incapable of changing their status or can they become 
core sentences? The answer to this question is that they can become core 
sentences because of the human passion for interfering with their own 
epistemic filters and altering the course of their development. Acts of 
intellectual deus ex machina frequently result in incorporating whole tracts of 
fringe sentences into the core and the epistemic filter, so enriched, then 
begins to progress towards a stable state which it would have not attained had 
it been left alone. These acts of deus ex machina are conventions which fix
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the truth-values of certain crucial fringe sentences, on the promise of thus 
evolving a new area of research and eliminating doubt or fog over fundamental 
issues.
Cantor's foundational work on infinity was an example of such a deus ex 
machina intervention in the epistemic filter of nineteenth century 
mathematics. Prior to Cantor's work, most discussion of the concept of 
infinity took place within philosophy and the concept of infinity resisted 
incorporation into mathematics. For this reason, statements about infinity 
(e.g. 'All infinite collections have the same number of items') were fringe 
sentences relegated to philosophers. Had the procedures and conceptual 
equipment of the mathematician circa 1850 been allowed to develop, no means 
of evaluating these sentences would have emerged.
Cantor's achievements lay in altering the epistemic filter of mathematics in 
such a way as to reclaim fringe sentences relegated to philosophy, for 
mathematics. In order to do so, Cantor had to propose certain conventions for 
the valuation of fringe sentences concerned with infinite collections. 
Principally Cantor chose to adopt a definition of infinity (that a set is infinite 
iff it is equivalent to a proper subset of itself) which reversed the classical 
conception that the whole is always greater than a proper part. By use of such 
conventions for fixing the values of fringe sentences concerned with infinity 
Cantor created the study of transfinite cardinal arithmetic in which hitherto 
fringe sentences became core sentences capable of proof or disproof. A 
similar example, though less enthusiastically endorsed than Cantor's work, was 
Whitehead's [147] ontological reduction of points and instants of time to set- 
theoretical constructions of events. Accepting the benefits of Whitehead's 
approach involves admitting to the domain of the core sentences, sentences 
reporting on the cardinality of space-time points that previously would have 
had no valuation. In this way, truth can evolve with the evolution of human
ideas. 2 34
1 See Grandy [56] for a proof. The strong Lowenheim - Skolem theorem was 
first proved by Bemays.
2 See section 6 on recursive reduction. Gottlieb [55] has pointed out that even 
if human intellect was so powerful as to be able to specify some arithmetical 
model on the presentation of a consistent theory, this would still not establish 
Pythagoreanism. Thus suppose T to be a true first-order theory written in L, 
whose domain of discourse was non-arithmetical. By the strong Lowenheim - 
Skolem theorem there is an arithmetical model <D,i> of T where D = N, the 
set of natural numbers. Suppose we could isolate this model. We might be 
able to specify a language L' with the following properties. Where v is any 
element of L and i(v) the interpretation of v under i, there would be a variable 
v' of L' where the extension of v' = i(v). By replacing each such variable v in T 
by v' of L', a true arithmetical theory T' would be created, i.e. one whose 
variables ranged only over numbers. T would be reduced to T'.
However it does not follow that if L' is an arithmetical language whose 
variables range only over numbers, that every theory formulated in L' is 
Pythagorean (i.e. committed only to numbers). For suppose that the predicate 
'x is greater than the number of members of the House of Representatives' is 
an element of L'. '(3 x) x is greater than the number of members of the House 
of Representatives' is both a theory of L' and a theory whose ontological 
commitments are not totally Pythagorean. Arithmetical languages need not 
generate arithmetical ontologies.
3 See Austin [1] [8] and Stawson [138],
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CHAPTER SIX
Ontological Reductions
Ontological reduction is both a generic and a dialectical procedure: generic, 
in that there is not simply one kind of procedure called 'ontological reduction' 
to be examined; dialectical, in that the procedure of ontological reduction is 
often executed within a human exchange. Dialectical procedures (such as 
demonstration or giving evidence) cannot be analysed outside contexts where 
on human being reasons with another.
Having said that ontological reduction is a generic concept, it is then natural 
to enquire what binds the various species of ontological reduction together and 
brings them together under one rubric or heading. It would be easy - and 
somewhat disappointing - to hide behind the ink-cloud of Family Resemblance 
and deny this question significance. Here, at any rate, it is not necessary to 
do so. What binds the various species of reduction together is not how they are 
performed but why. It may arise that a person wishes to demonstrate of a 
subject (possibly himself) that the discredit of a particular ontological 
commitment attributed to that subject can be avoided in some manner. 
Ontological reduction is simply a name given to any philosophically interesting 
procedure that can bring this about.
In this chapter, four kinds of ontological reduction will be examined; recursive 
reduction, reduction by logic-shift, reduction by limitation of the target 
language, and identity reduction. There is no claim to completeness in this 
list; they are merely those reductions that strike me as most pervasive or 
philosophically interesting. Anybody who can add to the list is welcome to do 
so. It should be noted that one species of reduction has already been dealt 
with: that which takes advantage of ontological elasticity by reformalising to
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avoid an unwanted existential quantification. I shall not cover this ground 
again. Finally the chapter will end in an examination of the development of 
Quine's views on ontological reduction.
6.1 Recursive Reduction
Recursive reduction originated in mathematics where the technique was used 
ancestrally in Riemann's relative consistency proof of Riemannian to 
Euclidean geometry. (Indeed, there are several striking similarities between a 
recursive reduction and a relative consistency proof). Although derived from 
mathematics, recursive reduction is applicable to other areas of human 
research. Appendix III at the end of this chapter contains a detailed expansion 
of a recursive reduction of instants of time by Russell, and is worth consulting 
by anybody interested in seeing the technique in action.
The procedure of recursive reduction is irreducibly dialectical. Consequently 
the procedure will be illustrated between two imaginary parties, Yodelstein 
and Zollicoffer, arguing over the existence of a species K of entity, which for 
the sake of generality, shall be left unspecified. The position - pre-recursive 
reduction - is that Yodelstein is committed to the existence of Ks, but is 
willing to abandon his commitment to Ks should anything better offer. 
Zollicoffer is determinedly opposed to recognising the existence of Ks and 
hopes to persuade Yodelstein to his position. The game is set.
The first move is Yodelstein's. Yodelstein isolates a formal language L|<, 
which can be assumed to be first order. Lj< is selected on the basis that 
Yodelstein believes that anything significant that he wishes to assert of Ks can 
be asserted in this language.
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The second move is also Vodelstein's: the isolation of a set T|< of axioms 
written in the language L|<. Yodelstein takes the elements of T|< to be true 
and ideally will also be complete. However completeness being a property 
laid up more in heaven than found in terrestrial theories, it will not matter 
that T|< is incomplete. It is important, however, that Yodelstein be happy to 
identify the seminal truths about Ks with the theorems of T|<, and hence that, 
in respect of the important verities about Ks, Yodelstein should agree Tj< is 
'complete'.
The first two moves define Yodelstein's position, and from thereon in, most of 
the moves are made by Zollicoffer. Zollicoffer has to specify a domain of Os, 
within which Ks are not included and Zollicoffer has to get Yodelstein 
agreement that there is such a domain. Without Yodelstein's agreement on 
this, the game terminates without Zollicoffer arriving at a winning position. 
Having secured Yodelstein's agreement, Zollicoffer then procures a formal 
language Lj, (whose variables range only over the items of J) which Zollicoffer 
considers is rich enough to say what he wishes of the elements of J. 
Zollicoffer produces a theory Tj written in the language Lj; and Zollicoffer 
must persuade Yodelstein that Tj is true. Again without Yodelstein agreeing, 
Zollicoffer fails to arrive at a winning position.
If he has got this far, Zollicoffer is in a position to make his crucial winning- 
move - the application of a recursive reduction. What Zollicoffer endeavours 
to do is to produce a computable or recursive function r, where r takes as its 
domain the set of sentences and has as its range a subdomain of the domain 
of Lj sentences. Zollicoffer attempts to prove, on the assumptions granted to 
him by Yodelstein, that r preserves truth-values; i.e. s 5  r(s) for all s of L|<. If 
Zollicoffer suceeds in doing this, then- he has provided Yodelstein with what 
Yodelstein must agree is a mechanical truth-preserving means of translating 
(and hence eliminating) all talk about Ks in favour of talk about Js. He has 
effectively shown that Yodelstein no longer has any good reason to cling to an 
ontology of unreduced Ks.
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How may Zollicoffer constructively prove the existence of such a recursive 
function? In fact, granted the assumptions provided by Yodelstein, Zollicoffer 
proves his point if he proves the following:-
f-Tjr(s)
I- T k- s 3  Tj " r(s)
The reasoning is quite simple. Let s be any sentence of Lk. Now suppose v(s) 
= 1; on the assumption granted by Yodelstein the idea of truth-in-Lk can be 
conveniently approximated to derivability from Tk. So Zollicoffer has been 
given licence to treat v(s) = 1 and F j^s interchangably; let him do so. Since 
Yodelstein has allowed that Tj is true, by mapping s to a theorem r(s) of Tj, 
Zollicoffer shows that, according to Yodelstein's own thinking, whenever v(s) = 
1, r preserves truth-value.
Now suppose v(s) = 0; by the same assumptions as before Zollicoffer is entitled 
to treat this as equivalent to F jk - s, and since Tj is assumed true, if s is 
mapped to r(s) where F j .  - r(s), then again Yodelstein must agree r preserves 
truth-value. Game to Zollicoffer.
There are a few points to note about this little scenario. Yodelstein can have 
a reply if he wishes. He can, for instance, change his mind about Tk and 
enlarge its repertoire of home truths about Ks, even if such an indulgence 
smacks of gamesmanship. Zollicoffer, for his part, is restricted by the rules of 
the game; especially by the fact that r must be a recursive function. The 
reasons for the emphasis on recursiveness is that Yodelstein cannot eschew his 
commitment to Ks unless he is provided, whenever he is tempted to quantify 
over Ks, with an effective means of avoiding this quantification. To be told 
that talk of Ks is dispensable, but to have no means to hand to dispense with it 
is no use to Yodelstein. There are two corollaries to this demand for 
recursiveness.
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Corollary one is that since r is recursive, Zollicoffer must define r purely 
syntactically, without reference to any semantic concepts like truth or 
meaning, r must be defined purely in relation to the order and appearance of 
the signs used in the sentences of L|< and Lj*
Corollary one contains its own justification for the requirement that r be 
recursive. For imagine that r need not be recursive; then we could easily find 
a truth-preserving non-recursive function r*; where s is any sentence of L^, r* 
is defined as follows:-
r*(s) = f  '(x)x = x' if v(s) = 1 
^  '-(x)x = x' if v(s) = 0
In this way the ontology of every theory could be dispensed with altogether. 
Recursiveness blocks out this option. However, where truth in !_;< is decidable» 
then a function such as r* can be defined recursively. It follows that the 
ontology of any decidable theory is dispensable.
Corollary two is that if the domain of r (the set of sentences) is 
denumerable, then r cannot be specified by enumeration. Thus defining, f or 
the sake of illustration, a recursive function in terms of Turing computability, 
to define r by enumeration for each element of would require a program of 
infinite length, and programs of this kind (as well as being humanly impossible 
to write) are defined as inadmissable for Turing machines. In such a case f  
must be defined from the elements of L|< itself, and r(s) is defined for each § 
by the components from which s is constructed.
In closing, it is worth remarking on the close parallels between a recursive 
reduction and a relative consistency proof. The techniques are basically the 
same. In both cases the means is a procedure which maps one theory into & 
subtheory of another theory. In fact, the recursive reduction of Tj to T  ^ is alt 
the same time a relative consistency proof of Tj to T|<. The difference
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between a recursive reduction and a relative consistency proof lies mostly in 
the different purposes for which the same technique is adopted.
6.2 Reduction by Logic Shift
Haack [59] defines an extended logic as a logic which includes as a proper part 
both the symbolism and axioms/rules of inference of either the classical 
propositional or predicate calculi. Where the study of extended logics 
intersects with metaontology, is when an ontologist shifts to the use of an 
extended logic to avoid a quantification that he finds distasteful. To 
illustrate.
The sentence 'Tom moved' is a simple action sentence. If asked to formalise 
'Tom moved' then the atomic sentence:-
moved (Tom)
is close at hand. Complexities begin with the introduction of adverbs. 
Suppose the task is to formalise not 'Tom moved' but 'Tom moved swiftly'. 
Plodding along the lines of previous thought we suggest:-
moved swiftly (Tom)
as a good formalisation.
Davidson [38] disagrees. Davidson criticises formalisations like this one on 
two counts.
First, the proposal, if generalised as a way of treating adverbial sentences and 
placed in the context of a Davidsonian theory of meaning, stands in danger of 
violating the constraint of finite axiomatisation. The string of modifying 
adjectives and adverbs can be extended indefinitely, thus:-
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Tom moved swiftly....
Tom moved swiftly and with stealth....
Tom moved swiftly and with stealth towards the pantry....
Tom moved swiftly and with stealth towards the pantry on all 
fours.........................
If each of these sentences is formalised as an atomic sentence then the 
predicates 'moved', 'moved swiftly', 'moved swiftly and with stealth', 'moved 
swiftly and with stealth towards the pantry', 'moved swiftly and with stealth 
towards the pantry on all fours' become semantic primitives each of which 
requires its own satisfaction conditions to be axiomatised. Since there is no 
guarantee that an infinite number of such predicates cannot be formed, then 
there is no guarantee that an infinite number of axioms will not be required.1 
Second, the species of formalisation advocated fails to legislate for inferences 
like:-
Tom moved ....
Tom moved swiftly
Tom moved;
which becomes formalised as the logically invalid:-
moved swiftly (Tom)
moved (Tom)
of the form Fa I- Ga.
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Both these disadvantages are avoided on Davidson's proposal. This proposal 
would formalise 'Tom moved swiftly' as:-
'(3e) movement (e) & swift (e) & of (e, Tom)'
Here complex adverbial constructions are teased apart into predicates true of 
events (or ordered n-tuples containing events). The threat of using infinite 
axioms is avoided. As a bonus, if 'Tom moved' is formalised as:-
'(3e) movement (e) & of (e, Tom)'
then the inference from 'Tom moved swiftly' to 'Tom moved' becomes 
represented by the logically valid argument:-
(3e) movement (e) & swift (e) & of (e, Tom)
(3e) movement (e) & of (e, Tom)
Davidson reasonably identifies the values for which these sentences are true as 
being events. Consequently Davidson recognises an ontological commitment 
to events in adverbial sentences.
Romane Clark [30] is not happy about admitting the existence of events. He 
complains that Davidson fails to supply identity criteria for events. Clark 
follows a course of formalising adverbial sentences unlike Davidson's. Clark's 
approach, he believes 'reflects the grammar of our native language' as regards 
adverbial sentences. Clark's idea is to see 'swiftly' in 'Tom moved swiftly' not 
as predicating of an event, but as attaching to and modifying the sense of 
'moved'. 'Moved' becomes what Clark calls 'a core predicate' and 'swiftly' a 
predicate modifier. So 'Tom moved swiftly' is formalised in Clark's predicate 
modifier logic as:-
. 2 4 3
’swiftly (moved (Tom))’
In a logic of predicate modifiers there is a primitive rule of inference that 
allows predicate modifiers to be peeled off from the outside of formulae. 
Formally, where M is any predicate modifier, any concatanation of n (n > 0) 
predicate modifiers ending with an m-place (m > 1) predicate, and tj,..., tm 
are terms; then all inferences of the following schema are allowed.
M O 'C t!.....tm))
$  (ti,....tm)
If 'Tom moved swiftly' is formalised as 'swiftly (moved (Tom))' and 'Tom 
moved' by 'moved (Tom)' then the argument Tom moved swiftly therefore Tom 
moved' becomes represented as:-
swiftly (moved (Tom)) 
moved (Tom)
which is an instance of the rule of predicate modifier detachment given above. 
Clark opens his paper by stating what he takes to be the difference between 
stating what he takes to be the difference between Davidson and a 'radical' 
like himself on issues of this kind.
'The conservative philosopher [Davidson] attributes to the English sentence a 
hidden logical form which does not coincide with its apparent logical form. 
Radicals [Clark], by contrast, will be inclined to take the English sentence at 
face value. Instead they will tinker with standard logic hoping to 
accommodate those recalcitrant inferences in an enriched formal structure'.
Clark [30](311)
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This summarises the differences quite well. The different patterns of Clark's 
and Davidson's arguments can be brought out if their positions are simplified 
and idealised to draw attention to the salient features of each; thus:-
Davidson
P
Q
R
((P & Q) & R 
S
The first-order predicate calculus is the correct logic 
for the purposes of formalisation.
'Tom moved swiftly' is true.
In order to properly formalise 'Tom moved swiftly' in 
first order logic, events have to be quantified over.
If the first-order predicate calculus is the correct 
logic for the purposes of formalisation and 'Tom 
moved swiftly' is true and in order to properly 
formalise 'Tom moved swiftly' in first-order logic 
events have to be quantified over then events exist.
S Events exist.
Clark
- S Events do not exist.
Q 'Tom moved swiftly' is true.
R In order to properly formalise 'Tom moved swiftly' in
first order logic events have to be quantified over.
C(P & Q) & R) If the first-order predicate calculus is the correct 
"D S logic for the purposes of formalisation and 'Tom
moved swiftly' is true and in order to properly 
formalise 'Tom moved swiftly' in first-order logic 
logic events have to be quantified over then events 
exist.
- P The first-order predicate calculus is not the correct
logic for the purposes of formalisation.
___ O A  5 ________
Both arguments are tautologically valid. The Davidsonian argument is of the 
form P,Q,R,((P & Q) & R)D S f- S. Clark's argument is of the form -S,Q,R, ((P 
& Q) & R) 3  S t- -P.
The problem facing the ontologist here is this: does he accept the correctness 
of the first-order predicate calculus (thus accepting P) and then acknowledge 
the existence of events (accepting S); or does he reject the existence of events 
(thus affirming - S) and then revise his opinion of the correctness of the 
predicate calculus (asserting - P)?
Each course has its own prima facie advantages. Accepting (P & S) allows the 
ontologist to keep his logic simple; but at the cost of inflating his ontology 
with events. Accepting (- P & - S) allows the ontologist to keep his ontology 
free from events - at the cost of inflating his logic. The metaontological 
problem is to try to discern some superordinate principles by which such 
contests can be decided.
These contests are by no means restricted only to the formalisation of action 
sentences. For instance:-
Quantification over periods of vs
time in formalising tensed 
sentences and retaining first- 
order logic 
Quine [119]
Quantification over possible vs
worlds in formalising strong 
conditionals and counterfactuals 
and retaining first-order logic 
Lewis [83]
Stalnaker [134]
Rejecting first-order logic in 
favour of tense logic and dispensing 
with moments in time
Geach [49]
Using a special notation for strong 
conditionals and counterfactuals 
thus removing the need to quantify 
over possible worlds.
Pollock [102]
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Quantification over attributes in vs Dispensing with attributes but using
formalising sentences of epistemic logic.
propositional attitude, but
retaining first-order logic. Ackermann [1]
Quine [117] Hintikka [67]
Haack recognises the generality and importance of this kind of logico- 
ontological disagreement. Her conclusion is that there may well be no 
question-begging way of deciding these contests.
'For myself I concede the desirability both of austerity of symbolism ... and of 
simplicity of paraphrase ....; I fear it is just a fact of logical life that these are 
competing desiderata.'
Haack [60] (161)
Gilbert Harman [63] is less pessimistic than Haack - but also less than 
cautious. Harman lays down a set of rules which are designed to filter out 
unwanted formalisations leaving only one survivor: 'the logical form' of the 
sentence under formalisation. In summary form, Harman's rules are:-
(1) A mode of formalisation must formalise sentences in such a way as to 
obey the constraint of finite axiomatisation.
(2) A mode of formalisation should limit itself, as far as possible, to first- 
order logic.
(3) A mode of formalisation should minimise the axioms that would be 
needed in a good (Davidsonian) theory of meaning for a language if that 
formalisation were incorporated in such a theory.
(4) A mode of formalisation should avoid ascribing unnecessary ontological 
commitments to the sentences formalised.
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(5) A theory of formalisation should assign forms which would be assigned by 
a good transformational grammar.
Some of these rules are quite obscure (what for instance counts as a 'good' 
transformational grammar?) others are lacking justification (why the bias 
towards first-order logic?). The most obviously relevant rules to our 
discussion are (2) and (4); on those Harman has this to say.
On rule (2)
'A theory of logical form should minimise rules of logic. In practice this 
means that rules of logical implication should be kept as close as possible to 
the rules of ordinary (first-order) quantificational logic; for example, one 
might suppose that a three-valued logic yields a better account of the 
language than a two-valued logic does; or one might take quantification in the 
language to be 'restricted' in one or another way. But, other things equal, one 
account is better than another, the closer its logical rules are to those of 
ordinary quantificational logic'.
Harman [63] (291)
On rule (4)
'A theory of logical form would avoid ascribing unnecessary ontological 
commitments to sentences of the language. Other things being equal, one 
theory is better than another to the extent that it interprets sentences as 
implying the existence of more ordinary sorts of things.'
Harman [63] (299)
I do not know what Harman means by 'ordinary sorts of things': but rules (2) 
and (4) are incapable, as Harman states them, of arbitrating the sorts of
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contest previously examined. It is over these contests that an ontologist has 
to choose between (2) and (4). What Harman needs is some hierarchic 
arrangement whereby his rules can be placed in order of importance.
Harman does have some idea of the relative importance of rules (2) and (4). In 
considering predicate modifiers vs quantification over events, Harman chooses 
the latter. Harman remarks that one should only change one's logic 'as a last 
resort'. But the game is given away at the end of the article where Harman's 
logical conservatism is defended on the grounds that it goes to 'help to narrow 
down possibilities'.
This is true. But a series of ad hoc and unsupported conditions does not 
rationally limit possibilities: nor does it give confidence to the idea that every 
sentence has a unique logical form. Harman needs to show that his possibility- 
limiting rules have some other justification apart form limiting possibilities - 
otherwise why not just pick straws? This problem will be resumed in chapter 
seven.
6.3 Reduction by Limitation of the Target Language
A major 'discovery' of post-war Oxford philosophers was made by Austin [9] 
who found that not all indicative sentences performed or could perform in a 
statement-making role. Austin's case study specialised much in promises and 
other avowals which Austin called 'performatives'. In ontology the fact that 
an indicative sentence may not be declarative is sufficient condition to bar it 
from being formalised or from having ontological commitments attributed to 
it. Such sentences can be limited from target language.
An instance of a philosopher taking this line, though not admittedly for 
ontological reasons, is Campbell [17]. After discussing the well-known 
problems involved in formalising the subjunctive and counterfactual 
conditionals in terms of the weak material conditional, Campbell chooses
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Mackie's analysis of both. According to Mackie [87], strong and counterfactual 
conditionals are not really declarative sentences at all. They are really very 
telescoped arguments with many suppressed premises (enthymemes). If strong 
and counterfactual conditionals are emthymemes, then they are not 
statements and so they need not be formalised. Campbell concludes:-
'....since on Mackie's view conditionals are not assertions, they need not (and 
indeed cannot) figure in a complete schedule of assertions....[Therefore]... 
there is no good purpose served by including these reasonings among the 
assertions on which reasoning rests. So such conditionals should not figure in 
the canonical schedule of assertions that claims to be complete in principle.'
Campbell [17] (173)
Mathematicians often use the non-declarative response in defending 
mathematics (and themselves) from the charge of Platonism. Mathematical 
sentences, it is claimed, do not make statements at all; they are simply 
collections of marks on paper which are manipulated according to certain rules 
to give certain results. The applicability of mathematics to the physical 
sciences is explained by the mathematical signs being capable of 
interpretations which relate them to physical and measurable properties and 
operations. But these interpretations are not essential to pure mathematics, 
and properly speaking mathematical sentences are senseless. Mathematics has 
no ontology. This is the philosophy of mathematics which is modern formalism 
as espoused by Haskell Curry [34] and others.
Whether an invocation of the non-declarative response is correct obviously 
depends on whether the sentences so classified are declarative or not. How 
does one tell? Given Austin labelled as the 'descriptive fallacy', that of 
assuming that an indicative sentence can always be used to make a statement, 
syntax can give no help. The best approach is to consider what it is a 
declarative can be used to do, that a non-declarative sentence cannot.
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One of the commonest uses of statement-making sentences is to justify, 
defend, or explain a position; or else to refute or attack somebody else's 
position. It is a peculiar feature of declarative sentences that, when put 
together to form a set of assumptions or premisses, it often happens that it is 
then possible to infer a completely new decarative sentence, and this peculiar 
feature is the basis of reason and argument in general. What defines a 
sentence as declarative, is that it can be added to a set of declarative 
sentences to derive a declarative sentence not previously derivable.8 Thus 
from 'Charles I was beheaded or Charles I escaped to France' we can infer 
neither 'Charles I was beheaded' or 'Charles I escaped to France'. But add 
'Charles I did not escape to France' and it is immediately deducible that 
'Charles I was beheaded'.
Applied to strong conditionals the criterion disagrees with the Mackie- 
Campbell view of their non-declarative status. Consider the sentences:-
(a) 'This solution of hydrogen peroxide has bleach added to it at time t.'
(b) 'This solution of hydrogen peroxide evolves oxygen at time t + 5 seconds.'
Suppose the indexical elements of (a) and (b) are anchored to the appropriate 
particulars, (a) does not entail (b). However if to (a) we add (c)
(c) 'If this solution of hydrogen peroxide has bleach added to it at time t 
then it must be that this solution of hydrogen peroxide evolves oxygen at 
time t + 5 seconds.'
then from (a) and (c), (b) is derivable. Consequently (c) is an information 
bearing sentence and counts as declarative.
Applied to formalism as a philosophy of mathematics, the criterion propels 
discussion into the area of mathematical reasoning in applied mathematics.
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The issues here are too ramified to be treated fully in a short section, and 
Lehman [79] contains an examination of Curry's modern formalism which can 
be consulted by those interested in the issues. I will only mark out where I 
think the important issues are.
Bearing in mind the criterion for declarativeness suggested, there is a prima 
facie case for saying that mathematical sentences are declarative or 
information-bearing. Mathematics plays an important part in inferences in the 
physical sciences. For instance, calculus is required in order to derive a report 
on the position and velocity of a shell at time t given a complete account of 
the forces acting on the shell from the moment of firing. Without calculus 
such ballistic calculations would be impossible. This suggests that calculus 
must consist of declarative sentences.
The strangest counter to this argument I can think of is to deny what is 
presumed in the argument: that calculus is required to derive results in 
physics. This seems patently wrong, but the position is quite defendable in 
fact. The formalist argues that calculus can be used in applied mathematics 
as a set of transformation rules for deriving physical sentences from other 
physical sentences, much as the schema '(p3q) & p)Dq' can be used as a rule 
of reasoning in argument. Physicalistic sentences are actually derivable 
without mention of calculus, but calculus is mentioned because it makes the 
reasoning easier to follow. The fact that the sentences of calculus appear in 
the same calculation as evidently declarative reports on the velocity of the 
shell, should not, according to the formalist, mislead us into thinking they have 
the same logical status.
As a tentative realist I must register my disquiet over two aspects of this 
reply. The first, and possibly the least justified flutter of suspicion is that 
when inferences in applied mathematics are formalised in first-order idiom, 
that the sentences of pure mathematics have to be entered in the same 
manner as sentences reporting on the physical position, velocity etc., of any
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mass body, if the argument is to be represented as logically valid. The 
formalist will retort that formalisation in first-order logic distorts the nature 
of mathematical reasoning by requiring the misrepresentation of the logical 
status of mathematical sentences. (Since logic is equipped fundamentally only 
to handle declarative sentences, my first disquiet is perhaps too much of a 
petitio anyway). The second grumble is perhaps more serious. The formalist 
owes us an account of the logical status of sentences which combine 
terminology of pure mathematics with that of reference to the physical world 
(e.g. reports on standard deviations, numbers of items etc.). These sentences 
are obviously declarative and the challenge to the formalist is to supply an 
account which is fully satisfactory and yet involves no recantation of his 
formalist ideals.
6.4 Identity Reduction
An identity reduction occurs where a sort K of entities is identified with 
another sort J. In philosophy, identity reductions cause the maximum of 
argument and the minimum of reasoned agreement; why this is will be seen 
shortly. First, it is useful to see why identity reductions are ever attempted 
at all.
Frequently, in ontology, an ontologist ambitious enough to formulate an 
ontological hypothesis, is challenged to take a position in respect of a kind K, 
which (a) there is good reason to think instances exist; but (b) does not 
apparently fit into any category of objects admitted by his hypothesis. The 
ontologist may then choose to challenge (b) by claiming that Ks are in fact 
identical with a particular species of entity J recognised by his hypothesis.
An example of this technique is provided by Berkeley [14], Berkeley's ontology 
consisted of minds and their ideas. This ontology collides with the view that 
there are also objects of everyday experience which are non-mental. Rather
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than deny the existence of such objects, Berkeley identified them with 
perceptions in the mind of God. A more modern identity reduction is 
attempted by Smart [133]. Smart believes in a physicalist ontology. What 
then of thoughts and sensations? Rather than deny their existence, Smart 
identifies them with brain-processes. Since this example is the most currently 
absorbing of all identity reductions, I will use it as the centrepiece in 
examining identity reductions in general.
Identity claims come in two kinds. The first, most familiar kind, are where 
two terms are equated via an identity sign (eg. 'Cicero = Tully', 'Abraham 
Lincoln = America's greatest president'). Identity statements of this kind I call 
token-token identity statements, since they relate specific particulars. Type- 
type identity statements are statements which claim the identity of a 
particular kind with that of another e.g. 'Numbers are identical with a species 
of set', 'Thoughts are brain-processes (of an unspecified kind)'.4 
One way of coming to grips with the problems of identity reductions is to 
enquire how type-type identity statements can be verified or falsified.
Consider the case of the mind-brain identity theory. Might we say that this 
theory is falsified if it became known that there was a lack of significant 
correlation between mental processes and brain processes? Such an empirical 
discovery need not falsify the mind-brain identity theory. The mind-brain 
identity theorist can then retreat to a position that Davidson [40] calls 
'anomalous monism' in which mental events are identical to brain processes for 
each token, but there is a lack of correlation in the form of psycho-physical 
laws relating the occurence of a particular type of brain-process to a 
particular type of thought. Anomalous monism is by no means merely an ad 
hoc evasion of a potentially falsifying situation (though it does, I think, deprive 
the mind-brain identity theory of most of its empirical interest). It is quite 
possible that given genetic and environmental differences that the same type 
of thought in X as in Y is not encoded as the same type of brain-state. (An
2 54
analogy exists in computing: the same piece of software can be stored at 
different addresses by different computers).
Would a correlation between mental processes and brain processes verify (or at 
least render more probable) the mind-brain identity theory? Alas, once again,
no. There is a group of traditional dualist views which insist both on such a 
correlation and yet deny any identity between brain-processes and mental 
processes: parallelism, epiphenomenalism, and interactionism are the leading 
three versions of dualism. At this point, it becomes clear that there is no 
possible empirical resolution of this particular philosophical dispute. When the 
hard core empirical question about mind-brain process correlation is 
subtracted from the mind-brain identity theory, what is left over is a 
philosophical pseudo-problem concerned with the valuation of fringe sentences 
which could only be settled by convention. But not all type-type identity 
claims are pseudo-claims; indeed Smart [133] groups 'Mental processes are 
brain processes' with 'Lightning is a form of electrical discharge' as being both 
genuine empirical theories. This is not so, and it is worth looking at the 
difference.
For the sake of a simple illustration I prefer to use 'Macroscopic organisms are 
collections of cells' rather than 'Lightning is an electrical discharge'. It is 
obvious that the claim 'Macroscopic organisms are collections of cells' is a 
substantive empirical claim. How would it be verified (or for Popperians, 
corroborated)? The obvious way to endorse this claim (in fact, the way it was 
endorsed and the study of ontology founded) is by microscopic examination of 
thin slices of plant and animal tissue. Under the resolution of a good optical 
microscope it is quite easy to make out the cellular structure of an 
appropriately prepared and mounted specimen.
Looking down the microscope the cytologist is presented with a structure of 
remarkable diversity in appearance from the structure that presents itself to 
the naked eye on the platform of his microscope. What he sees down the
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microscope looking at a piece of plant tissue is a brick-wall arrangement of 
cells each with a cellulose wall framing a cytoplasm and nucleus and an 
internal vacuole filled with fluid. What he sees on the platform is a thin green 
translucent piece of plant tissue. At very high magnifications, e.g. under an
electron microscope, the cytologist is presented with a world even more 
bizarre and diverse from the macroscopic world of his senses.
Yet ontology has never been plagued by philosophical arguments. There are no 
cellular interactionists who insist that the domain of cellular structures and 
living organisms are radically diverse and distinct and yet mysteriously 
interactive. There are no cellular epiphenomenalists who insist that what 
happens to the body influences the cells, that nothing that happens to the cells 
influences the body. The main reason for this happy agreement is that 
cytologists have agreed that the same identity criteria apply to both 
collections of cells and parts of living organisms and living organisms 
themselves. Living organisms and collections of cells belong to the same 
category. A cytologist who looks down a microscope is presented with a 
structure at space-time coordinates x,y,z,t which are the same coordinates as 
the tissue mounted on his slide. Any material object x and any material object 
y are identical just when their space-time coordinates are the same: therefore 
the cytologist of a philosophical cast of mind rightly and logically concludes an 
identity.
Identity claims (whether token-token or type-type) are significant, cognitive 
claims just when they equate items of the same category. To put the matter 
in the formal mode, as long as there is an agreement on the criterion of 
identity appropriate to evaluating an identity claim, so that the 
terms/expressions of the claim are assessed relative to the same criterion then 
there is a significant claim. Identity claims of this kind I call subcategory 
identity statements. In contrast identity claims that relate expressions where 
there is no such agreed criterion are intercategory identity claims, which
belong to the domain of fringe sentences as do their denials. If two disputants 
of the truth of an identity claim are not willing to abide by the same identity 
criterion then there is no way in principle of settling their differences. 
Contests like the mind-brain identity theory vs dualism are incapable of 
resolution, because neither the identity theorist, nor his dualist opponents, can 
concede that mental processes or brain processes are governed by the same 
identity criteria: to do so would be either to beg the question in favour of 
their own position or to give it away to their opponents.
As practised by scientists identity reductions are an important part of the 
progress of science. In philosophy, however, identity reductions are generally 
intercategoric operations frought with dissent, and ontologists are advised to 
avoid them.
6.5 Quine on Ontological Reduction
Quine views on ontological reduction are required reading for anybody anxious 
to get to grips with the topic of ontological reduction. This chapter would be 
incomplete without an examination of his writings on the subject. Since 
Quine's views evolve starting from 'On What There Is' in 19A8 and continuing to 
'Ontological Relativity' in 1970, I have chosen to examine his thought 
chronologically.
'On What There Is' (1948)
Quine's remarks on ontological reduction are limited to part of one paragraph.
'...... when we say that some zoological species are cross fertile we are
committing ourselves to recognising as entities the several species themselves, 
abstract though they are. We remain so committed at least until we devise
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some way of paraphrasing the statement as to show that the seeming 
reference to species on the part of our bound variable was an avoidable 
manner of speaking.'
Quine [116] (13)
Despite the brevity of this passage, there are two points here to note of 
special interest.
First, when Quine talks here about banishing ontological commitments, he has 
in mind banishing the ontological commitments of people rather than theories 
(hence 'We remain so committed....'). Quine consequently avoids a mistake 
attributed to him by Alston [2], and an attribution endorsed by Searle [131], of 
believing that it is possible to change the ontological commitments of a theory 
through formalisation or paraphrase. Alston's argument is in essence a direct 
one. Let S be any sentence with an ontological commitment to Ksj an 
ontological commitment the ontologist O does not want to share. O tries to 
reduce this commitment by paraphrasing S as Si. In Si, reference to Ks is 
avoided and an ontological reduction effected. What is wrong with this 
method, argues Alston, is that either S and Si make the same statement or 
they do not. If they do, then their ontological commitments are the same and 
no reduction has taken place. If they do not, then Si is no true paraphrase of S 
since they are used to make different claims.
Applied to Quine; this criticism misses the point of his theory of ontological 
reduction as Chihara [26] has observed. The idea of paraphrasing a theory T to 
remove an unwanted reference to species is not to show that T was not so 
committed to species but to provide an ontologically superior theory Ti which 
does not have such a commitment and which we can adopt in place of T. The 
presupposition of this approach is that although whatever useful purpose T 
served can be served by Ti, T and Ti do not make the same ontological claims, 
and hence do not make the same overall statement.
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This point raises the second and related point about the nature of paraphrase. 
It follows directly from Quine's position that paraphrase need not preserve 
meaning: if it did, then it would be impossible to reduce a theory Tjs by 
paraphrase alone. Quine's disavowal, in Word and Object, of the relevance of
5
synonymy to paraphrase, was legislated by his position in 'On What There Is'. 
Word and Object (1960)
Word and Object is rich in ontological speculation concerning propositions, 
numbers, sets and universals. However metaontological developments are 
more restricted. I shall concentrate on a theme that Quine raises: that of the 
distinction (if any) between explicative and eliminative reduction.
Quine's exposition of the distinction is marred by some amount of the 
equivocation and unclarity. At the simplest level the distinction between 
eliminative and explicative reductions is the distinction between (a) a 
reduction where a kind K is eliminated from our ontology and (b) where a kind 
K l is explicated as a kind
However Quine fogs the distinction by declaring that '...explication is 
elimination, and ... conversely elimination can often be allowed the air of 
explication' (Quine [116] (265)). Quine also refers to explication as 
'philosophical analysis' (259), and hastens to add he does not understand by 
'analysis' what the Oxford School of linguistic analysis understood by 'analysis', 
but something quite different that does not depend on replacing expressions by 
synonymous expressions. What that something is, is left in the air, but Quine's 
passing remarks incline to the judgement that what Quine means by 
'explication' is what he means by 'paraphrase' since what he says about them is 
much the same.
Quine's 'explication is elimination', which he italicises (260), comes clearer in 
respect ot Wiener's and Kuratowski's treatment of ordered pairs, which Quine
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offers as an example of 'explication*. Quine's point is that this 'explication' 
(=paraphrase) allowed mathematicians to achieve a kind of elimination - 
whether of ordered pairs from their ontology or the language of ordered pairs 
from the language of mathematics is not made clear - which they could not
have achieved before. This is an uncontroversial stand which can only be 
condemned on the grounds that the terminology used to put it across is 
confusing.
Quine's '...conversely elimination can often be allowed the air of explication.' 
is even more confusing; principally because Quine is here equivocating again of 
'explication' using it in the original sense as applied to reduction. Decoded, 
Quine is saying that, in certain cases, when T is paraphrased as a theory T j, 
the reduction of the entities of T to those of can be treated as an 
explicative reduction as easily as an eliminative reduction.
It becomes apparent on later reading that Quine is ambivalent about the value 
of his own distinction between explicative and eliminative reduction. Thus in 
contrasting eliminative and explicative physicalism, Quine remarks:-
'Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them? 
Does it repudiate the mental state of pain of anger in favour of its physical 
concomitant [eliminative physicalism], or does it identify the mental state 
with a state of the physical organism [explicative physicalism] (and so a state 
of the physical organism with the mental state)?.... Some may... final comfort 
in reflecting that the distinction between an eliminative and explicative 
physicalism is unreal.'
Quine [116] (265)
Immediately afterwards, Quine openly rejects the eliminative-explicative 
distinction.
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Some attempt on these questions can be made through the services of System 
4 which was designed specifically to deal with reasoning of this kind In which 
classical principles do not apply. Let P = 'There are only physical objects and 
processes', Q = 'Mental processes do exist' and R = 'Mental processes are 
physical processes'. We have (P & Q) R. Since R has been classified as a 
fringe sentence neither R nor - R is true i.e. - (R v - R). The question as to 
whether P or Q being fringe hypotheses follows from (P & Q)d R and - (Rv - R) 
can be formalised in System 4 s the query as to whether
K(P & 0 )0  R) & - (Rv - R)] 3  [- (Pv - P) v - (Qv - Q)]
is valid in System 4 or not. The answer is that it is valid; for it can be proved
ethat this formula is a member of any conforming set.
The conclusion, based on System 4 reasoning, is that either physicalism (P) 
and/or the view that mental processes exist is a fringe hypothesis. Since the 
existence of mental processes seems fairly established, the weight of suspicion 
would seem to fall on P.
As regards Quine's second example, Eddington vs Stebbing, the issues are quite 
different. Swarms of molecules and solid tables belong to the same category 
of being, since, as spatio-temporal objects, they share the same identity- 
conditions. If a swarm of molecules occupies the same space-time coordinates 
as a wardrobe or table, then the swarm and the table are one. There is nothing 
problematic in this identification and in this Stebbing is in the right; and Quine 
in the wrong for classifying the identity claim as unreal.
'Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers' (1964)
In this article Quine specifically sets out to examine the nature of ontological 
reduction as applied to first-order theories. The goal is to specify the nature
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of the reduction relation (R) as it holds between two theories 0  and 
'ROOi' can be read as ’^ reduces to 0\\ Quine's definition of R is as follows:-
'The standard of reduction of a theory ^ t o  a theory 0\  can now be put as 
follows. We specify a function, not necessarily in the notation of 0  or 0 \ , 
which admits as arguments all objects in the universe of 0  and takes values in 
the universe of This is the proxy function. Then to each n-place primitive 
predicate of 0 , for each n, we effectively associate an open sentence of 0\  
with n free variables, in such a way that the predicate is fulfilled by an n-tuple 
of arguments of the proxy function always and only when the open sentence is 
fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values.'
Quine [116] (218)
The idea, I take it, is that if R 00\ then theory 0\ is capable of subsuming the 
position that 0  held and can be freely used in place of 0 \ . Quine does not 
mention constants or function-letters in his definition of R. I conjecture that 
a plausible extention of Quine's account would be as follows. Let p be the 
proxy function from the domain D of 0  to the domain Dj of then for each 
n-ary primitive function-letter f of 0 there is effectively associated an n-ary 
function-expression f^ of such that where d^,..., dp+1 are any elements of 
D, <d!,...d n+]> is an element of the extension of f iff <p(di)..., p(dn+j)> is an 
element of the extension of fj_. Where c is a primitive constant of 0 which 
denotes d, there is associated a closed term c j  which denotes p(d). I also take 
it that the formulae of 0  are written out in primitive notation. Some logical 
observations on R.
First, an unfortunate feature of Quine's definition of R has been isolated by 
Tharp [143], It turns out that unless the proxy function is an onto function 
from the domain D of 0  to the domain Dj of 0 i, that truths in 0^do not
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necessarily go into truths of 0 ± . Tharp suggests adding this extra condition 
into Quine's definition and I shall suppose this done.
R is reflexive. Given theory with domain D, we give the identity function 
on D as proxy function and the identity function on the set of primitive 
variables of ^ a s  Quine's second function (since Quine does not give it a name 
call it the symbol function). In this case - £3^ .
Is R transitive? Certainly it should be and intuition suggests that, as Quine 
defines it, it is. Certainty would demand a proof in mathematical logic of 
considerable bulk and complexity. In view df the fact that, as we shall shortly 
see, Quine's criterion is at any rate seriously wrong, the labour involved would 
not be rewarded by a result of sufficient philosophical interest to repay it.
Is R symmetrical? In the general case, no, since to demonstrate R is 
symmetrical we should have to suppose two things. First that the proxy 
function was always 1 - 1  and hence always had an inverse. Second, that the 
values that the symbol function gave for its arguments were all and only the 
primitive variables of
In Ontological Relativity, Quine denied that the proxy function need always be
1 - 1.
'The proxy function used in reducing one theory to another need not, like Godel 
numbering, be one-to-one ....[for] the fragment of economic theory lately 
noted...[we] would happily reduce its ontology of persons to a less numerous 
one of incomes. The proxy function would assign to each person his income. It 
is not one - to - one; distinct persons give way to identical incomes. The 
reason such a reduction is acceptable is that it merges the images of only such 
individuals as never had been distinguished by the old theory.'
Quine [113] (56)
However Quine goes on to argue that given any 1 - 1  function f from the 
domain D of a theory ^  the ontology of pfcan be reduced to that of the range
of f. 2 6 4
'One ontology is always reducible to another when we are given a proxy 
function f that is one - one. The essential reasoning is as follows. Where P is 
any predicate of the old system, its work can be done in the new system by a 
new predicate which we interpret as true of just the correlates fx of the old
objects x that P was true of.'
Quine [113] (59)
It seems that Quine's standards of ontological reduction are too liberal. For 
let the domain D of ^ b e  countable; then a 1 - 1 function exists from the 
domain D into the set N of natural numbers. Would this show that we could 
dispense with all countable ontologies bar that of numbers? Quine recognises 
a similar sort of danger from a strong form of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem 
which says that every first-order theory that has a model in the domain of 
natural numbers. Remarking on this theorem, in 'Ontological Reduction and 
the World of Numbers', Quine says
'Reduction of a theory $  to natural numbers -  true reduction by our new 
standard, and not mere modeling - means determining a proxy function that 
actually assigns numbers to all the objects o f / i  and maps the predicates o f ,# ' 
into open sentences of the numerical model. Where this can be done, with 
preservation of truth-values of closed sentences, we may well speak of 
reduction to natural numbers. But the Lowenheim-Skolem argument 
determines, in the general case, no proxy function. It does not determine 
which numbers are to go proxy for the respective standards ofjzf! Therein it 
falls short of our standard of ontological reduction.'
Quine [110] (219)
Quine is, in effect, adding a rider to his previous conditions; this rider is that 
the proxy function be constructively demonstrated to exist from the domain of
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to that o f /0 i  i.e. that the reductionist first give an individuating description 
of the proxy function before proving it to be a proxy function. This 
requirement does banish the spectre of a wholesale Pythagoreanism blanking 
out our ontology. However, Quine's criterion of reduction still produces some
peculiar results.
One of these results is that whenever a relation R is discovered to well-order 
the domain D of a theory jZ(^  where D has countably many items, (by Quine's 
criterion) the ontology of (0 /is reducible to that of natural numbers. It is quite 
simple in such as case to specify a proxy function that takes the form of an 
order isomorphism from the set D into a subset S of the set N of natural 
numbers. Thus supposing that no two Oxford philosophers are born at exactly 
the same time, it would be possible to enumerate them by their ages. Any 
statement about these philosophers could thus be effectively associated in the 
manner Quine suggests, with a remark about natural numbers.
What is wrong in principle with Quine's suggestion that one ontology is always 
reducible to another given a 1 - 1 proxy function? The answer is that we 
cannot implement the suggestion unless we introduce numerical predicates 
whose sense is fixed by reference to the objects of the old ontology. Thus i 
may attempt to reduce the elements of Oxford's philosophy department by 
enumerating them. I then proceed to replace each predicate P applied to the 
unreduced dons by a numerical predicate Pjsj true of just those numbers 
correlated to the objects P is true of. But then to fix the sense of Pjsj, an 
essential reference is required to the Oxford philosophy department and I am 
forced to reacknowledge my old commitment. There are other things wrong 
with Quine's criterion however.
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A serious deficiency of the whole of Quine's use of proxy functions is that it 
seems to require an acknowledgement of the objects of the domain of the old 
theory pfas  well as those of the new t h e o r y H o w  can a proxy function be 
defined at all unless we acknowledge the existence of the objects of the old 
theory as unreduced objects? Quine recognises he has a difficult problem 
here:-
'I must admit that my formulation suffers from a conspicuos element of make- 
believe.... My formulation belongs, by its nature, in an inclusive theory that 
admits the objects of $  as unreduced, and the objects of on an equal 
footing.'
Quine [110] (219)
But Quine shrugs off the problem adding:-
'But the formulation seems, if we overlook this imperfection [!], to mark the 
boundary we want.'
In 'Ontological Relativity’, Quine takes this issue more seriously.
'Ontological Relativity1 (1969)
Quine tackles the problem posed by the proxy function directly.
'....... we cannot declare our new ontological economies without having
recourse to the uneconomical old ontology.
This sounds, perhaps, like a predicament: as if no ontological economy is 
justifiable unless it is false economy and the repudiated objects exist after all. 
But actually this is wrong; there is no more cause for worry here than there is
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in reductio ad absurdum. If what we want to show is that the universe U is 
excessive and that only a part exists, or need exist, then we are quite within 
our rights to assume all of U for the space of the argument. We show thereby 
that if all of U were needed then not all of U would be needed, and so our 
ontological reduction is sealed by reductio ad absurdum.'
Quine [113] (58)
Is this a fair analogy? Reflection suggests it is not. Thus supposing one wishes 
to prove p; the method of reductio ad absurdum invites the assumption of -p. 
From -p and a pool of assumptions S, p is derived. Thus a contradiction is 
evolved from S U and —p (=p by Double Negation) is derived on the
strength of S. Though an inconsistency is evolved during the course of the 
proof, consistency in regard to assumptions is restored at the end of the proof. 
But in Quine's procedure, the intitial position is one of consistency and the 
terminal position is one of inconsistency . It is consistent to suppose that Kjs 
exist and K2S exist and a proxy function f exists from the domain of Kjs to 
that of K2S. It is not consistent then to conclude that one has shown that Kjs 
need not be acknowledged to exist on the strength of such a proxy function, 
since to acknowledge f is, ex hypothesi, to acknowledge K^s.
Quine suggests an alternative formulation of ontological reduction in 
'Ontological Relativity'.
'We may picture the vocabulary of a theory as comprising logical signs such as 
quantifiers and the signs for the truth functions and identity, and in addition 
descriptive or nonlogical signs, which, typically are singular terms, or names, 
and general terms, or predicates. Suppose next that in the statements which 
comprise the theory, that is, are true according to the theory, we abstract 
from the meanings of the nonlogical vocabulary and range of the variables. 
We are left with the logical form of the theory, or, as I shall say, the theory
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form. Now we may interpret this theory from anew by picking a new universe
for its variables of quantification to range over and assigning objects from this 
universe to the names, and choosing subsets of this universe as extensions of 
the one-place predicates and so on.'
Quine [113] (33 - 54)
Chihara [26] (127 - 128) does not regard this model-theoretic account of 
reduction as successful. Essentially Quine is arguing that we can ontologically 
reduce a commitment to Ks incurred by a theory O if we can define a model 
for O in which Ks do not occur. Chihara takes T as his theory form.
T: (3x)(3y)(3z)(x^( y & y ^ z & x ^ z &  (w)(w = x v w  = y v w  = z))
(x) -Rx
( 3x)(y)(Ty & Oy)= x = y
The interpretations given to T are as follows:-
Td: Domain:
R: ____
T: ____
O: _____
dogs that live in my neighbourhood, 
has retractable claws, 
has only three legs, 
is owned by Mr. Jones.
Tc: Domain:
R: ____
T: ____
O: ____
cats that live in my neighbourhood, 
has non-retractable claws, 
has only three legs, 
is owned by Mr. Smith.
Assuming that Tc and Td are both models for T, by Quine's criterion Tc can be 
reduced to Td or vice-versa. But does the ability to define alternative models
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for small slices of theory prove a reduction? Chihara does not think so and 
argues convincingly that since the key ontological concepts of a theory can be 
used outside that theory, reduction is only successful when it applies across 
the board to all occurrences of the concepts. Therefore the proper unit of 
reduction is not the theory but the language in which all relevant theories are 
expressed. In reducing a language ipso facto the theories expressed in that 
language are reduced as well.
The main focus of 'Ontological Relativity' is on the phenomenon I have called 
'ontological elasticity', and the consequences of accepting its presence. That I 
have no chosen to follow Quine's terminology of 'ontological relativity' is an 
indicator that our conclusions are not always in sympathy. Nevertheless there 
is much of first-rate importance with which I thoroughly agree with Quine and 
there is no doubt that Quine was the first to set the right level of importance 
on these fundamental issues. It is best to lay down the elements of Quine's 
position and demarcate the areas of agreement from disagreement. These 
elements are as follows:-
(a) There are often alternative representations of the domain of a theory 
which are equally acceptable on the basis of all evidence. None of them 
can be identified as the unique right representation.
'Each.... interpretation of ,.[a]...theory form is called a model of it if it makes 
it come out true. Which of these models is meant in a given actual theory 
cannot, of course, be guessed from the theory form... It is thus meaningless 
within the theory to say which of the various possible models of our theory 
form is our real or intended model.'
Quine [113] (54)
270
(b) In such cases we cannot enquire after the identity of the elements of the 
domain of the theory.
'Numbers.....  are known only by their laws, the laws of arithmetic, so that any
constructs obeying those laws - certain sets for instance - are eligible in turn 
as explications of number. Sets in turn are known only by their laws, the laws 
of set theory.... The subtle point is that any progression will serve as a version 
of number so long and only so long as we stick to one and the same 
progression. Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to number: there is no 
saying absolutely what the numbers are; then? is only arithmetic.'
Quine [113] (44 - 45)
(c) Therefore we cannot enquire after the ontology of a theory or its 
ontological commitments, unless our enquiry is relativised to a particular 
interpretation of the theory itself.
'What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, absolutely 
speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in 
another.'
Quine [113] (50)
I agree with Quine on elements (a) and (b); but I am In some doubt about 
element (c), which Quine seems to treat as a corollary of (a) and (b).
First, a general observation. The phenomenon of ontological elasticity is a 
phenomenon which has been proven to extend only to some theories and not to 
all. Therefore for Quine to draw a conclusion in respect to all theories is an 
overstatement of what may reasonably be inferred from his assumptions. It 
seems wise then, to restrict the domain of (c) to all those and only those 
theories of which (a) and (b) hold true.
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Does (c) follow from (a) and (b)? An informal argument which suggests it does 
not is this one. A theory $  may be analogically elastic in that p f can be 
formalised to a variety of domains D j,..., Dn. But all of these domains may 
share a general feature F in common. In such as case, we can argue that 
although JZI^ does not require a universe which contains specifically one of D]., 
...Dn in order for^p^to be true, nonetheless p^does require a universe which 
displays the general property F. For example, it is true to say with Quine that 
any progression can be made to serve as the domain of Peano arithmetic. But 
a general feature of any such domain must be that it contains a denumerable 
number of elements. Therefore we can say, ontological elasticity 
notwithstanding, that Peano's axioms are committed to the existence of a 
denumerable domain.
Had Quine adopted this course, it would have fitted neatly in with one of his 
earlier definitions of ontological commitment which was quoted in chapter one 
and which I quote here once again.
'If a theory implies '(3 x) (x is a dog)' it will not tolerate an empty universe; 
still the theory might be fulfilled by a universe that contained Collies to the 
exclusion of Spaniels and also vice-versa. So there is more to be said of a 
theory, ontologically, than just saying what objects, if any, that the theory 
requires; we can also ask what various universes would be severally sufficient. 
The specific objects required; if any, are the objects common to all these 
universes.'
Quine [112] (96)
Quine's actual course, as remarked, differs sharply from that which might be 
projected from the above quotation, and it brings him into collision with some 
of his earlier views on ontological commitment. Thus the earlier Quine would 
have said that a theory which contained '(3x) number x' was committed to the
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existence of numbers. But the Quine of 'Ontological Relativity' would
disagree. Whether '(3 x) number x' was committed to numbers or not depends,
according to the later Quine, on how we interpret the 1 - place predicate
'number'. Thus let O be any theory having '(3 x) number x' as a theorem.
Suppose that O is reducible to a range of theories p i ,  . . . ,p n i.e. R pP l, Rpp2>
.....F\IZ^ n. In some of p i , . . . ,  p n, '(3x) number x' is a theorem but in others it
is not; the predicate 'number' being taken over by some other predicate.
What prevents Quine from taking the course suggested; of examining each
reduction and arriving at the ontological commitments of $  by distilling off
the common elements of p i ,  ..., p^,? I think the reason may be that Quine
feels that the range of any reducing theories is not fixed, and therefore that
any such distillation will be made from an arbitrarily limited sample. Thus the
ontologies of p i ,. . . . ,  p i  are subject to the same relativism that p f  is, in that
/  . ✓
for any 0 [ ,  (1 < i < n), there is another reducing series p  m (where
'  / /ROj0i,..., ROiJZfp} and for any p j (1 < j < m) there is another reducing series 
Ol, ... O^and so on in an infinite regress. Two remarks about this possibility. 
The first is that there is a distinctness assumption buried in this idea of
/ s 4 t
infinite regress. This is that P i ,  ..., 0 n and p i ,.. . ,  and p i , . . . ,  p^are all 
disjoint series. This assumption is false if R is transitive. For if R p0j and 
R p p j then RpPj and p j  is an element of the series p]_..., 0 n. Hence the 
generation of a new series need not generate any new elements. It seems 
intuitively true that R is or should be transitive, in which case the distinctness 
assumption fails. So much for the regress.
The second remark concerns the infinite part of the regress. It may be that Jp* 
has an infinite number of reducing theories in which case p i ,  p2> p 3 - — is a 
series without end. But would this stop the distillation process from being 
practicable or at least comprehensible? It seems it should not, for Peano's 
axioms are ontologically committed to a denumerable domain as remarked, but 
they also have a denumerable number of reducing theories with different
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domains. Whether the concept of infinity ultimately proves bothersome here, 
will depend, I think, on two factors. First, on whether a series like f l i ,  ,02, 
,03, .... has a definable well-ordering. Secondly on whether one adopts a 
constructivist or anti-realist attitude to statements about infinite collections 
themselves.
If p i ,  JZI2 , proves to have a definable well-ordering relation then it
becomes possible to use inductive techniques to establish universal quantifier 
statements about them. In such a case I can see nothing problematic about a 
claim that all JZlj., JZf2, ,03>—* share F, where this claim is backed by an 
inductive proof.
What if $2* -03» •••• lacks the appropriate well-ordering relation? In this 
case the dissent between the realist mathematician and the anti-realist and 
constructivists becomes important. The realist will still credit sense to 
universally quantified claim about JZ)]_, .... The constructivists and
anti-realists will see it differently. The constructivist denies the existence of 
completed infinite collections: for him, to say that there are (e.g.) an infinite 
number of numbers is just a bad way of saying that for any finite collection of 
numbers it is always possible to think up (construct) a number not found in that 
collection. The constructivist prefers to see a universally quantified 
statement to the effect that all numbers have property F as being equivalent 
in cash-value terms to a statement about the impossibility of constructing a 
number which has -F. The dubious idiom of modal logic, 'impossibility', can be 
conveniently exchanged by saying that from the assumption that Fn for some 
arbitrary number n, a contradiction can be derived. This proof-theoretic 
interpretation of claims about infinite totalities is shared by the anti-realist 
mathematician. The difference is that whereas the constructivist bases his 
claim on an excursion into the metaphysics of infinity, the anti-realist trots 
towards the theory of meaning to gain his support. Both sorts of 
mathematician might be reasonably suspicious of the sense of an infinity-claim
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when the domain in question had no useful well-ordering and hence no means 
of proving the claim.
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APPENDIX HI
Russell's Recursive Reduction of Instants of Time
Russell's recursive reduction of instants of time is a good example of recursive 
reduction, if only because it dispels the idea that recursive reduction is 
necessarily limited to mathematics. The reduction is taken from Russell [123], 
Russell observes that the three main conceptions of physics are space, time 
and the objects therein. As regards time, we are only aware of events of 
measurable duration and not of instants of time. Instants of time are not 
objects of acquiantance, and for Russell, this meant their existence as 
unreduced entities was in doubt. According to Russell logical constructions 
were required to be substituted for instants of time. The process of recursive 
reduction begins with isolation of an axiom set describing the important 
properties of instants. Russell retails:-
'What are the properties we expect of instants? First, they must form a 
series: of any two, one must be before the one; if one is before another, and 
the other before a third, the first must be before the third. Secondly, every 
event must be at a certain number of instants; two events are simultaneous if 
they are at the same instant, and one is before the other if there is an instant, 
at which the one is, which is earlier than some [? any] instant at which the 
other is. Thirdly, if we assume that there is always some change going on 
somewhere during the time when any given event persists, the series of 
instants ought to be compact, i.e. given any two instants, there ought to be 
other instants between them.'
Russell [123] (95)
Some of the expressions of this passage require explanation.
In Russell's terminology, two events are simultaneous not only if they begin 
and end at the same time, but simply when there is a time at which they are 
both going on. One event is before another just when that event begins before 
the other event. An event is wholly before another when it begins and ends 
before the other event. The relations of being after and being wholly after, 
are just the converses of the relations of being before and being wholly before. 
(See diagram 5).
Russell's remarks about the properties we expect of moments of time can be 
codified in a language L]_.
Li = ['EV, IN, AT, <, SIM, <•}
EV =df is an event 
IN =df is an instant 
AT =df at
< =df before
SIM =df simultaneous
< =(jf  wholly before
Axiomatised in l_i, Russell's statements about instants emerge as an axiom set 
A, whose elements are just the following
A i(l) (x)(y)(IN x<5cINy&-x = y ) u ( x < y v y < x )
A£(2) (x)(y)(IN x & IN y )3  (x < y zd -  y < x)
A](3) (x)(yXz)(IN x & IN y & IN z ) d  ((x < y & y < z)Z5 x < z)
Ai(4) (x) EV x O (3y) IN y & AT x,y
Al(5) (xXyXEV x & EV y)z> (SIM x ,y s  (3z) IN z & AT x,z & AT y,z)
Ai(6) (xXyXEV x & EV y )3  (x < y e ( (3 z )  IN z & AT x,z & (w)(INw & AT y,w
3  z < w))
Diagram 7
time
♦>
e l  e l  e 2
e 2  e 2 e l
e i and e2 are simultaneous, SIM ex e2
e i  e l
e7 e2
ex is before e2, e2 *s after e]_, ex < e2
ei
—
ex is wholly before e2, e2 is wholly after ex
el  e i
e2
/
e i  is an initial contemporary of e2, ICON e i e2
e j is at instant i]_, 
e i  is not at instant ’12» 
iX is before i2«
AT ex ¡x & -  AT ex i2 & 
i l  < i2
iX l2
«1
A](7) (xXyXlN x & I N y & x < y ) D  (3z) I N z & x < z & z < y .
In order to recursively reduce unreduced instants, Russell begins by identifying 
the nature of the logical construction he is to offer in place of an instant, 
which I call a CIN or constructed instant.
'Let us take a group of events of which any two overlap, so that there is some 
time, however short, when they all exist. If there is any other event which is 
simultaneous with all of these, let us add it to the group; let us go on until we 
have constructed a group such that no event outside the group is simultaneous 
with all of them, but all the events inside the group are simultaneous with 
each other. Let us define this whole group as an instant of time. It remains to 
show that it has the properties we expect of an instant.'
Russell [123] (95)
To guarantee that CINs, as he has constructed them, have the properties 
expected of unreduced instants, Russell makes some auxiliary assumptions 
about the nature of SIM, < < and EV. Russell apparently believed (wrongly as 
it turns out) that his auxiliary assumptions suffice to guarantee that 
constructed instants have the properties of unreduced instants. Russell 
tabulates these''assumptions in a footnote.
’In order to secure that instants form a series, we assume:
(a) No event wholly precedes itself. (An 'event' is defined as whatever 
is simultaneous with something or other.)
» •
(b) If one event wholly precedes another, and the other wholly 
precedes a third, then the first wholly precedes the third.
(c) If one event wholly precedes another, it is not simultaneous with it.
(d) Of two events which are not simultaneous, one must wholly
precede the other.'
Russell [123] (96)
Together with his definition of a constructed instant these assumptions are 
axiomatised in language l_2.
t_2 = {  'EV, CIN, £,<,  SIM, <, ICON' }
EV =df is an event
CIN =df is a constructed instant 
£ = jf is a member of
< =c|f is before
SIM =df is simultaneous with
< =cjf is wholly before
ICON =(jf is an initial contemporary of
To be added to these assumptions is Russell's definition of temporal beforeness 
for CINs.
'.....we shall say one [constructed] instant is before another if the group which
is the one instant contains an event which is earlier than, but not simultaneous 
with, some event in the group which is the other instant.'
Russell [123] (95)
It turns out that, of the assumptions Russell makes to prove CINs have the 
properties of unreduced instants, some that are included are not needed and 
some that are needed are not included. If the necessary revisions are made, 
then the resultant axioms are encapsulated in A2(l) to A2(7).
A2(l) (w ) CIN w  = [(3x)(x £ w) &  (x)(x £ w o  EVx) &  (x)(y) ((x £  w &  y £w)
3  SIM xy) & (xX-x £w D (3y)y£w &  -SIM xy)]
A2(2) (xXy) (CIN x & CINy) 3 ( x  = yS  ((z) z £ x  3  z £  y))
A2(3) (xXy) (EV x & EV y) D (SIM xy O SIM yx).
A2(4) (xXy) (EV x & EV y & x < y )o  - SIM xy.
A2(5)(xXy) (EV x & EV y & - SIM x y )o (x  < y v y < x).
A2(6) (xXy) (CIN x & CIN y) O (x < y 5 ((3w)(3z)(w £ x & z £ y & w <  z)).
A2(7) (wXxXyXz) (EV w & EV x & EV y & EVz)3((SIM x y & x < z & w < y )
3  w < z).
We now require a recursive function r, where the domain of r is the set of l_i 
sentences, and the range of r is a subset of the set of L2 sentences. Moreover 
r, should be truth-preserving. In order for this recursive reduction to be 
judged successful, it must be assumed that; (i) the true sentences formulable in 
the language l_i are sufficient to state comprehensively what is taken as true 
of instants of time; (ii) that the set of theorems deducible from axiom set A i 
coincides fairly exactly, with the set of significant truths in l_i.
Under these suppositions it is sufficient, to effect a recursive reduction, to 
specify a function r that maps the theorems of A i into the set of theorems of 
A2. Here it suffices to show that if*< is an axiom of A j, then 1-^2 r($0. r 
itself is specified thus:-
where s is any sentence of L]_, r(s) = the result of substituting 'CIN' for 'IN' and 
'£,' for 'AT' throughout s.
From the definition of r, together with A2(l) - A2(7), it is provable, where s = 
A l(l) or s = Ai(2) or s = Al(3), that b A 2
Proof: KAjU)) = '(x)(y) (CIN x & CIN y & - x = y)3(x < y v y < x)'
Let A and B be CINs where - A = B. It is required to prove from A2 that 
A < B v B < A;
that is, - (A < B) 3  B < A. Assume - A < B. By A2(6) this assumption is 
equivalent to:-
- ((3w)(3z) w£ A & z £.B & w < z); 
that is:-
(w )(z) (w £ A & z  £B )3  - w  < z
Now since - A = B, by A2(2) either there is some x such that x £A 4  - x £ B  or 
there is some y such that - y £ A & y EB.
Lemma 1: there is some x such that x £ A & -  x£B. Let x = a. By A2O.) there 
is some b such that b£B & -  SIM a,b. Since (w)(z)(w£A & z£ B )3  - w < z then 
(a £ A ic b £ B )3  - a < b. Thus we have:-
-  SIM a,b & - a < b
for EVs a and b. By A2(5) it follows that b  < a. Therefore:- 
b£B & a £A & b < a 
By Existential Generalisation.
(3w)(3z) w£B LA & w < z.
This, by A2(6), entails B < A.
Lemma 2: there is some y such that -  y £A & y£.B. Let y = b. By A2(l) there 
is some a such that a £ A & -  SIM ba. But by A2(3) -  SIM b,a D - SIM a,b; so - 
SIM a,b. Thus we are returned to the same assumptions that were used in 
lemma 1 to derive B < A.
Theorem 1 h/\2 KAjCD)
Proof: r(A][(2)) = '(xXyXCIN x & CIN y ) D ( x < y 3 - y < x ) '
Let A and B be CINs. To prove A < B ^ - B < A ,  we will' prove -(A < B & B > A) 
by indirect proof.
Assume A > B and B < A. Since A > B; by A£(6) it follows that:- 
(3wX3zXw£A & z£B  & w < z)
Since B < A; by A£(6) it follows that:- 
(3wX3z)(w£.B & z C A & w < z)
So for some a,b,c,d:-
a f A & b £ B & a < b & c £ B ( ! c d £ A & c < d .
By A2(l) it follows:- 
SIM ad & SIM be 
By A 2O):-
(SIM a d & a < b & c < d ) D c < b
Therefore c < b. But by A2(4), c < b 3 -  SIM cb and by A2 O), - SIM cbD - SIM 
be. Therefore - SIM be & SIM be. This establishes - (A > B & B > A) by 
indirect proof.
Theorem 3 t  r(A]_(3))
/
Proof: r(Ai(3)) = '(xXyXz) (CIN x & CIN y & CIN z)D  ((x < y & y < z)3x < z)' 
Let A,B,C be CINs. Assume A < B & B < C. By A2(6) for some a,b,c,d. 
a f  A & b£B & a < b 
c £ B & d £C & c < d.
t
By A2(l), SIM cb, and so by A2( ):- 
(SIM cb & c < d & a < b) a < d.
Hence a < d. Therefore
a £ A & d C.C & a < d.
Theorem 2 I- r(A]_(2))
By Existential Generalisation
(3w)(3z) w £ A  &  z£_C &  w < z 
Hence by A2(6), A < C.
In order to accommodate the other axioms of A]_, Russell defines the concept 
of an initial contemporary (ICON).
'We have next to show that every event is 'at' at least one instant, i.e. that, 
given any event, there is at least one class, such as we used in defining 
instants, of which it is a member. For this purpose, consider all the events 
which are simultaneous with a given event, and do not begin later, i.e. not 
wholly after anything simultaneous with it. We will call these the 'initial 
contemporaries' of the given event. It will be found that this class of events is 
the first instant at which the given event exists, provided every event wholly 
after some contemporary of the given event is wholly after some initial 
contemporary of It.'
Russell [123] (96)
Russell's definition of an initial contemporary is contained in A2(8)
A2(8) (x)(y) (EV * & EV y) => (ICON x y s  (SIM xy & (z) (SIM y z D - z < x))
His assumption about ICONs of any given event is expressed in A2(9)
A2(9) (xXyXz) (EV x & EV y & EV z)o ((y  < x & SIM y z )3  (3w) ICON wz &
w < x)
Again, supplementary axioms are needed relating to ICONs. First, that for 
every event, there is a set containing ail and only those ICONs of that event.
Second of any two things, if they are ICONs of each other then they are 
events. Third, that any event is simultaneous with itself. Fourth, that if a and 
b are ICONs of each other and c is wholly before a, then c is wholly before b. 
These assumptions are expressed in axioms A2(10) - A2(13).
A2(10) ( x )  EV x D (3 y)(z) z £ y =  ICON zx.
A2( l l )  (x)(y) ICON xy O (EV x & EV y).
A2(12) ( x ) EV x O  SIM xx.
A2(13) (xXyXz) (EV x & EV y & EV z)3  ((ICON xy & z < x)dz < y)
To prove that every event is ’at’ an instant, it suffices to prove that every 
event is a member of an ICON set (a set of all ICONs of a given event) and any 
ICON set is a CIN. Theorems 4 and 5 prove just that.
Theorem 4 (x) EV xo(3y)(z)((z£ y S ICON z x) & x£y)
Proof: Let a be any EV. By A2(10) there is some A such that (z) z £A S
ICON za. Thus if ICON aa then a£A.
To prove ICON aa, it is required to prove that for any EV b, SIM aa & 
(SIM abD -b < a), (see A2(8)). By A2(12), SIM aa. Assume SIM ab, by A2O) 
SIM ba, and by A 2^» < a* Hence SIM ab O -  b < a.
Therefore any event is a member of an ICON set.
Theorem 5 Every ICON set is a CIN.
Let A be any ICON set. To establish A is a CIN it is required to prove that
(i) Q x) x £A
(ii) (x) x£  AOEV x
(in) (x)(y) (x EA & y £ A ) 3  SIM xy.
(iv) ( x ) - x i A 3  ((3y) y £ A & - SIM xy)
Lemma 1 Since A is an ICON set then 
(3x)(y) (y£A «ICON yx)
Since by theorem 4, ICON xx for all x, then (3x) x CA. This proves condition
(0
Lemma 2 Let a and b be any members of A, then there is some c £.A where 
ICON ac and ICON be. By A2O.D, a and b are both EVs. This proves condition 
(ii).
Lemma 3 Let a and b be any members of A. There is some c £,A where ICON 
ac & ICON be. By A2(8), SIM ac & SIM be. By A2(8) again, (z) SIM c z D - z  < a 
and (z) SIM cz 3  -  z < b. By universal elimination, SIM cbD - b < a and SIM ca 
3  - a < b. Given SIM ac & SIM be, by A2(3), SIM ca & SIM cb. Therefore - b < 
a and - a < b. By A2(5), SIM ab.
Lemma 4 Let a be any EV not belonging to A. Then for some c €A, - ICON 
ac. By A2(8)
- SIM ac v -(z) SIM c z O * z < a )
Assume - SIM ac; then (3y) y £A & - SIM ay. This proves condition (iv).
Assume - (z) SIM czO  - z < a; then (3z) SIM cz & z < a and hence by A2(9) (3w) 
ICON wc & w < a. But then (3y) y £„A & y < a, by the definition of A. By 
A2(4), (3y) y E-A & - SIM ya and by A2O), O y) y£ A & - SIM ay. This proves 
condition (iv).
Theorem 6 /\2 r(Ai(4))
Proof: r(Ai(4)) = '(x) EV x ( y) CIN y & x y'.
By theorem 4 every EV is a member of an ICON set and by theorem 5, every 
ICON set is a CIN.
In order to prove r(Aj(5)), it is required to assume A£(14)
A2(14) (xXyXEV x &EV y )o  (SIM xyO (3z) CIN z & x £ z & y £ z)
A2(14) is a particularly powerful axiom since, with A2(14), theorem 6 can be 
derived very simply without using Russell's ICONs (proof: let a be any event; 
SIM aa by A2 (12); by A2(14), Oz) CIN z k  a £.z). However Russell's ICONs 
have useful services to perform in deriving other theorems.
As for the truth of A2(14), this can be justified by the following informal 
proof. Let a and b be any events where SIM a b, (a and b need not be distinct). 
The series a0, aj_, a2> 83, •••• is an ordering of the set of all events.
is a series of sets defined as follows; A0 = £a,b]. For any A;, 
where i > 1, define A} =^ j_i U £ aj^ if aj is simultaneous with all members of 
aj_i, otherwise A Let A = L){Ae,..:.j; then a ciM since all elements
in A are simultaneous with each other and no element simultaneous with all 
members of A is to be found outside A. By hypothesis, a £ A  and so is b.
Theorem 7 I- r(Aj_(5))
Proof: r(A^(5)) = '(x)(y)(EV x & EV y )3  (SIM xy 9  (3z) CIN z & x£_z & y £.z)' 
That (x)(y)(EV x & EV y )3  (SIM x y o (3 z ) CIN z & x^ z  & y£z) is axiom A2(14). 
Let a and b be such that (3z) CIN z & x £z & y £z. By A2(l), SIM ab.
To prove theorem 8 it is required to prove that any event a is before an event 
b if and only if there is a CIN which a is 'at' which is before any CIN b is 'at'. 
This theorem requires two axioms. The first, A2(15), defines beforeness or £.
A2(15) (x)(y)(EV x & E V y ) 3 ( x < y S  (3z) SIM xz & z < y).
A2(15) suffices to show that if a < b, then there is an instant at which a is a 
member which is before any instant at which b is a member. To demonstrate 
the converse, and hence to complete the equivalence, A2(16) is needed.
A 2(16) (wXxXyXz) (EV w & EV x & EV y & EV z) 3  ((w < x & SIM wy &
ICON xz)3  y < z)
Theorem 8 h r(A]_(6))
Proof: r(Ai(6)) = '(xXyXEV x & EV y) Z> (x < y 3* (3 z) CIN z & x £. z & (w) 
(CIN w & y £.w)P z < w)'
Assume a < b where EV a and EV b. By A2(15), (3z) SIM az & z < b. Let 
z = c; then SIM ac & c < b. By A2(14) there is some A such that A is a CIN and 
a C A & c £ A. Let B be any CIN where b£B,  then we have:- 
c £ A & b £ B & c < b
from whence, (3wX3z) w £_A & z^B & w < z, which entails A < B by A2(6). 
Thus there is some CIN of which a is a member which is before any CIN of 
which B is a member.
Assume (3z) CIN z & a £.z & (w) (CIN w & b £w)D z < w. By theorems 6 and 7 
there is an ICON set B such that:- 
(x) x I B s  ICON xb.
and B is a CIN. There is some CIN A, where a £,A and A < B. By A2(6) there is 
some c and d, where c £ A & d  B c < d .  Hence by A2(l).
c < d & SIM ca & ICON db 
Therefore by A2(16)> a < b.
Theorem 9 establishes that CINs constitute a compact series. Russell remarks 
on the assumption necessary to derive theorem 9.
'Finally, the series of instants will be compact if, given any two events of 
which one wholly precedes the other, there are events wholly after the one and 
simultaneous with something wholly before the other. Whether this is the case 
or not, is an empirical question; but if it is not, there is no reason to expect 
the time-series to be compact.'
Russell [123] (96)
A2(17) CxXyXEV x <5c EV y & x < y) 3  (3z)(x < z & Qw) SIM zw & w < y) 
A2(17) is used to demonstrate theorem 9.
Theorem 9 h r(Aj_(7))
Proof: r(Ai(7)) = '(x)(y)(CIN x & CIN y & x < y) 0  (3z) CIN z & x < z & z < y '
Let A and B be CINs where A < B. By A2(6), there is some a and b where:- 
a £. A & b £.B & a < b 
By A2(17) there is some c and d where 
a < c & SIM cd & d < b
Since SIM cd, by A2(14), there is a CIN C of which c £C and d CC. Since a < c
by A2(6), A < C and since d < b, by A2(6), C < B.
/
Theorem 9 concludes the theorems. The axiom set A2 which recursively 
reduces instants of time is not uniquely privileged in that respect. Indeed, 
Russell suggests another logical construction which can serve as the basis for a 
recursive reduction of instants of time, (space prevents the investigation of 
this parallel axiom set). The ability of a theory to have its ontology 
reorganised into different axiom sets is, of course, simply more evidence of 
ontological elasticity at large.
1 See Davidson [38] (107 - 108). Davidson admits he has no 'knock down' 
argument to show FAC would be violated by this proposal. A knock-down 
argument would prove that adverbial modifiers could be extended to any finite 
length.
2 Clark does not mention Davidson's criterion for event identity which 
appeared in Davidson [39]. Since Clark's article appeared less than a year 
after Davidson's article on event identity, it is likely that Clark had not read 
Davidson [39] when Clark was writing. Tiles [144], writing six years after 
Davidson [39], does offer independent criticism of Davidson's criterion of 
event identity.
Put formally, the definition of a declarative sentence is:-
(1) If S is a true sentence or S is a false sentence then S is a declarative 
sentence.
(2) If B is a set of declarative sentences and Sj is a declarative sentence 
then if Sj is deducible from BU £sjbut not from B then S is a declarative 
sentence.
(3) Nothing else is a declarative sentence.
4 'All' statements can, in general be seen as covert type-type identity claims 
of a kind. Thus 'All men are mortal' is equivalent to 'Every thing that is a man 
is identical to a thing which is mortal'. In first order logic this is given by the 
theorem; (x)(Fx D G x)s (x)(Fx D  (3y) Gy & x = y).
9 See Quine [ ] (53, 54)
The proof runs as follows. Let n be any conforming set:-
K(P & Q)3R) & - (Rv -R)] => [-(Pv -P)v-(Qv-Q)]t \i
iff
((P & Q)D R & -(Rv-Rjgfr) or (-(Pv-P) v - (Qv - Q))fc|i
iff
( P & Q ) D R ^ H o r -  (Rv -R )^p or -(Pv -P)£(i or - (Qv -Q) 6 \i
iff
(P & Q 6 p and R j£p) or ( - R o r  --R jL p) 
or (-P t  ii and —P £ li) or (-Q Cp and —Q fcp) 
iff
(P£p and Q£p and R ^  p) o r - R£i p  or R^i p 
or (-P £ fi and P £ p) or (-Q fc p and Q £.p)
Since conforming sets are consistent, then both (-P € n and P €. p) and (-Q € p 
and Q £ p) are ruled out: therefore the final formula above is equivalent to 
the following:-
0
(P €- p and Q £ p and R ii) or -R j i  p or R £  p
This formula is true. Assume R Eji, then since p is consistent, then -R f- p; in 
which case the formula is true. Assume R p, then the formula is again true.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Logics and Ontology
7.1 Preliminary Remarks
Section 6.2 closed on an intransigent problem in contemporary philosophical 
logic: that of determining the proper choice (if any) of a notation for the 
formalisation of natural languages. The choice is by no means a purely 
cosmetic one, since, as became clear, important ontological issues concerning 
the existence of events, instants of time, possible worlds etc., were predicated 
on the choice of an appropriate notation. Thus the choice of a logic or 
canonical notation can play as great a part in the elimination or selection of 
an ontological hypothesis as the current state of empirical science. The 
philosophical problem posed by extended logics is that, whereas there is a 
definite rationale in the selection of competing scientific theories, there is 
none in the selection of competing logics. Yet the results of each kind of 
choice can be equally important for ontology.
If inroads are to be made on the problem of choosing logics, it has to begin 
with a very precise idea about what a logic is and how it is applied. For this 
reason, this chapter begins with the elucidation of logics as formal structures, 
open to logical or mathematical investigation as are other formal structures 
like Abelian groups or fields. The second part of this chapter is devoted to the 
investigation of the applications of these same formal structures or logics. 
Again the treatment of this topic is formal in that the application of a logic is 
taken as a formal structure incorporating the formal structure which is the 
logic of which it is the application. If the reader comes to find the formal 
exposition here unduly wearing, then he is referred to Haack [60] to whom is 
owed a debt of philosophical inspiration in writing this chapter.
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7.2 What a Logic is
A logic is an ordered pair <F,S> where F is a formal system and S is a formal 
semantics for F.
A formal system F is an ordered quadruple <A,W,P,R>. A is a non-empty set 
called the alphabet of F, and whose elements are called signs. W is a non­
empty subset of the set M(A) of all finite sequences of elements of A. P is a 
subset of W and R is a set of finitary relations over W (a finitary relation over 
W is some subset of Wn where n > 1 is some positive integer). Elements of 
M(A) are strings of F; elements of W are called well-formed formulae, 
abbreviated as wffs, or just formulae of F; elements of P are called axioms of 
F; and elements of R are called primitive rules of inference or just rules of 
inference of F.
The above definition is the standard one of a formal system.^ It is also useful 
to partition the alphabet of F into a set of logical variables and a set of logical 
constants, and to require that each wff of F contain at least one logical 
variable. I shall make this requirement.
Given a formal system F and a set of wffs of F, we say y is immediately 
inferred from the set A of wffs just when there exists a primitive rule of
inference Rn of degree n and a finite sequence b j,..... . bn_i of elements of
such that Rn(bi..... t>n-l>y) holds or y is an axiom (thus an axiom is derivable
from any set of wffs). We say y is deducible from the hypotheses A if there 
exists a finite sequence c i,...,cn such that y = c n and such that every member 
of the sequence is either (i) an element of A or (ii) immediately inferred from 
a set of prior members of the sequence.
The finite sequence c i,....,cn itself is called a formal proof, formal deduction 
or derivation from the hypotheses . If A is empty then the sequence c i»—*>cn
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is called simply a formal deduction, formal derivation or formal proof in F, In 
this case y is said to be a provable wff or theorem of F. We write ' A Ff y' to 
show y is deducible from the hypotheses A, and 'Kp y' to show y is a theorem of 
F.
Example of a Formal System F 
F = <A,W,P,R>
A is the alphabet of F and A = V U C, where V is the set of logical variables of 
F and C is the set of logical constants of F. V and C are defined as follows:-
•a'e V
If x e V, so is x*.
Nothing else is a member of V 
C = 'b'
W is the set of wffs of F defined as follows:-
If x c V and y e V, then x^'b^y e W 
Nothing else is a member of W.
P is the set of axioms of F defined as follows:-
If x c  V, then x^'b^x e  P 
Nothing else is a member of P.
R is the set £ri,r2^ of primitive rules of inference of F defined for any wffs 
wl>w2»w3 of F as follows:-
ri(wi,W2) iff where x £ V and y e  V and given w  ^= x 'b' y; W2 = y^'b’^ x
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V2 (wj_,W2»W3) iff where x e V, y e V and z t V, given w  ^ = x ^  'b’ ^ y  
and W2 = y^'b'^z; then W3 = x^'b'^z.
Given the above definition of F, elementary formal proofs of F include the 
following.
a* b a" h p a" b a'
1. a’ b a" Hypothesis
2. a" b a' By ri
a' b a", a" b a'" h p a'" b a'
1. a' b a" Hypothesis
2. a" b a"' Hypothesis
3. a' b a'" By T2
4. a'" ba ' By ri
h p a b a
1. a b a  Axiom
We now turn to the definition of a formal semantics of a formal system.
A formal semantics for a formal system F is an ordered triple S = <T,I,v>. T is 
a set of truth-values and T > 2. At least one element of T shall be designated 
the model truth-value or the truth-value true. I is a non-empty set whose 
elements are interpretations and v is the valuation function in 5 which takes 
ordered pairs of the form <w,j>, where w is a wff of F and j an interpretation 
and gives an element of T as a value. An interpretation j is said to satisfy or 
be a model of a wff w just when v<w, j> = t, where t is a model truth-value. An 
interpretation j satisfies or is a model of a set A of wffs if, and only if j i3 a
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model of every element in A. A logically implies w if and only if every 
interpretation that is a model of A is also a model of w. Wffs wj and W2 are 
logically equivalent if, and only if there is no model of one that is not a model 
of the other. A wff is valid or logically valid if and only if every 
interpretation is a model of it. If A logically implies w, we write 'A^gw' and if 
w is valid, we write >w'. The logic L = <F,S> is sound if Fpw implies £gw, and
complete if ft gw implies i-pw. S is said to characterise F just when L is sound
and complete.
Example of a Formal Semantics 5 
F is as given in the previous example.
5 = <T,I,v>
T is the set of all interpretations. I is the set of all functions whose arguments 
are just the logical variables of F.
v is the valuation function, v is defined as follows:
Where x 'b' y is any wff of F (x and y being logical variables of F) and j e I:-
v <x^b'^y, j> = 1 iff j (x) = j(y) 
v <x/ ',b,/>y, j> = 0 iff j (x) = j(y)
The soundness of the logic L = <F,S> under the above semantics follows from 
the equivalence of identity (namely (x) x = x; (x)(y) x = y 3  y = x; (x)(y)(z) (x = y
6  y = z ) 3  x = z). To prove completeness it is required to prove Hg v O  Kp w
for all wffs w; or equivalently, - I- pw 3  - ("gw. Assume - 1- pw; then since all
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theorems of F are of the form x *b* x, then for some logical variables x and y, 
w = x 'b' y and x i  y. Let j be any interpretation where j(x) = j(y); then v <w,j> 
= 0 and hence - £ sw. The logic L = <F,S> is somewhat simpler, and less useful, 
than the logics recognised as the classical propositional and predicate calculi. 
The difference serves to remind us that the word 'logics' serves to define a 
great many formal structures of greater or lesser application.
It may be said that the formal definition of a logic given fails to distinguish 
between a formalised theory and a logic. An immediate reply is that are a 
number of pertinent differences between the two. A formalised theory 
consists of statements which make significant claims and are (at lease in some 
cases) true or false. A set of formulae of a logic is not a theory, but a set of 
meaningless strings. We may, of course, wish to stipulate that, for the 
purposes of a particular occasion, a given variable shall be given to have 
meaning: such variables are revealingly referred to as dummy variables. But 
dummy variables play a part in the use of a logic rather than in the logic 
itself. 'Every statement or its denial is true' makes an assertion: 'pv-p' does 
not. Logics make no assertions.
It may be charged that the definition of 'logic' supplied fails to discriminate 
set theory from logic. Again a fair reply is that set theory consists of 
assertions about sets whereas a logic consists of no assertions at all.
Set theory could be reconstructed so that it contained no assertions. The 
axioms of ZF would become uninterpreted first-order formulae. The trouble 
then becomes finding a semantics for characterising ZF; first-order semantics 
will not do since the axioms of ZF are not valid in first-order logic. Even if '« ' 
is treated as a logical constant, the results are still unsatisfactory. For let A 
and B be any two distinct sets, and let C be any domain in which the elements 
belonging to A and B are one and the same. Now assign C as the range of the 
variable 'z' in the formula 'A = B =  (z)(z t A ~  z t B)', and the Axiom of 
Extensionality comes out as false. Perhaps more complex contrivances are
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possible, but it is simpler and more natural to demarcate set theory from 
logic.
7.3 Applications of Logics: Readings
So far we have treated logics as purely formal structures open to investigation 
in the same way that other mathematical theories are in abstract algebra. It 
is of the greatest importance to distinguish those purely formal investigations 
of a logic as a mathematical structure from those investigations and questions 
which arise when a logic is used as a guide for reasoning.
The situation that has obtained in contemporary logics is similar, in many ways 
to the situation that obtains with Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. 
Mathematicians have come to separate pure geometry as a mathematical 
discipline from applied geometry as it is used in physics. Within mathematics 
there is no sense to the question as to which geometry is correct. All that is 
important from the mathematical point of view is that Euclidean geometry 
and non-Euclidean geometries are all self-consistent: all can be practised 
without allotting any meaning to the primitive expressions used. Questions of 
correctness only arise when the primitive expressions of each geometry are 
given some interpretation. For instance, if 'straight line' is interpreted to 
mean 'path described by a beam of light', then Riemannian geometry becomes 
a true description of the behaviour of beams of light in gravitational fields. 
Hence physicists talk of Riemannian geometry as being 'correct' (and of space 
as being Riemannian) only under the presumption that the expressions of 
Riemannian geometry are given the appropriate physicalistic interpretations: 
any attempt to judge the correctness of Riemannian geometry in vacuo is 
misguided. Consequently modern mathematics has long since outgrown the 
ancient definition of its status as the science of space and quantity.
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Modern logic has outgrown its ancient definition as the science of reasoning. 
The development of multitudinous systems of logic in place of Aristotelean 
syllogistic logic, and the divorce of logic, as formal discipline akin to 
mathematics, from philosophy, makes it apppropriate to develop the same 
attitude to logics as to mathematics. This attitude makes a clear separation 
between logics and their applications. Unlike mathematics, however, this 
distinction is not so universally rooted, or taken for granted, in the minds of 
those involved in logic, as it is in mathematics. Mathematical logicians 
understand well how an uninterpreted 'theory* gains an interpretation, and in 
model theory the nature of and relations between uninterpreted theories and 
their models are disseminated in depth. This area requires no development 
here. But the way in which a logic acquires an 'interpretation' and thereby 
ceases to be a more formal structure on which to perform symbolic gymnastics 
is nowhere near as well understood. Until a clear view of how a logic acquires 
an interpretation is gained, discussions of logics must necessarily lack the 
desired precision. A consequence of this lack of precision will be a loss of 
philosophical penetration about the relation of logics to natural language 
reasoning.
As an entry into the area of applications of logics, Heyting's Intuitionist Logic 
furnishes a useful illustration. As a formal system, Heyting's logic consists of 
11 axioms and a rule of modus ponens. The axioms are as follows; where A B, 
C are any wffs of Heyting's calculus:-
1. A D ( A & A )
2. (A & B )0(B  <5c A)
3. ( A 3 B ) 0 ( ( A & C ) 0 ( B & C ) )
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4. ((A 3B )<5c(B 3C ))o(A =>C )
5. B 3 (A o B )
6. (A 4 (A O B ))3 B
7. A o ( A v B )
8. (A v B) => (B v A)
9. ( (A 3 C )& (B d C ))d ((A v B)o C)
10. - A o ( Ad B)
11. ((Ad B ) & ( A O - B ) ) d - A  
MP. From A and A O  B, derive B.
Heyting's calculus was devised to incorporate just those canons of reasoning 
which intuitionists believed were validly employed in mathematics. For 
philosophical reasons to do with their views on infinite domains, intuitionists 
rejected the Law of the Excluded Middle and consequently 'pv-p' is not a 
theorem of Heyting’s calculus (nor is '—A O  A).
Heyting's calculus is a single identifiable formal structure created with a view 
to its application to mathematical reasoning. But this is not the only 
application which can be found for the calculus. Under another application, 
Heyting's calculus could be treated as a logic of verification and falsification 
as follows:-
It is verified that A 
It is falsified that A
It is verified that A or it is verified that B.
It is verified that A and it is verified that B.
If it is verified that A then it is verified that B.
The lack of 'A v - A' as a theorem, which seemed so radical previously, now 
seems eminently in accord with commonsense: it is not true to say, if any
A ......
-A .....
A v B 
A & B 
A O B
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statement A, that A is either verified or falsified, since patently there are 
many statements (e.g. Goldbach's Conjecture) which are neither. Similarly the 
lack o f - A D A' as a theorem is right too, since It does not follow from it 
being falsified that A is falsified, that A is therefore verified. The fact that 
Heyting devised his logic in response to the case for intuitionism in 
mathematics is, so as to speak, accidental to the logic he evolved. Heyting’s 
original application is just one application amongst many. To revert to the 
geometrical analogy used earlier; Euclidean geometry was originally evolved 
as a deductive set of assertions dealing with what the ancients reasonably 
supposed were the fundamental properties of space. But in its modern form, it 
is best viewed as an uninterpreted theory with a genealogy deriving from, and 
an application to, the nature of space.
There are two aspects to an application of a logic; or as a mathematician 
would say, an application A is an ordered pair <R,D> where R is a reading of a 
logic L and D is a depraved semantics for R.
A reading R is a quintuple <L,t,S,f,E>.
L is the logic of which the rest of R is a reading. The formal structure of a 
logic has already been defined in the previous section, so no comment is 
required here.
t is a bijective computable function called the transcription function. The 
domain of t is the set of W of wffs of L and the range of t is the set of S of 
sentence-frames of R. Typically a sentence-frame results from a wff W by 
the replacement of the logical constants in W by some fragment of a natural 
language which we shall call a depraved constant or natural language constant.
Example of a Transcription Function t
Let L be Heyting's calculus. Let R be the reading that interprets Heyting's 
calculus as a logic of verification and falsification, t is defined thus.
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For any atomic wff A
t(A) = 'It is verified that' - A
For any wffs B, C
t(-B) = 'It is falsified that' • t(B)
t(B => C) = ’If"t(B)-'thenQ(C)
t(B v C) = t(Bpor'*t(C)
t(B & C) = t(Bf'and'l(C)
The depraved constants are 'It is verified that', 'It is falsified that', 'If' 'then', 
'or' and 'and'.
f is a substitution function that assigns to each logical variable v of L a non­
empty substitution set of possible substitutions for v. For Heyting's calculus 
treated as a logic of verification and falsification: f would assign to the 
logical variables (sentence letters) of the calculus, in each case, the set of all 
declarative sentences of some natural language (e.g. English).
Finally E is the set of recognised sentences of R. A recognised sentence of R 
arises by the uniform substitution of each logical variable v in a sentence-
frame s, of an element of the set f(v). Every element of E shall be a sentence
fc£*>w-
and if every element of E is a declarative sentence ^fp/ R is a declarative 
reading. (Not all logics are designed for declarative readings e.g. erotetic and 
imperative logics).
A sentence-frame s is depravedly deducible from a set A of sentence frames, in 
a reading R <L,t,s,f,E> if, and only if A^.j Kj_ t’ -^(s) where A^.j is defined as 
follows:-
(x)(xe A f l S  (3y) yeA & t_1(y) = x)
A recognised sentence s* is depravedly deducible from a set A* of recognised 
sentences if, and only if there is some set A of sentence-frames, and some
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sentence-frame s, such that s is depravedly deducible from A; and s* and A* 
result from A and s by some uniform substitution of the logical variables in s 
and in the elements of A by possible substitutions.
When a sentence-frame s is depravedly deducible from a set A of sentence 
frames in R we write ’A &• r  s'._If s is such that F i_t‘ l(s) then s is a depraved 
theorem-frame of R and we write'¿-(rs'. A depraved theorem of R is any 
substitution-instance of a depraved theorem-frame.
An argument-frame is a pair <A,s> where A is a non-empty set of sentence- 
frames and s is a sentence-frame. <A,s> is a recognised argument-frame in R 
if and only if A £• r  s. An argument in R is a substitution-instance of an 
argument frame and a recognised argument is the substitution instance of a 
recognised argument frame.
Declarative readings are far more important than non-declarative readings; so 
in what follows, attention is given solely to declarative readings.
What is it that is to be reguired of a declarative reading? The most important 
reguirement of a declarative reading is that traditionally made of logic: that 
the patterns of inference laid down be reliable, in the sense that they never 
lead from a collection of truths to a falsehood. Call an argument <A*,s*> 
materially correct when it is not the case that:-
(1) (x)(x c A* 3  x is true).
(2) s* is false.
To demand that a reading R be fully reliable is to demand that every 
recognised argument in R is materially correct. Material correctness is a 
weak property for an argument to have, since, it is satisfied by all and only 
arguments whose premises materially imply their conclusions. However, we 
might expect that any useful logic which was fully reliable in our sense would 
also legislate for only valid arguments; i.e. arguments whose premises strictly
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imply their conclusions. A weak property, distributed over a very large 
number of cases, puts strong constraints on things as a whole.
Our definition of reliability in respect of readings can be defined equivalently 
thus:-
(S) If R is reliable then for any recognised argument frame <A,s> of R, every 
substitution-instance of <A,s> should be materially correct.
(S) suggests a natural complement.
(C) It is desirable that, if an argument-frame < A ,s> is such that every 
substitution-instance of <A,s> is true, that <A,s> be recognised by R.
In an unfarfetched way, (S) and (C) are suggestive of the formal soundness and 
completeness conditions of logic. The analogies will be explored in the next 
section.
7.4 Applications of Logics: Depraved Semantics
Logicians go to much trouble to provide formal systems with formal 
semantics, even though only professionals seem interested in the results. The 
secondary interest that formal semantics poses for those who use logic can be 
seen in the history of modern logic. Frege provided the modern apparatus of 
quantification in the Begriffschrift in 1879. Russell and Whitehead used and 
adopted form of Frege's 'conceptual notation' in Principia Mathematica circa 
1910. It was only in 1930, over half a century after Frege's innovation, that 
Godel offered the first completeness proof of first-order logic. The ability of 
logic to expand and establish itself, was not notably affected by the retarded 
development of formal semantics: a fact which must inevitably cast doubt on 
its relevance.
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Even today, with another half century or so separating us from Gó'del's work, 
the case for the philosophical relevance of formal semantics is still not fully 
established. Formal semantics, has not, for instance, helped significantly in 
the task of selecting the right (if any) modal logic. It is easy, given the formal 
ability, to show a modal logic is 'right' by concocting a formal semantics which 
characterises it. But no philosophical skeptic of modal logic is convinced by 
this sort of chicanery, since he knows that the correctness of a given formal 
semantics has to be itself justified by philosophical argument as much as the 
system it characterises.
A logician, if asked to justify the existence of formal semantics, will most 
probably reply that without formal semantics, formal soundness and 
completeness proofs are not possible. But what of it? Why are formal 
soundness and completeness proofs important anyhow? If pressed on this 
point, a logician is apt to reply that a soundness proof proves that everything 
that js a theorem, ought to be a theorem, and a completeness proof proves 
that everything that ought to be a theorem is one; so proving the identity of 
'is' and 'ought' of a logic. But what sense can be made of the prescriptive 
'ought' in this context? The expression 'ought to be a theorem' is not a 
standard expression in logic textbooks and it has no given analysis; yet it 
seems indispensable in the philosophical justification of the logicians' work. 
Applied to a formal structure like a logic it seems to have no purchase. 
'Ought' makes no sense as applied to logics in isolation, any more than such a 
teleological concept would as applied to atoms, cosmic rays, electricity or 
rocks. What for instance would we make of a pure mathematician who, having 
proved that a group was non-Abelian then said that is ought to be Abelian? 
'Ought' in this context assumes its proper perspective when a logic is put to 
use or given an application. Only in regard to what has purpose can we find 
fault or praise, and if we wish to justify the significance of soundness or 
completeness proofs in pure logic, we have to see it in the application for
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which that logic is designed. A useful place to begin is with a depraved 
interpretation.
A depraved interpretation (js of a reading R = <L,t,s,f,E> is a function that 
assigns to each variable v of L an element of the substitution-set f(v). (Js is
said to be a depraved model of a sentence-frame s just when the result of 
replacing each variable v in s by (ji(v) is a true sentence. We write '(j30 a  s ' to 
show that in application A, (jl is a depraved model of s. (|i is a depraved model 
of a set A of sentence-frames if is a depraved model of every element of A. 
A set A of sentence-frames depravedly imples a sentence-frame s just when 
every depraved model of A is a depraved model of s; or 'Ai?A 3 '• A sentence- 
frame s is depravedly valid in A if every depraved interpretation (£ is a 
depraved model of s or 'i“ A s '•
Having to hand the concepts of a depraved theorem-frame and depraved 
validity, it is natural to go on to define depraved soundness and depraved 
completeness. An application A is depravedly sound, where A = <R,D>, if 
where any sentence-frame s is a depraved theorem in R, s is depravedly valid 
in A. A is depravedly complete if, where s is any depravedly valid sentence- 
frame, s is a depraved theorem of R.
i.e. A is depravedly sound iff 33 0  A s
A is depravedly complete iff s ^ g . a  3
where A = <R,D> and s is any sentence-frame in R.
Depraved soundness and depraved completeness subsume, to a great extent, 
the philosophical purpose of conditions (S) and (C) of the previous section. It is 
not hard to see that depraved soundness (especially) and depraved 
completeness are two very desirable properties of any application of a logic. 
Therein lies the only possible point of any formal soundness and completeness 
proof. The only philosophical point to formal soundness and completeness
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proofs lie in their contribution to proofs of depraved soundness and 
completeness.
Having made this statement we are still not clear of the woods, for it is not 
clear what exactly the relations between formal soundness and completeness 
proofs and their depraved counterparts are. A formal soundness/completeness 
proof is not a depraved soundness/completeness proof. What has to be added 
to a proof of formal soundness/completeness before it becomes a proof of 
depraved soundness/completeness? The answer is: a depraved semantics.
A depraved semantics is essentially a means of establishing a connection 
between a formal interpretation and a depraved interpretation. More formally 
a depraved semantics D is an ordered triple <I,J,h> where I is the set of formal 
interpretations of a logic L, in an application A, J is the set of depraved 
interpretations in A, and h is a function from J into I. The role of h is to 
demonstrate that the elements of I simulate, in all important respects, the 
elements of J; for this reason I call h the simulation function in A.
Let A = <R,D> be any application where R = <L,t,S,f,E> and J3= <I,J,h>. Let 
be any depraved interpretation (member of J) and s any sentence-frame 
(member of S). It is provable that:-
If L is sound and h(( )^ hLt'^s) implies 
If L is complete, h is onto, and a  s 
depravedly complete.
s ; then A is depravedly sound, 
implies h(CE) ^i_t"^-(s); then A is
These two theorems establish a vital connection between the formal and 
applied sides of logic and are worthy of proof.
Theorem 1 If L is sound and 
depravedly sound.
h(|5) Kf^s) implies A s ; then A is
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Proof: Assume L is sound and h(<jo|= i_t- l(s) implies s . Assume
£r ^ s; then h|_t“l(s) and, since L is sound, b|_t- l(s). Let (ji be any 
depraved interpretation, h((j3)^  i_t"l(s) implies (jr£? a  s and since 
then hCol^t "^(s) and so (js^A s f° r anY Therefore^A s •
Theorem 2 If L is complete, h is onto, and (|s^ \ s implies h((js) l|_t" (^s); then 
A is depravedly complete.
Proof: Assume L is complete, h is onto, and s implies h ^ ) H_t-l(s).
• A
Assume s . Let | be any formal interpretation. Since h is onto, then 
for some depraved interpretation (J^ , h((j5) = j .  (jifefts implies h(C^ ) 
t “ l(s), and since s then (js s and so hCtjs) f^f^Cs) i.e. jj ^i_fl(s) 
for all j). Therefore H[_t“^(s). Since L is complete, l-|_t“l(s) ar>d so s •
Where A satisfies the antecedent of theorem 1, h is said to simulate the 
depraved soundness of A. Where A satisfies the antecedent of theorem 2, h is 
said to simulate the depraved completeness of A. If both these conditions 
hold, then h is said to be a good simulator in A. Demonstrating that h is agood 
simulator and hence that an application is depravedly sound and complete will 
take us into the very heart of applied logic: the point where logic, philosophy, 
and ontology meet.
7.5 Monism, Pluralism, Instrumentalism
The previous section completes our analysis of the formal structure of logics 
and their applications. In this section, the emphasis' will be less on the formal 
aspects of logics and more on the philosophical aspects. Nevertheless the 
clarity of perspective gained in our formal investigations will be invaluable In 
later stages.
Haack [60] (221), in her section on the metaphysical and epistemological 
aspects of logic, distinguishes between three metaphysical attitudes to logics.
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Monism: there is just one correct system of logic. 
Pluralism: there is more than one correct system of logic.
Instrumentalism: there is no 'correct' logic; the notion of
correctness is inappropriate.
If a logic is identified as a formal structure in the manner of this chapter, then 
there is no doubt that the instrumentalist is right in saying that there is no 
'correct' logic; since a logic is only a set of rules for manipulating meaningless 
signs. But Haack's trichotomy can be restored to life if we replace 'system of 
logic' and 'logic' by 'application' in the above. The problem then remains in 
seeing what 'correct' could mean in this context.
If 'correct' means 'depravedly sound and complete' then the pluralist is in the 
right. There is no question but that there are many applications of different 
logics which are depravedly sound and complete. In these terms the context is 
decided immediately. Let us see if there is a more interesting sense to 
'correct'.
Another interpretation of Haack's 'correct', which is, perhaps, closer to her 
intentions (and brings the debate closer to our own interests) is that to say an 
application of a logic is 'correct' is to say that it is suitable for reasoning in 
general. The concept of suitability for general reasoning can be conveniently 
exchanged for the idea that this concept is manifested by an application just 
when that application Is suitable to the task of formalising the language of 
science. Derivatively, a logic is correct when it has an application of this 
sort. In this roundabout manner, Haack's original distinctions begin to make 
sense.
Instrumentalism is one casualty of this line of definition. There are logics 
which, in virtue of their own structural limitations, are simply not rich enough 
to provide the basis for 'correct' applications. A case in point is the 
elementary logic of 7.2 which was designed specifically for reasoning about
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identity. This logic was far too simple a formal structure to use in 
formalisation. Just as there are mathematical structures which are too 
limited in detail for research into them to be interesting or for them to have 
useful physical applications, so there are logics which are too far removed 
from the syntactical structures of Indo-European languages for them to 
subsume the job of reasoning in those languages. These more primitive logics 
may, like the propositional calculus, find a use in regard to limited areas of 
thought; but they will never be serious candidates for formalising all precise 
thought.
This leaves monism and pluralism; and both positions have their attractions. 
The rest of this section will be concerned with the case for pluralism 
developed from the issues of 6.2.
The immediate difficulty about the Davidson - Clark dispute was that both 
their arguments were valid, but there were no obvious superordinate principles 
to check the truth of their assumptions. We can either follow Davidson in 
keeping our logic first-order (and include events) or follow Clark in making our 
logic more complicated (and exclude events): but how to choose!
The pluralist is ready to move into the vacuum created by those philosophical 
uncertainties. First, he roundly asserts that there are no principles by which 
contests of the sort between Davidson and Clark can be decided. The trouble 
with this kind of dispute, the pluralist continues, is that there are two 
disagreements being conducted simultaneously: (a) a disagreement about 
logic, (b) a disagreement about ontology. The resolution of either of these 
disagreements depends on how the other is resolved. The situation is 
analogous to that of a linear eguation with two unknowns: there is no unique 
pair of solutions to be found; but any given solution will help determine the 
other. The pluralist insists that a choice of logic is conditional on a choice of 
ontology and science. Thus given an ontology containing events and 
recognising the truth of some adverbial sentence, it is rational to prefer first-
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order logic as the basis for formalisation. On the other hand, assuming there 
are no events, but still recognising the truth of some adverbial sentences, it is 
rational to prefer a predicate-modifier logic. But there is no reason to prefer 
one logic to another in vacuo.
The pluralist has the makings of a very strong case: but his reasoning would 
still be beside the point if the pluralist accepted that every kind K existed or 
it did not exist, and every declarative sentence was either true or false. Let 
us call the former position ontological objectivism. If ontological objectivism 
is true, then either events exist or they do not. Assume they do: then 
Davidson is right (if events exist, why not quantify over them?). Assume they 
do not: then Clark is right (if events do not exist, we need to use a logic which 
avoids them).
But the pluralist does not have to accept ontological objectivism. He can 
assert that not only do answers to ontological questions are hard to capture, 
but that answers do not exist to be discovered even in principle. The position 
that the pluralist is adopting towards logico-ontological questions is akin to 
that of the quantum physicist, who, when confronted with the impossibility of 
simultaneously determining the position and momentum of an electron, prefers 
to argue that determinate twin values for these variables just don't obtain, 
rather than that they do obtain but are experimentally undiscoverable.
There is a good deal of theoretical support for the pluralist's attack on 
ontological objectivism to be found in the preceding chapter: particularly in 
respect of ontological elasticity. One consequence of ontological elasticity is 
that there may be some radical indeterminacy as regards the objects counted 
to exist. It is possible for the universe to accommodate conflicting ontologies, 
each inconsistent with each other, but each internally self-consistent. 
Ontological elasticity demands that we interpret this rivalry seriously as 
revealing ontological gaps in the universe, where conflicts break out.
The pluralists position thus has far-reaching consequences that overflow the 
boundaries of the original dispute as to whether there is one 'correct' logic or
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many. The pluralist sees logical, ontological and even scientific decisions as 
all interrelated, each affecting the other in that, e.g., a choice of ontology, if 
rigidly adhered to, may force logical and scientific réévaluations. The 
particular complex of a choice of logic, ontology and science, may fail to be 
free from internal conflict. It may be impossible to accept first-order logic, 
an event-free ontology and the truth of certain adverbial sentences: but it is 
not determined which element has to be revised in order to bring harmony. 
The pluralist suggests that a better conception of ontology subsumes that 
subject under a wider conception: that of comparing world-pictures. A world 
picture is determined by a choice of logic, science and ontology. Fruitful and 
resolvable disagreement about any element of a world-picture between any 
two respondents who agree on two elements of a world-picture. External 
disagreement takes place between respondents who disagree on more than one 
element of a world-picture and hence have no common ground on which to 
argue. External disagreements are unsolvable pseudo-arguments. Buttressed 
and developed in this way, the pluralist cannot be easily put down. 
Nevertheless if the pluralist cannot be crushed, he may yet be evaded. It has 
to be seen what arguments can be put up by the monist to defend his own 
cause.
7.6 The Case for Monism
It has been taken as gospel so far, that extended logics do offer alternative 
means for formalisation, with concomitant ontological savings to compensate 
for their added symbolism. The pluralist built his case with this much taken 
for granted. But there are reasons why the monist might wish to deny the 
pluralist free use of this assumption.
Closer study of many extended logics reveals something both faintly surprising 
and disturbing about extended logics. Though extended logics are put forward
as superior alternatives to classical (first-order) logic, examination of them 
reveals that their formal semantics are often expressed in a first-order 
fashion. A sort of strange implicit contradiction is to be found in these 
extended logics, for while their promotors often pretend that one of these 
logics should supercede classical logic; it is classical logic that they turn to in 
the course of giving a formal semantics to their logics.
Modal logic is the clearest example of an extended logic with this sort of 
background. Modal logics are generally explained by recourse to possible 
world semantics. A formula of the form O p is said to be true if, and ony if p 
is true in all possible worlds and Op is true if, and only if p is true in some 
possible world. Realists in regard to possible worlds and construe the 
reference to 'possible worlds' straightforwardly: possible worlds exist and 
everything that is possible occurs in at least one of them.
Realism in regard to possible worlds and their use to provide semantics for 
modal operators forces a recognition of the superfluity of modal operators 
except as a notational shorthand. Chellas [25] (13) in his book on modal 
propositional logics observes that the formulae of S5 can be effectively 
mapped into a first-order logic in which modal operators are eliminated in 
favour of first-order formulae and quantifiers ranging over possible worlds. 
Given a commitment to realist possible world semantics, it is ontologically 
more honest to register this commitment by employing first-order notation 
and quantifying over possible worlds, than by hiding this commitment behind 
modal operators which are explained, eventually, by employing the same first- 
order notation and making the same commitments.
The same criticisms apply to Clark's sponsorship of predicate modifier logic. 
Although Clark is wary of including events in his ontology, he is ontologically 
prodigal in equipping his predicate modifier logic with a semantics that 
includes entities called 'states of affairs' amongst its ontology. This same 
semantics appears recognisably first-order in appearance. Therefore, on
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Clark's own showing, whatever good can be derived from predicate modifer 
logic can be derived from first-order logic employing quantification over 
states of affairs.
The monist has a stick to belabour the pluralist in all this. Extended logics, so 
the line goes, offer no ontological savings after all, only ontological 
camouflage. We can camouflage our commitment to possible worlds or states 
of affairs by extending first-order logic to include modal operators or 
predicate operators; but we regain those same commitments in providing these 
trendy logics with semantics. The ontological dilemmas which the pluralist 
sees as revolving on a choice of logics, are in the end sham. There is no real 
alternative to first-order logic on display.
There is a counter to this attack, as there often is to general philosophical 
arguments. Although it is possible to interpret the references to possible 
worlds, in possible world semantics, as references to the elements o f a 
Leibnitzean ontology, it is not necessary to do so. The modal logician can 
insist that any structure that satisfies his description of the domain of possible 
worlds can be used to foot the ontological bill. Moreover as long as the modal 
logician retains his grip on first-order notation then he has a very powerful 
ally: the completeness theorem for first-order logic. This theorem assures us 
that any consistent first-order theory has a model. The modal logician can 
thus follow up his protestations of ontological innocence by bullishly insisting 
that since his frolic with symbols was at least a consistent frolic, then the 
completeness theorem underwrites all ontological debts.
This is an ingenious counter which goes a good distance to clearing possible 
world semantics of ontological doubt: but it does so at an extremely high 
price. What has been lost in throwing overboard all ontological inclinations 
towards possible entities, is also the very raison d’etre of formal semantics. 
We may have good reason to doubt the realist's ontology of possible worlds and 
their possible contents, but at least we can see how, if we accept his
Leibnitzean vision, where this all comes into reasoning involving modal logic. 
But if we reject the philosophical story that accompanies the symbol-pushing, 
what remains may be formally impeccable, but it is philosophically with 
purpose: rather like an engine robbed of its flywheel.
To see this clearly it is necessary to relate the picture built up of logics in the 
previous sections to a specific example. For our purposes Kripke's semantics 
for the logic S5 will do. Kripke [75] [76] is amongst these logicians who are 
most free in their use of the dialect of possible worlds. But unlike Lewis [83] 
or Plantings [98], Kripke is careful to disown any ontological commitment to 
possible worlds. Whether Kripke's remarks about rigid designators can be 
made sense of without such an ontology remains an open question. But that 
question is not the relevant one here. The relevant question is this. Can 
Kripke's semantics for modal logic (e.g. S5) justify the employment of S5 as a 
basis for modal reasoning without presupposing the existence of possible 
worlds?
This question can be formally sharpened. Suppose we determine a reading R 
for S5 in which 'O' is mapped to the depraved constant 'It is necessary that ...' 
and the other constants their usual readings (we will be more precise later). 
Does Kripke's semantics for S5 show anything about whether R is depravedly 
sound and/or complete? If the answer is no, then Kripke's semantics is 
philosophically useless. If the answer is yes, then some bridge is required 
between Kripke's formal semantics and the informal reading given to the 
formulae of S 5. Such a bridge was found to be a depraved semantics. 
Therefore, even if an ontological commitment to possible worlds is not 
admitted in Kripke's semantics, it may still be that within the depraved 
semantics that gives the formal semantics purpose, a Leibnitzean ontology 
may lie concealed. Only by close examination of the formal structures 
involved, can it be seen how matters stand.
S5 is given by the axiom set AO - A4.
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AO Truth-functional tautologies using'3* and/or 
A l. O ADA
A2. 0 ( A 3 B ) 3 ( 0 A D 0 B )
A3. O A D O O A  
A4. ^  A D O O A
and the rules R1 and R2
R l. h A D O  A 
R2. A ,A 3 B -» B
In Kripke's semantics for S5 a model structure <G,K,R> is an ordered triple 
where G e K and R is an equivalence relation on K. (Informally G is supposed 
to represent the actual world; K the set of possible worlds; and R is the 
relation of relative possibility on K. We shall self-conciously try to forget this 
informal picture for a moment). A Kripke interpretation is a 2-place function 
<t> whose arguments are of the form <A,H> where A is a wff of S5 and H tK  and 
whose range is the set{T,F] where T is the model truth-value. For any Kripke 
interpretation $ , $ is defined for all atomic formulae and all possible worlds. 
In other cases 4 is defined by induction.
4(- A, H) = T  iff <KA,H) = F
4>(ADB, H) = T  iff 4(A,H) = F o r  4(B,H) = T
<KOA, H) = T iff for some H' where RH’H, 4(A,H') = T
4(0 A, H) = T iff for any H’, if RH’H then 4(A,H') = T
A formula A is valid if, and only if 4(A, G) = T for all Kripke interpretations 
4. We write 4*A' to show A is valid. Kripke [77] has proved that H 55A iff |*A. 
In the reading R = <S5, t, S, f, F>, t is defined thus:-
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t(A) = A for all atomic sentences A. 
t(AOB) = t(A)~'materially implies'^t(B) 
t(-A) = 'It is not the case that' t(A) 
t($A) = 'It is possible that' t(A)
A
t(OA) = 'It is necessary that' t(A)
S is the set of resultant sentence frames and f is a function assigning to each 
sentence-letter in S5 the set of declarative English sentences. E is the 
resultant set of recognised sentences.
To prove the depraved soundness or the depraved completeness of R, a 
depraved semantics <I,J,h> is required, where h is a good simulator. For our 
modest purposes, to demonstrate soundness is sufficient. We shall look at two 
depraved semantics. The first is ontologically free of a commitment to 
possible worlds, but turns out to be inadequate to guarantee the depraved 
soundness of R. The second is ontologically committed to possible worlds and 
is sufficient to give a guarantee of depraved soundness.
The First Depraved Semantics: is an ordered triple <I,J,h> where I is the set 
all Kripke interpretations and J is the set of all depraved interpretations, 
where a depraved interpretation (ji is a function that assigns to each sentence 
letter A of S5, a declarative English sentence (member of f(A))„ h is an into 
function from J into I.
This completes our description of the minimal apparatus of our first depraved 
semantics. In order to attempt a depraved soundness proof, it is required to 
introduce some auxiliary assumptions. The first is as follows.
Assumption One: that there is some function i from 3 into I, such that where 
ct e J and A is any atomic wff of S5, GfeA iff i(G) t*A.
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Assumption one says that for any assignment of declarative sentences to the 
sentence letters of S5, given some sentence-letters will be represented as 
truths, there will be a Kripke interpretation that assigns the value T to just 
those sentence letters in question. Let us define h to be a function with the 
properties of i.
Two more assumptions are needed.
Assumption Two; that for any ^ e J, and for any wff A of S5, 
case that'^t(A) iff- (ji £ t(A).
Assumption two says that the result of placing a declarative sentence after 'It 
is not the case that', is true if, and only if the declarative sentence itself is 
not true.
%*lt is not the
Assumption Three; that for any (js e J, and for any wffs B and C of S5, 
(j; £=• t(B) - '‘materially implies that t(C) iff - &■ t(B) or fe t(C)
Assumption three states that any sentence materially implies another just 
when the first is not true or the second is.
To try to prove depraved soundness we proceed by induction on the number n 
of natural language constants in any sentence frame t(A), to prove (ji t(A) iff 
h (G)|= A for all cjs e J.
n = 0: 
for any
then A is an atomic sentence and so t(A) = A. By the definition of h,
£>A iff h(G)% A and so
Assume t(M) iff h((p) j® M for any sentence frame M with any number j, j < 
n, natural language constants: then t(A) is either of the form (0 It is not the 
case that t(B) (ii) t(B) materially implies t(C) (iii) It is necessary thatt(B)(iv) It 
is possible that t(B)
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We have the following series of equivalences:-
((¡fetCA) iff h(iJi)H A,' 
is equivalent to 
(^ t (A ) iff h(c|) <A,G> = T, 
is equivalent to,
(jigfe'It is not the case that' t(B) iff hCcjl) <-B,G> = T, 
is equivalent to,
£&'It is not the case that^t(B) iff h((js) <B,G> = F.
By assumption two, (|3§-'It is not the case that' t(B) iff - (Js&t(B). Hence the 
formula, '(jlfe'lt is not the case that' t(B) iff h(G) <B,G> = F' is equivalent to:-
-  (ji&t(B) iff h((ji) <B,G> = F; 
which is equivalent to 
cfi&tCB) Iff hCcf) <B,G> T, 
which is equivalent to 
(fl%t(B) iff h(cj) ^ B;
Case 1 t(A) = 'It is not the case that' t(B)
Where B has n - 1 natural language constants. This last formula is true by the 
inductive hypothesis, and so G£ t(A) iff h(G)^ * A is established for case 1.
r\ r\
Case 2 t(A) = t(B) 'materially implies that' t(C)
We have the following series of equivalences:-
(|;&t(A) iff h((j;)^ A 
is equivalent to
I O
ffig*t(B) 'materially implies that' t(C) iff h(G) (BoC,G) = T
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is equivalent to
(j3£»t(B) 'materially implies that' t(C) iff (h((fe)<B,G> = F or h(d)(C,G) = T)
By assumption three, the last formula is equivalent to:-
(-(Jàfet(B) or (jìÉrt(C)) iff (h((j3) <B,G> = F or h (£) <C,G> = T)
To prove the above formula it is sufficient to prove -  (jjfetCB) iff h((j3)<B,G> = F 
and (^&t(C) iff h(C )^<C,G> = T.
- ^ t ( B )  iff h((f)<B,G> = F
is equivalent to 
fi&tCB) iff h(cfc)<B,G> T 
is equivalent to
<£frt(B) iff h(cf)[=B
where B has n - 1 natural language constants. This last formula is true by the 
inductive hypothesis. Similarly C has n - 1 natural language constants and so
<|3£t(C) iff h(G)<C,G> = T 
is equivalent to
And here the proof stops. Quite simply, the depraved semantics suggested is 
not ontologically or structurally rich enough to provide a depraved soundness 
proof. Cases 3 and A involving the modal constants cannot be established. 
Thus without invoking a depraved semantics richer than the one suggested
which is true. Consequently ffife-t(A) iff KG)!2 A is established for case 2.
here; it is only possible to validate that part of S5 which it shares In common
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with the classical propositional calculus. However, as we shall see, by 
invoking a Leibnitzean ontology of which Kripke's model structure is a 
representation, cases 3 and 4 can be completed.
The Second Depraved Semantics; is explicitly committed to a Leibnitzean 
ontology of possible worlds. There is a domain W of possible worlds in which oc 
t W and is the actual world. There is an equivalence relation P on W of 
relative possibility where P<p,oO iff f  is possible relative to«^ Kripke's model 
structure <G,K,R> is thought of as representative of the structure of W in the 
following sense. There is an isomorphism i from W onto K such that i(o<) = G 
and P(p,<x) iff R(i(p),i(*))
To this ontological picture has to be added a number of ancillary assumptions. 
The first is that, given there are a number of possible worlds, a depraved 
interpretation can be a model of a sentence-frame in one world and not in 
another. To say ^ is a depraved model of t(A) is to say that in the actual 
world (i.e.o<), 5^ is a depraved model of t(A).
Assumption One: (^fet(A) iff (j5&-t(A) in o<. •
The next two assumptions relate to the depraved constants 'It is not the case 
that' and 'materially implies that'. These assumptions apply assumptions two 
and three of the previous depraved semantics to an possible worlds.
Assumption Two: for any possible world P,( f^e»'It is not the case that' t(A) in P 
iff - c|sfet(A) in p .
Assumption Three: for any possible world p , (js & t(B) 'materially implies 
that' t(C) in p, iff - (js §• t(B) in p or (j; fc t(C) in p .
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Case 1: t(A) = 'It is not the case that' t®.
Cg=t(A) in/Siff h(j3)<Afi^)> = T 
is equivalent to
Gfr'It is not the case that' t®  in p iff h((j3)<-B, i(^> = T 
is equivalent to
(j^ 'It is not the case that' t®  in P iff h(C5)<B, i(ja)> * F
By assumption two, this last formula is equivalent to:-
-((J; t®  in p iff h(( )^<B, i®> = F
is equivalent to 
j; t®  in p iff h(cjî)<B, i(p)> = T
where has n - 1 depraved constants. This last formula is true by the 
inductive hypothesis, so the hypothesis is established for case (i).
Case 2 t(A) = t(B) 'materially implies that' t(C)
(jsfertCA) in p iff h(|3)<A, i(p)> =T 
is equivalent to
(|3£=t® 'materially implies that' t(C) in P iff hojiXBDC, i(p)> = T 
is equivalent to
^  tOa)- 'materially implies th a t^ tO  in p iff h«Jo<B, i (p)> = F 
or hOjsXC, i(p)> = T
By assumption two this last formula is equivalent to:-
C-«ifr.t(B) in p) or (3fct(C) in y8) iff h(| )^<B,iC )^> = F or h(<3XC,l(p)> = T
To prove this formula it is sufficient to prove - (Ufet(B) in p>) iff h((jo <B,i^ ff)> 
= F and (tfrt(C) in p> iff h(Ci) <C,i(£)> = T.
First -(ij* ^  t(B) in p  ) iff h((js)<B,i( p)> = F is equivalent to (ji£t(B) in fi iff 
<B,i( p)> = T which is true by the inductive hypothesis since B has n - 1 
depraved constants. (Ji t(C) in £  iff h((js)<C,i( ^ )> = T also holds by the 
inductive hypothesis, since C has n - 1 depraved constants.
Thus the hypothesis is established for case 2.
Case 3 t(A) = 'It is possible that' t(B) 
t(A) in iff h(( )^<A, i(/3)> = T 
is equivalent to
'It is possible that' t(B) in iff h(js)<OB, i(/3)> = T 
is equivalent to
'It is possible that' t(B) in ß  iff for some H, R(H, i(y3)) &
h((b)<B,H> = T
To prove the formula immediately above it is required to prove (i) If 'It is
possible that' t(B) in then for some H, R(H,i(p)) & h((!)<B,H> = T and (ii)
If for some H, R(H,i(^)) & h(<|2)<B,H> = T then (ja£'It is possible that' t(B) in 
/
P-
Assume for some H, R(H,i( ^  )) & h((J^)<B,H> = T. Then by the inductive 
hypothesis applied to t(B), (jl^tCB) in i"l(H) and by the definition of i, P(i“l(H), £ ).
Thus by assumption four, (^§^'It is possible that ' t(B) in ft.
This proves the hypothesis for case 3.
Case 4 t(A) = 'It is necessary that' t(B) 
t(A) in ft iff h(j;)<A,i(£)> = T 
is equivalent to
'It is necessary that' t(B) in p  iff h(G)<OB, i(/J)> = T 
is equivalent to
'It is necessary that' t(B) in ^  iff for any H, if R(H,i( )) then
h(G)<B,H> = T
To prove the formula immediately above it is necessary to prove (i) that 
ifB%>'It is necessary that' t(B) in then for any H, if R(H,i( f t  )) then 
h(G)<B,H> = T (ii) if R for any H, if R(H,i(£)) then h(G)<B,H> = T then Gfe'It 
is necessary that' t(B) in p .
Assume G 'It is necessary that' t(B) in £  . Assume for some given H, 
R(H,i(j3)). By the definition of i, P(i_l(H), ). By assumption five, since P(i"
y  'It is necessary that'^t(B) in , then ^6t(B) in i“l(H), Since 
t(B) has n - 1 constants, by the inductive hypothesis applied to t(B), since 
$fcrt(B) in i-iflH), then h((f)<B,H> = T.
Assume for any H, If R(H,i(p)) then h(G)<B,H> = T. Assume for some given y, 
P()r,^I. By the definition of i RO(J'), i(/3)) and so h(G)<B,i(jr)> = T. By the 
inductive hypothesis applied to t(B), §** t(B) in ¿T. Hence if P(>", £ )
then fe*“ t(B) in / .  By assumption 5, ^fr'It is necessary that'^tiB) in ^ .
This proves the hypothesis for case 4 and for all cases.
Granted £ & t(A ) in ^  iff h(G)<A,i( f>)> = T for all f >, then $fet(A) in «X iff 
h(G)<A,0> = T and, by assumption one, this is equivalent to l|r&t(A) iff h(G)J=A. 
Since S5 is formally sound by Kripke's semantics for S5, then by theorem 1 of 
6.3.1, the reading R is depravedly sound.
What philosophical conclusions are to be drawn from the preceding proof? In 
essence, that the elements of Kripke's model structure <G,K,R> have been 
thought of as isomorphic to, or standing for, elements of some sort of ontology 
with relevance to modal reasoning. If assumptions like this are not made, then 
a proof of depraved soundness reaches no further than the classical 
propositional calculus. Ontological decisions are deferred, rather than
eliminated, in steadfastly refusing to consider what significance the signs 
have, that are used in formal soundness and completeness proofs. In a proof of 
depraved soundness and completeness, those same decisions are forced back 
upon us.
Modal logic is perhaps the most thoroughly known and best researched of all 
branches of extended logic; but the same principles emerge in other extended 
logics. For example, it was remarked in the previous chapter that tense logic 
might be preferred, on ontological grounds, to first-order logic plus 
quantification over moments of time. McArthur [90] in his lucid work on tense 
logics provides the syntax and the formal semantics for a wide variety of tense 
logics. The formal semantics of these logics are based on the idea of indexed 
sets which are maximally consistent, called historical moments. Inspection of 
the semantics for tense logics invites the idea that these historical moments 
are formal proxies for temporal moments in time in the most real sense. It is 
difficult to see how the formal semantics could give any assurance to tense 
logics unless that were so. Therefore to bridge the gap between formal and 
depraved soundness/completeness for tense logics, some commitment to 
instants of time seems needed.
So the monist's defence is a powerful oner essentially a defence of first-order 
notation against its rivals, The defence is that where extended logics have 
been invoked, their formal semantics reveals, either directly (as with the 
realist interpretation of possible world semantics) or indirectly (as with 
Kripke's treatment of possible world semantics), that their useful purpose 
could be subsumed by first-order quantification over the elements 
ontologically presupposed in the formal semantics.
On balance, it seems fair to award the contest to the monist rather than the 
pluralist. But to draw this conclusion is not to adopt a neo-Kantian 
complacency that no improvement on first-order logic is possible. The 
conclusions of the monist's defence were, after all, based on an inductive
3 2 5
inspection of certain researched extended logics. No apriori reason was 
offered to show that any conceivable extended logic had to fall prey to the 
monist's attack. Monism, is, simply speaking, the best bet as matters
currently stand in logic; but this is not to say it cannot be overthrown. In 
logic, as in ontology and science, hypothesis must substitute for certainty.
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